054-NLR-NLR-V-23-KATIRITAMBY-et-al.-v.-PARUPATHIPILLAI-et-al.pdf
Preset# : De Sampayo J. and Garvin A.J.KATIRITAMBY el ol. v. PARUPATHTPILLAI el ol.. 14$—D. C. Jaffna, 13,621.
1921.
Hmmeoua decision on a pure question of Jaw—Res j udicata.
An erroneous decision on a pure question ol law will operate asres adjudicata quoad, the subject-matter of the suit in which it isgiven, and no further.
P gifted to the second and third defendants certain lands,reserving life interest. In D. G. No. 3,447 these lands wereseized in execution, and claimed by the second and thirddefendants. The District Judge ordered the Fiscal to sell theinterests of P. At the sale in execution, 8 (through whomplaintiffs claim) became the purchaser. In 0. R. No. 12,239 Ssued second and third defendants to vindicate title to one of thelands seized under writ in No. 3,447. The Commissioner held(wrongly on the question of law raised) that the order in the claiminquiry was one dfamiawng the claim, Mid as the second andthird defendants had not brought an action under section 247,they had no title to the land. Subsequently, at an execution sale,the interests of the second and third defendants to the other landsbought by 8 were purchased by the fourth defendant. In thisaction plaintiffs sued to vindicate title to these other lands, andthey pleaded the decree in No. 12,239 in bar of defendants* title.
Held, that the decree in No. 12,239 did not operate as res 'judicata on the question of law involved.
BaJasingham (with him Croos-Dabrera), for appellants.*
St. V. Jayawardene, K.C. (with him Joseph), for respondents.
December 19,1921. Gabvin A.J.—
The plaintiffs are seeking a declaration of title to the threeallotments of land fully described in the plaint. These lands andcertain others originally belonged to one Parupathy, wife of Aru-mogam. This lady, by deed No. 3,225 of October 23,1901, giftedthese lands to the second and third defendants, subject to the
fJTHE facts appear from the judgment.
Cur. adv. vuti.
19
( 210 )
1921.
Garvin A.J.
Katvritanibyv. Paru-paikipHlai
reservation of a life interest. Under a writ of execution issued incase No. 3,447 of the District Court of Jaffna, these lands andothers, including a land called Kalani, all of which formed thesubject of the gift above referred to, were seized, and upon seizureclaimed by the second and third defendants. At the inquiry intothese claims the only evidence recorded was that of the seconddefendant, who claimed the lands under this deed of gift, but statedthat a life interest was reserved by the judgment-debtor. Nofurther evidence was adduced. The District Judge made thefollowing order: “ Instruct the Fiscal to sell the interests of thedefendants in the lands seized. No costs.’*’
A month later ah objection appears to have been lodgedwith the Fiscal by the claimants to the sale in execution, on theground that the defendants’ interests were not clearly defined.This objection was apparently referred to Court, whereupon theDistrict Judge minuted as follows: “ I decline to make any furtherorder in the matter. I cannot make the order clearer. Interestincludes life interest or any other kind of interest. NI mean defend-ants’ interest, whatever it is.”
At the sales in execution which followed one K. H. Sinnatambybecame the purchaser, and through him the present plaintiffsclaim. Many years later, at a sale in execution against the secondand third defendants, their interests were purchased by the fourthdefendant, who now claims that the title to these lands is in him,subject to Parupathy’s life interest, which admittedly passed tothe plaintiffs or rather their predecessor Sinnatamby.
Primd facie, this contention is sound. But the plaintiffs contendthat the judgment in case No. 12,239 of the Court of Bequests ofPoint Pedro is res adjudicate, and is in bar of the title of the fourthdefendant. Now, that was an action by Sinnatamby against thesecond and third defendants to vindicate his title to another of thelands seized under the writ in case No. 3,447. It was contendedon behalf of Sinnatamby that the order in the claim proceedings,to which I have referred, was in effect an order disallowing theolaim of the second and third defendants, and was binding andconclusive as to the title to the land in claim, inasmuch as noaction was brought within fourteen days as provided by section 247of the Civil Procedure Code. This contention was upheld, andSinnatamby was declared entitled to the land, which formed thesubject-matter of that action.
