KARTHIHASU AMBALAWANAR et al. v. SUBRAMANIAR KATHIRAVELU et al

004-NLR-NLR-V-27-KARTHIHASU-AMBALAWANAR-et-al.-v.-SUBRAMANIAR-KATHIRAVELU-et-al.pdf


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Present: Bertram C.J. and Jayewardene A.J.
KARTHIGASU AMBALAWANAR el al. v. SUBRAMA-NIAR KATHIRAVELU et al.
30—D. C. Jaffna, 16,481.
Hindu religious trust—Right of de facto trustee to obtain possession oftemporalities—Personality of religious foundations^-Disputesbetween persons vested with legal title to endowments—Vestingorder—Trusts Ordinance, ss. 101, 102, and 112,
The de facto trustee of a Hindu temple is not entitled as such toobtan possession of its temporalities.
Our law does not recognize the personality of religious foundations.
When a person transfers property to a temple, the effect of hisdoing so is to constitute himself a trustee for the purpose of religiousworship to be carried on at the templeT The document of dedicationamounts to a declaration of trust and the dominium vests with thededicator and passes on his death to his heirs subject to the trust.
The provision in section 101 of the Trusts Ordinance whichreserves the right of a trustee to apply to the Court for directionsregulating the administration of the trust or succession to thetrusteeship applies to religious trusts as well.
Where two families descending from a common origin had a jointinterest in a Hindu temple and had participated in its manage-ment for some fifty years, by reason of the fact that each had beenvested with title to a share of the endowment; and where disputeshad arisen between them regarding the management of the templeand the endowments,
Held, that the appropriate remedy for the settlement of theaffairs of the temple would be a vesting order under section 112 ofthe Trusts Ordinance, enumerating the temple properties in chargeof the two groups and vesting the respective sets of property intrustees representing the respective groups.
The order should give directions regarding the devolution oftrusteeship, and it should be registered in accordance with sub-section (3) of the section.
A
PPEAL from a judgment of the District Judge of Jaffna. Theaction was brought by the plaintiffs, as joint-managers and
trustees of a Hindu temple, claiming a declaration of title that thetwelve lands scheduled in the plaint are the property of the temple,a nd an order that the defendants should be ej ected therefrom. It wasproved that the temple had been originally built on land belongingto one Kathimayake Mudaliyar, who left two sons, named Ulaga-n.ather and Vinayagar. The present contestants are the descendantsof these two persons. The evidence further disclosed that these twolines of the descendants of Kathimayake had for very many years
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KarthigasuAmbala-wanar v.SubramaniarKathiravelu
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taken an active interest in the temple and its endowments as shownby a series of deeds ; in the case of the plaintiffs from 1873 to 1901,and in the case of the defendants from 1870 to 1905. It alsoappeared that as a result of some friction between the two branchesof the family, a trust deed had been drawn by the defendants’ branchin 1905 to consolidate their position with regard to the managementof the endowments. This was followed in 1916 by a similar deed ofappointment and trust on the plaintiffs* line, by which the first andsecond plaintiffs were appointed managers and trustees ofthe temple.
It was also established that the properties set out in the scheduleto the plaint had been in the exclusive and undisturbed possessionof the defendants’ branch of the family for twenty-five years ; andthat out of the revenues of these lands they had contributed a shareof the funds necessary for the support of the poojaks of the temple.
The learned District Judge having found that the first and secondplaintiffs were the ‘de facto managers of the temple entered a decree, declaring the lands in the schedule to be the property of the temple,,and directing the defendants to be ejected therefrom and theplaintiffs be put and quieted in possession.
Drieberg, K.C* (with him Joseph), for defendants, appellants.
Elliot, K.C. (with him Balasingham), for plaintiffs, respondents.
November 12, 1924. Bertram C.J.—
This is a case relating to a temple in the Jaffna District dedicatedto the worship of a Hindu deity, Subramaniam. It raises importantquestions of law relating to the management of temples and the titleto their endowments. The action was brought by the plaintiffs,who claim to be joint-managers and trustees of the temple. Theydemanded a declaration that twelve lands scheduled to the plaintwere the property of the temple, and an order that the defendantsshould be ejected therefrom.
