020-NLR-NLR-V-16-KEEGEL-v.-ASANA-MARAKAR-et-al.pdf
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Present: Ennis J.
KEEGEL v. ASANA MABAKAB et al.
625^-P. G. Joj/na, 7,Sfi3.
Touts—Ordinance No. 11 qf 1£04, 0. 5—Intermeddling with suitors*
The Ordinance No. 11 of 1894 applies to touts and vagrants only.A tout is one who procures the employment in any legal businoa?of any legal practitioner in consideration of remuneration movingfrom such practitioner, or proposes to a legal practitioner tosecure his employment in legal business in consideration of suchremuneration.
A
PPEAL from a judgment of the Police Magistrate oi Jaffna(W. K. H. Campbell, Esq.).
The facts of this case are shortly as follows. On July 17, 1912,a case came before the District Judge of Jaffna (M. S. Pinto, Esq.),in which one Abdul Cader and (his parents sued one Putappar.The District Judge was of opinion that the case should be settledout of Court. The case was fixed for August 2 for that purpose.On the morning of that day, before the case was called, “ a group ofpeople (including the third accused) were discussing the case outsidethe Court, and certain people who had no right to interfere at allstrenuously opposed the settlement.” The three accused in thiscase were charged, under Ordinance No. 11 of 1894, with havingintermeddled with suitors without an excuse. The evidenceshowed that the third accused “ was seen in Court heaps of timeswhen he had no case.” But he “ accounted for his presence inCourt M on that day, which explanation the Magistrate accepted:—
He has partially accounted for his presence in Court. Judgment .wasgiven in a case of his that day without notice it is true, but perhaps hehad heard through his counsel, and 1 aocept that.
The learned Magistrate acquitted the first and second accused,and held that the third accused opposed the settlement and sen-tenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 100, in default two months' rigorousimprisonment.
The third accused appealed.
H. A. Jayewardene (with him Talaivasingham), for the accused,appellant.—The evidence does not disclose any offence under Ordi-nance No. 11 of 1894. There is a good deal of difference of opinionas to what class of persons come within the operation of the Ordi-nance. The Ordinance never contemplated that a person who speaksto a litigant about a case should be guilty of an offence under the
1919*
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4
1W2. Ordinance, which was aimed solely at professional touts. [Ennis J.ReegeIv—Who is a tout? And what is the law in India on the point?]
AsanaIn India the procedure is to call upon a person to show cause why
MaraUar he should not be proclaimed a tout. If he is so declared, his name isposted up (Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, section 86). It was neverintended by the Ceylon Ordinance that a person who speaks to alitigant about the Courts and tries to bring about a settlement shouldbe punished as a tout. Counsel referred to Naranaswamy v. Deogu,1Mesu v. Karunaratna2 and Keegel v. Assart Lebbe.*
No appearance for respondent.
September 5, 1912. Ennis J.—
In this case the accused has been charged and convicted that he" did without lawful excuse intermeddled with S. M. Abdul Cader,who had business in the District Court of Jaffna/' The convictionis under section 5 of the Ordinance No. 11 of 1894.
The provisions of sections 5. of this Ordinance have been on severaloccasions the subject of observation by the Supreme Court, and thedifficulties of interpreting the section have been pointed out.
Thjs Ordinance was enacted to “ provide against the mischief bytouts and vagrants meddling'with parties who seek redress in theCourts of Justice," and whatever the construction of section 5, itmust, I think, be read With the intention stated in the preamble,and apply to touts and vagrants only.
In this case it is suggested that the accused is a “ tout." Nodefinition of tout is given in the Ordinance, but the ordinary defini-tion of a tout is one who procures the employment in any legalbusiness of any legal practitioner in consideration of remunerationmoving from such practitioner, or proposes to a legal practitionerto secure his employment in legal business in consideration of suchremuneration.
There is nothing in the evidence to show that the accused in thiscase is such a person, and in the circumstances I must allow theappeal and quash the conviction.
Set aside.
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* 2N.L. B. 81.
* 9 N. L. B. 146,
*9N.L. R, 147.