With all respect to the Judges who were responsible for thatdeoision, I am unable to see how that order can be said to amountto a disallowance of the claim. Earlier in this judgment I haveset out exactly what occurred in the course of those claim proceed-ings. The District Judge did not disallow the elaim, nor did hedirect the sale of the property under seizure. Admittedly, thejudgment-debtor had some interest in the property under seizure.
( 211 )
The District Judge did not think it neoessary to determine exactlywhat those interests amounted to. Instead he directed the Fiscalto sell, not the property under seizure, but the “interests of thedefendant ” in that property.
The order made at the claim inquiry in the terms in which it wasmade is, undoubtedly, binding on the parties to those proceedings.So also the ruling m C. R. case No. 12,239, whether it is right or,as I think, wrong, is binding on the parties and their privies quoadthe subject-matter of that action.
Now, this is a different aotion, the subject-matter is different,the cause of aotion is different, and as to parties, it is a questionwhether the fourth defendant, who purchased these lands in execu-tion against the second and third defendants, is inlaw privy to them.
The order in the claim inquiry is pleaded in bar of fourth defend-ant’s title. That defendant replies that that order is no bar, inthat it allowed this claim, or, at all events, did not disallow it.The plaintiffs’ answer whether the order amounts to an order ofdisallowance or not, it was held to be such in case No. 12,239 of theCourt of Requests of Point Pedro, and the matter is therefore resadjudicate, and cannot be challenged, even in regard to a differentland upon a different cause of action. In a word, it is contendedthat a ruling on a pure question of law is binding for all times onthe parties to the case in which the ruling is given, and may notbe questioned even in a separate and distinct action in which thesubject-matter is also different.
For this proposition no authority was cited. For the exactcontrary we have been referred to Caspersz on Estoppel, sections536 to 539. In a chapter in which he treats of the effect of erroneousdecisions, Caspersz says: “ A decision which is erroneous cannothave the force of res adjudicate in a subsequent proceeding for adifferent relief. Or when the cause of action is different, but thematter has already been in controversy, then the estoppel oughtto be limited to matters distinctly put in issue and determinedpreviously, and should further be restricted to questions of factor of mixed law and fact …. section 537 ….
But as regards the law, an erroneous decision does not prevent theCourt from deciding the same question arising between the sameparties in a subsequent suit according to law.”
These passages, so far as they apply to the matter immediatelybefore us, are an authority for the proposition that an erroneousdecision on a pure question of law will operate as res adjudicate quoadthe subject-matter of the suit in which it is given, and no further.
The following cases cited by Caspersz have been examined byus;—Porthasardi v. Chinna Krishna,1 Ghaman Lai v. Baputhai,2and Gopu Kolandavelu v. Sami Boyar?
1921.
Gabvin A.J.
Katiritambyt>. Parti-pathipiUai
1 (1882) 5 Mad. SOL
* (190S) SS Mad. 102.
* (1897)22 Bom 669.,
1921.
Oi&m A.3.
KaUrUattibyv.Paru- 'paihipiffai
Without exception, they all affirm the proposition that a deoisionon a pure question oi law does not prevent a Court from decidingthe same question afterwards between the same parties accordingto law.
In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider thefurther contention that a purchaser at an execution sale is privyto the judgment-debtor. The rulings of this Court, in the cases ofKuda Banda t>. Dingiri Ammo1 and Banda v. Pattison? indicate thatsuch a purchaser is not privy to the judgment-debtor. It is sub-mitted that these decisions should be reconsidered'. There is noreason to do so in this appeal, which fails for the reasons I havealready given.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and the appealdismissed, with costs.
Ds Samtayo J.—I agree.
Appeal dismissed.