From the evidence given on both sides, the history of this templeand its endowments may be summarized as follows :—It is impossibleto say when it was originally built^but it is referred to as being inexistence as early as 1870 (see P 4). It is situated on lands registeredin the thomboo as belonging to an ancestor of both parties who may* be identified by the name of Kathirnayake Mudaliyar. Two of the:sons of this original ancestor were named Ulaganather and Venayaga r,respectively, and the present contestants are descendants of boththese persons. It seems clear that these two lines of the descendantsof Kathirnayake Mudaliyar have, for very many years past, takenan active interest in the temple and its endowments. Each sidehas produced a long series of deeds proving this active interest*.Plaintiffs’ descent from Ulaganather and the history of the connectioaof Ulaganather's descendants with the temple as traced by the deed s
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is as follows:—At some unknown date Ulaganather, on evidencewhich the learned Judge accepts, is said to have converted thooriginal mud building into a temple of stone. In 1873, by P 17 onJune 27, certain lands were conveyed to the temple, VelupillaiUlaganather providing the consideration out of temple funds. In1878 Swaminather Velupillai, a grandson of Ulaganather, under twodeeds, purchased certain lands out of temple funds (see P 18 ofSeptember 2, 1878, also P 19 of December 23, 1878). A year laterthis same Swaminather Veluppillai advances some of the templefunds upon an otty bond (see P 16 of May 1, 1879). SwaminatherVeluppillai executed a transfer in favour of the temple of the templesite (the temple itself being excepted). The price of the land sotransferred was paid to Swaminather Veluppillai by his son, Velup-pillai Ulaganather, and it is recited that this money was paid outof temple funds, of which we may assume that Veluppillai Ulaga-nather was in charge as manager or as one of the managers. OnJanuary 17, 1882, by P 23, certain other lands were sold in otty toSwaminather Veluppillai on his declaration that the purchasemoney was temple money. In 1891 certain other lands were soldto the temple, the purchase money being paid out of temple fundsby Veluppillai Ulaganather to whom I have already referred. OnJuly 17, 1894, by P 13, certain other lands were sold in otty tothe temple, and the consideration also was furnished out of templefunds by Veluppillai Ulaganather, his son, Ulaganather Kandiah,being a witness. There is another deed of the same year (P 26) andof the same character dated July 3, 1894. In 1901 certain otherlands were transferred to the temple, Ulaganather Kanthaiyar, a sonof Veluppillai Ulaganather, this time providing the money, presum-ably as manager. There is a similar deed of the same characterand of the same date with regard to certain other lands (P 15). OnOctober 21, 1901, temple funds are again invested, the vendor inthis case is Ulaganather Swaminather himself, Kanthaiyar’s father.Kanthaiyar is here expressly referred to as manager, but, it may benoted, not as manager of the temple but as manager of the Hindumadame called “ Ambalavana Chuppiramaniyaswamy.” I pause atthis point because the next deed on this side is some years later, andindicates a new phase in the story. Enough has been adduced toshow that this line of the family descending through Ulaganatherand Kanthaiyar had an active connection with the temple, andthat its members were in charge of the temple funds for nearly awhole generation.N
The story, however, of the connection with the temple of the rivalline, descending from Venayagar, is equally emphatic. On June 4,1870, by P 4, Velauther Venayagar, Venayagar’s son, joins withfour others, one of whom is Swaminather Veluppillai himself, inexecuting a deed of donation of certain lands in favour of the temple.On Muy 18,1872, by P 5, this same Velayuther Venayagar conveyed
1924.
Bertram
C.J.
Karthigasu
Ambala-
wanarv.
Subramaniar
KathimveUi
12(61)29
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1924.
Bertram
O.J.
KarthigaauAmbala-wanar v.SubramaniarKathvravelu
three other lands in favour of the temple for a consideration ofRs. 500, and certifies that he received this sum from his grandson,Venasithamby KanapathipiUai, who is referred to as manager ofthe temple. A life interest is reserved by the vendor and hisdaughter, and after their death, it is directed that “ the said Kana-pathipillai, as manager thereof, should look after, manage, and takethe produce of the said properties.” It may be noted that Swami-nather Veluppillai, a representative of the other line of the familyfrequently referred to above, signs this deed as witness. On July21, 1892, by P 6, Velayuther Venayagar transferred six other landsto the temple. The lands were accepted on behalf of the templeby Sellathamby Velasithamby (great grandson of Venayagar), whois referred to in the deed as one of the managers of the temple.Finally, on February 9, 1905, this same Sellathamby Velasi-thamby executed a very important deed (D 1). This is the firstsystematic deed of trust which appears in the story. It recitesthat he himself alone had managed, possessed, looked after, andconducted the twelve parcels of lands referred to in the deed, as hewas directed by the late Velayuther Venayagar and his wife.Seethevy,and their son, KanapathipiUai, the trustees thereof, while they werealive. He conveys these lands to Vaitilingam Sellathurai, the fourthdefendant. He further declares that “ these lands have been inpossession and management of the managers of the said temple,including me, and in my management and possession according tothe said deeds, for more than ten years up to this date. He vestsin the said SeUathurai fuU powers of management of these lands.He is to join with the other shareholders of the temple in respectof the said temple, and aU the immovable and movable propertiesbelonging to the said temple and not mentioned in this deed and aUthe affairs, and look after and manage what are necessary, and heis to look after and manage himself alone the aforesaid parcels oflands …. After my death the said SeUathurai, withoutjoining any of my co-managers, is at his own wiU and desire, fromdescendants to descendants, to manage and look after the said twelveparcels of lands ; to celebrate and conduct with the income andrents thereof the affairs of the said temple, charity Inn Holy Tank.Sellathurai being a minor, his father, Venasithamby Vaitialingam,is to be associated with the grantor, Venasithamby, in the manage-ment of the property during the minority.” Provision?is made forfaUure of the descendants of Sellathurai. It is plain from theextraordinary explicitness of this elaborate deed that questions hadarisen between the two branches of this family with regard to thistemple and its endowments, but it nevertheless seems to me perfectlyclear that this branch of the family also had been in close associationwith the temple, and had been actively engaged in its management.Inded, as a result of the deeds above referred to, and certainsubsequent deeds, the properties set out in the schedule to the plaint
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have been in the exclusive and undisturbed possession" of this branchof the family for twenty-five years and upwards. See the evidenceof the witness, Gnanasekera Kurukkal, a witness for the plaintiffs.Similarly, a yet more extensive number of lands has been exclusivelyheld and possessed for the benefit of the temple by the plaintiffs*branch of the family. We have thus carried the story of theconnection of these two branches in case of the plaintiffs from 1873to 1901, and in the case of defendants from 1870 to 1905. Thatthere was at this time some friction is, as I have said, indicatedby the emphatic terms of the deed of 1905. Further evidence ofthat friction is to be found in a Court of Request’s case of the year1907, which owing to the want of harmony between the two brancheshad no definite results.
For about ten years the history of the temple was apparently un-eventful. But in 1916 it entered upon a new phase. In that year,one Veluppillai Katirkesu, the brother of Veluppillai Ulaganather,previously referred to as a man of some considerable substance,conceived the idea that he had fallen under the malign influence ofan evil spirit. This spirit, according to the learned Judge’s accountof the matter, took possession of Katirkesu’s house, anfl offeringshad to be made to the private idol in his house and in the templeto get rid of the evil spirit’s influence. Out of gratitude for hisdeliverence Katirkesu left a large sum of money for the restorationof the temple, and the temple was accordingly restored and enlarged.In this year Ulaganather Kantbaiyar, previously referred to, executeda formal deed of appointment and trust, appointing his cousinsAmbalavanar, the first plaintiff, and Muttukumaru, the second plain-tiff, both sons of Katirkesu, as trustees and managers of the temple.This is the first trust deed executed in plaintiff’s line and correspond-ing in importance to the deed of 1905 (D 1) executed on the otherside. There can be no doubt that from this point plaintiff’s branchof the family now assumed full control of the temple, and that thefirst and second plaintiffs became de facto managers. There are onlytwo points in which the other branch of the family asserted itself.When it became necessary to remove the idol to another place forthe purpose of improvements, the traditional ceremony for thispurpose was obstructed by the fourth defendant, and it was not untilsome adjustment was made (of the nature of which we are ignorant)that the ceremony could proceed. Further, notwithstanding the defacto trusteeship of the first and second plaintiffs, the fourth defend-ant remained in exclusive possession of the lands scheduled to theplaint, and it is asserted by him and his witnesses and confirmed byexplicit admissions on the part of the plaintiff’s witness, that out ofthe revenues of these lands they did contribute a share of the fundsnecessary for the support of the poojahs of the temple. When theimprovements were completed and the reopening ceremonies wereto be carried out, printed invitations were issued in the name of
1924.
Bertram
C.J.
Karthiga&uAmbala•wanar v.SubramaniarKcUhiravelu
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1924.
Bertram
C.J.
KarthigasuAmbala.wanar v.SubramaniarKathi/ravelu
the first and second plaintiffs* as managers, and it is difficult tobelieve that the fourth defendant and his branch of the family werenot acquainted with the terms of these invitations.
These being the facts what is the position ? The learned Judge,having found that the first and second plaintiffs were de facto exclusivemanagers of the temple, has thought himself justified in enteringa decree declaring the lands in the schedule to be the property ofthe temple, and directing the defendants to be ejected therefrom,and the plaintiffs as de facto managers and trustees of the said templeto be put and quieted in possession thereof. It seems to me thatit is impossible that this decree could stand. The fourth defendantand those associated with him have been in exclusive possessionof these lands for at least twenty-five years. They have them intrust for the religious charity represented by the temple. Theplaintiffs are mere de facto trustees of the temple. They have nolegal right to the lands. They have not even shown a legal titleto be appointed as trustees of the temple and its endowments, norhave they asked for such an appointment. It is impossible to admitthe doctrine that a de facto trustee of the temple is as such entitledto the possession of its temporalities. He can only obtain thosetemporalities by becoming vested with the legal title to them. Noris it possible by a decree of our courts to declare that lands are theproperty of a temple. We do not recognize the personality ofreligious foundations.
It is quite clear that these two families descending from a commonorigin have had a joint interest in the temple for some fifty yearspast. They have each been vested with a share of its endowments,and have from time to time participated in its management.However extensive the contributions that may have been made tothe temple on the part of plaintiffs’ branch of the family, the attemptto arrogate to itself its exclusive management can only be regarded'as unconscientious. Similarly, on the side of defendants, the claimof the fourth defendant to be exclusive manager and proprietor ofthe temple is also unconscientious. It is satisfactory to knowthat it is recognized on both sides that this is a question for a familysettlement, and that that family settlement should proceed upon.arecognition of the rights of both branches to a share in the manage-ment of the temple. It has accordingly been arranged by consentthat the case should go back to the learned District Judge for furtherinquiry and for appropriate relief.
It may be convenient to indicate what powers the learned Judgehas for this purpose, and what are the matters which will require hisattention. The scheme of the Trusts Ordinance is as follows :—
Section 101 deals with public charitable trusts generally. Themachinery of that section is set in action either by the Attorney-General, or two persons having an interest in the trust acting byhis authority. Section 102 deals with a special class of charitable
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trusts, namely, those relating to places of religious worship, orreligious establishments, or places of religious resort. The machineryof this section may be set in motion by any five worshippers. Thesection does not apply to Christian religious trusts. To preventthe section being used for purposes of faction, it is declared that acertificate of the Government Agent of the nature specified in sub-section (3) shall be necessary before such an action is instituted.But the present action is not of this character. A paragraph insection 101 expressly reserves the rights of any trustee to applyto the Court by action or otherwise under the general provisions ofthe Ordinance for the purpose of regulating the administration ofthe trust or the succession to the trusteeship. And the Court isexpressly empowered on any such application to make such orderas it may seem equitable. This provision applies both to section 101and section 102, and the final sentence of section 101 must be readsubject to this circumstance. It is open, therefore, to the plaintiffsin this action, as persons, claiming to be trustees, to apply to theCourt for such directions as the Court may deem equitable for thepurpose of regulating the administration of the trust and thesuccession to the trusteeship. This can be done in the present caseby an amendment of the plaint. In giving these directions, the Courtshould, in my opinion, start from the fact that the two branchesof the family have been concerned in the administration of the trust,and that two groups of property have been separately controlledby these two respective branches. It will be necessary, in the firstplace, to ascertain and define the title to these various properties.Some of them have been simply dedicated to the deity who isworshipped in the temple. Some of them, indeed, purport to beactually transferred to the deity. But I think it must be taken assettled that we do not in our law recognize this personification of areligious foundation. See Maraliya v. Gunasekera1 and Kwrukal v.Karthikesu.2 In my own opinion when a person, who is the ownerof property, purports to transfer it to a temple, the effect of his sodoing is to constitute himself a trustee for the purpose of religiousworship to be carried on at the temple. The document of dedicationis in fact a declaration of trust, and the dominium remains with thededicator, and passes on his death to his heirs subject to the trust.It is consequently extremely difficult to know at this time in what■ person the dominium of the various properties belonging to thetemple actually resides. If we could trust the recitals in the deedof 1905 by Venasithamby, the fourth defendant, the twelve landswhich the defendant controlled had been in the exclusive possessionof Venasithamby for over ten years ; he had acquired a prescriptivetitle thereto, and the full dominium would be vested subject to thetrust in the fourth defendant. I doubt, however, whether it could
'(1921) 23N.L. R. 262.
* {1923) Times of Ceylon L. R.t Vol. II., Part II., page 120.
*
Bertram
C.J.
KarthigasuAmbata-wanar v.SubramaniarKathiravelu
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1924.
Bertram
C.J.
Karthiga&uAmbala-wanar v.SubramaniarKathiravelu
be said that the possession by one member of the family for thepurpose of the trust of properties, the legal title to which was vestedin him jointly with various unascertained members of the family,could be considered adverse possession as against these other personslegally entitled. Similar difficulties arise as to the legal title to theproperties controlled by the plaintiffs’ branch of the family. Thisconfusion is an inevitable incident of hereditary religious trusts andit can only be avoided by periodical timely transfers or devises.For the purpose of the settlement of the affairs of this temple at thepresent moment, the appropriate remedy seems to be a vesting orderunder section 112. The Court snould, I think, make a vesting orderunder that section enumerating the temple properties in charge ofthe two groups. The order should vest these respective sets ofproperty in the trustee or trustees at present representing these tworespective groups. And the order should be duly registered inaccordance with sub-section (3). A vesting order of this natureshould be asked for by a formal amendment of the plaint.
Next as to the devolution of the trust.
This religious foundation must be considered as having beenfounded by the two branches of the family. No scheme of manage-ment was drawn up at the time of the foundation, or within areasonable time after it.
The religious law and the custom of the community concerned (towhich we are entitled to have regard under section 106 of the TrustsOrdinance) appear to be that the right of management vests in theheirs of the founder. (See Gour's Hindu Code, section 215 (3)):—
“ Where the founder makes an endowment without providingfor its management, the right of management vests in the founderand his heirs.”
In all such foundations the custom or course of action observedin the family must be taken into account, and in this case thatcustom or course of action appears to have been that the landsheld by the two several branches should be vested in somemember of that branch as the representative of himself and theothers. Dr. Gour proceeds to add :—ct (4) the right of the founderto provide for the management devolves upon his hGirs on his death.”The meaning of this appears to be that if no deed of managementis drawn up at the time of the original foundation, the heirs of thefounder would be entitled at any subsequent period to draw up a deedof management for the future administration of the trust, and hisdeed of management might presumably contain a provision forthe devolution of the trusteeship. I have consulted the authoritiesreferred to by Dr. Gour in so far as they are accessible, and I havenot been able to trace any precise authority confirming thisstatement. But I think that on the authority of Dr. Gour, it mustbe taken to be an accepted principle of Hindu customary religiouslaw. In the absence of any selection of a special member of the
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family as trustee, it would appear as if all the descendants of thefounder would be joint managers and trustees discharging thefunctions in rotation or according to some other arrangement. SeeBamanathan Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty.1 But it is obviouslyconvenient that some definite representative of the family shouldbe recognized as trustee.
It will have been observed that deeds of the nature of deed ofmanagement have now been drawn up on both sides, that of theplaintiffs* side being P 2 of October 18, 1910, and that of thedefendants* branch being D 1 of February 9, 1905. These deedsare formally executed and very fully attested, so that I think it maybe taken that they represent family arrangements'made by or withthe consent of the members of the two respective branches. So faras these two deeds can be reconciled with each other and with thefamily rights of the two brapphes, I see no reason why they shouldnot be accepted as deeds of management dealing with (a) the controlof the properties vested on behalf of the trust in the particularbranch; (6) the devolution of the trusteeship of the temple withrespect to the representatives of that branch. Both deeds providefor the trusteeship devolving from descendant to descendant, but theplaintiffs* deed makes the wise provision that the trustees with respectto that branch “ should in their lifetime appoint trustee or trusteeswithin their descendants to manage and look after the said templeand properties after their death.” The same thing appears to becontemplated, though not directed in paragraph 6 of the defendants*deed.
The following observations may be made as to these respectivedeeds—Paragraphs 1-5 in the plaintiffs* give general directions asto what I may describe as the plaintiffs* share of the management.They relate to the management and subject to any objection by thedefendants, I see no reason why they should not be accepted for thepurpose of the defendants’ share of the management also. Thereare two provisions of the defendants’ deed which seem to me ultravires. The first is that which directs the defendants’ trustee to“ join with the other shareholders of the temple in respect of thesaid temple, and all the immovable and movable properties belongingto the said temple and not mentioned in this deed.” This shouldbe considered as inoperative so far as it purports to deal with theproperties specially vested in the plaintiffs* branch. The nextprovision also goes somewhat too far. It directs the defendants*trustee not only to manage and look after the twelve parcels of landspecially vested in him without joining any of his co-managers, butfurther gives the same direction with regard to the temple itself.“ To celebrate and conduct with the income and rents thereof theaffairs of the said temple.” This must be read as subject to tbecorresponding right in the other branch. Finally, in the last
1 (1903) 27 Mad. L. B. 192.
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Bertram
C.J.
KarthigasuAmbcda-wanar v.SubramaniarKathiravdu
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1924.
Bbbtbah
C.J.
KarthigcmiArabella-wanotr v.SubramaniarKathiravelur
paragraph of the deed, the maker attempts to provide for the caseof the failure of descendants of the trustee whom he appoints, or allpersons onminated by him to carry on the trust. In such an eventthe deed directs that the trust should be managed and looked afterby the officials of the two local religious bodies. This directioncould, in my opinion, have no effect, unless the other branch saw fitto concur in it. In the absence of such common arrangement,I think that on the failure of descendants of either branch the rightsof that branch should pass to the surviving branch.
There is one further matter which must be provided for. Atpresent there are two trustees, representatives of the plaintiffs’branch and only one of the defendants’ branch. With regard tothe present trustees, it seems to me that this status quo should remain,but in regard to future appointments it would seem more convenientand less likely to lead to friction if the representation of the twobranches in the trusteeship was equal. If the learned Judge thoughtit more convenient, an additional trustee might be appointed on thedefendants’ side at once. Whether the trustees should exercisetheir functions in co-operation or in rotation, as for example, duringannual or monthly periods, this is a matter on which the learnedJudge, if he saw fit, might give directions after ascertaining the viewof the parties.
It appears to me, therefore, that the learned Judge, on the mattercoming before him again, should give directions with regard to thedevolution of the trusteeship. These directions might suitablybe that the trusteeship should devolve from time to time upon suchdescendants of the present holders of the office, in each branch ofthe family, as may be nominated and appointed by the holder of theoffice for the time being before his death, or, in the absence of anysuch appointment, upon such of the heirs of the original founder inthat branch as may be selected by the heirs of that branch, and inthe absence of any special selection, upon the eldest male descendantof the last deceased trustee. It appears to be in accordance withthe family custom that a trustee nominating a descendant to succeedhim should associate this descendant with himself as trustee duringthe continuance of his own life, and the learned Judge might bearthis in mind and give any directions on the subject he thinks suitable.
The directions, therefore, to be given by the learned District Judge,as to the administration of the trust and the succession to thetrusteeship, should be on the lines above suggested, subject to anyparticular modification which he may think fit to make by theagreement of the parties, or, in his own discretion, after ascertainingthe local and family circumstances.
I would, therefore, remit the case to the learned District Judge forthe purpose of an amendment in the plaint asking for directionsunder section 101 of the Trust Ordinance for regulating the admin-istration of the trust and the succession to the trusteeship, for a
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vesting order under section 112, and for such further and other reliefas to the Court may seem fit, and for the purpose of subsequent actionby the learned District Judge on the lines 1 have indicated.
It was agreed by the parties that no question should be raisedas to the accountability of the defendants or any of them in respectof the revenues of the lands controlled by their branch of the familyup to this action, these revenues being taken to be expended onbehalf of the trust, and further that there should be no order as tocosts either in this Court or in the Court below or in any subsequentproceedings for giving effect to this judgment in t^e Court below,except so far as contentions might arise in those subsequentproceedings—in which case the costs of the contention should bein the discretion of the learned District Judge.
Jayewabdene J.—I agree.
Set aside ; case remitted.
♦
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Bbbtbah
C.J.
KarthigamAmbala-wanar v.SubramaniarKathiravdu