027-SLLR-SLLR-1996-V-2-KIRIHAMY-v.-DINGIRIMATHTHAYA.pdf
scKiiihamy v. Dingirimaththaya175
KIRIHAMY
V.
DINGIRIMATHTHAYA
SUPREME COURT.G. P. S. DE SILVA, C.J.
RAMANATHAN.J.WIJETUNGA, J.
S.C. 100/95
A. 447/83
C. KURUNEGALA4694/L
JULY 23, 1996.
Paddy Lands Act No. 1 of 1958 – Agricultural Lands Law 42 of 1973 – S.3(1), (13), (14), S. 3(b) b(i) (ii) – Eviction – Deeming clause – Threat to Evict.
The Plaintiff instituted action seeking a declaration that he is the lawfulTenant Cultivator. The Defendant-Respondent raised the plea that theDistrict Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the action.TheDistrict Judge entered judgment for the Plaintiff. The Court of Appealreversed same. On appeal.Held:
The operative concept in the definition – (Evict), is the deprivation of theTenant Cultivators’ right to use, occupy and cultivate the field. The deprivationmay be by using direct or indirect methods.
A threat to evict or interference in the occupation and use of the landdoes not amount to ‘Eviction’. The remedy of a Tenant Cultivaor whocomplains of eviction is set out in S.3 (3).
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[1996] 2 Sri L.R.The case for the Plaintiff is that the Defendant had forcibly entered thepaddy field and had threatened to evict him and had obstructed him in theexercise of his ‘Ande Rights’ the complaint is not one of eviction but of athreat to evict.
On the cause of action pleaded the Plaintiff has no remedy nor can heclaim any relief under the provisions of law No. 42 of 1973.
It is undoubtedly good law that where a statute creates a right and in plainlanguage, gives a specific remedy or appoints a specific tribunal, for itsenforcement, a party seeking to enforce the right must resort to that remedyor that Tribunal and not to others.
AN APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Appeal.Cases referred to:
Hendrick Appuhamy v. John Appuhamy – 69 NLR 29.
Wilkinson v. Barking Corporation – 1948 – 1KB 721
Dolawatte v. Gamage 1989 – 2 SLR 327.
Sanath Jayatilake for Plaintiff-Appellant.D. R. P. Goonetilake with S. A. D. S. Suraweera for Deffendant-Respondent
Cur. adv. vult.
August 22, 1996.
G. P. S. DE SILVA, C.J.
The Plaintiff brought this action seeking, inter alia, a declarationthat he is the lawful tenant cultivator of a half share of the paddy land insuit. The Defendant in his answer raised the plea that the District Courthas no jurisdiction to hear and determine this action. The District Courtheld against the Defendant on the issue of jurisdiction and enteredjudgment for the Plaintiff. The Defendant appealed to the Court of Appealwhich upheld the Defendant’s plea that the District Court has nojurisdiction and dismissed the Plaintiff’s action. Hence the appeal ofthe Plaintiff to this court.The Court of Appeal relied heavily on the judgment of Sansoni C.J.,in Hendrick Appuhamy v. John Appuhamy,w in taking the view that theDistrict Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine this action.
scKirihamy v. Dingirimaththaya (G.P.S. DE Silva, C.J.)177
That was a case where the owner of a paddy field sought to havehis tenant cultivator ejected from it. In his plaint filed in 1963 he averredthat “from about 1959 the Defendant failed to maintain the paddy landdiligently with the result that the yield began to deteriorateprogressively.” Sansoni C.J., examined several provisions of the PaddyLands Act No. 1 of 1958 and in particular section 14 which enabled “ alandlord to become an owner cultivator of an area of paddy land, inrespect of which there is a tenant cultivator, by applying to theCultivation Committee.”Referring to section 14 the learned Chief Justiceobserved, “This section is important since it provides the remedy bywhich a landlord can recover the extent or a part of it, which was in thetenant cultivator’s possession”. His Lordship reasoned thus: “The Actprovides the machinery to which a landlord must resort if he wants tohave his tenant cultivator evicted or his paddy field properly cultivated,and I think this is the only machinery available to him since this Actwas passed.” Sansoni C.J., relied on the principle set out by AsquithLJ in Wilkinson v. Barking Corporationi® “It is undoubtedly good lawthat where a statute creates a right and, in plain language, gives aspecific remedy or appoints a specific tribunal for its enforcement, aparty seeking to enforce the right must resort to that remedy or thattribunal, and not to others.”
Does the ratio decidendi of the above decision apply to the appealbefore us? I think not. It is of intense relevance to note that the case forthe Plaintiff as pleaded in his plaint is that the defendant had forciblyentered the paddy field and had threatened to evict him and hadobstructed him in the exercise of his “ande rights.” What needs to bestressed for present purposes is that the complaint is not one ofeviction but of a threat to evict.
Mr. D. R. P. Goonetilake for the defendant-respondent relied onsection 3(1), 3(14) and the definition of the expression “evict” in section54 of the Agricultural Lands Law No. 42 of 1973 in support of thejudgment of the Court of Appeal.
Section 3(1) reads thus:-
“A tenant cultivator of any extent of paddy land shall have the
right to occupy and use such extent in accordance with the
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[1996] 2 Sri LR.provisions of this Law and shall not be evicted from such extentnotwithstanding anything to the contrary in any oral or writtenagreement by which such extent has been let to such tenantcultivator and no person shall interfere in the occupation and useof such extent by the tenant cultivator and the landlord shall notdemand or receive from the tenant cultivator any rent in excess ofthe rent required by this Law to be paid in respect of such extentto the landlord.”
Section 3(14) provides as follows:-
“For the purpose of this section, if any person directly or indirectlymakes use of, or threatens to make use of, any force, violence,or restraint or inflicts, or threatens to inflict, any harm, damage orloss upon or against a tenant cultivator of any extent of paddyland in order to induce, compel, or prevail upon, that tenantcultivator to refrain from exercising any right or privilege conferredupon him by or under this Law, such person shall be deemed tointerfere in the occupation and use of such extent by that tenantcultivator.”
“Evict” is defined in the following terms:-
“Evict means in relation to a tenant cultivator, to deprive by usingdirect or indirect methods that tenant cultivator of his right to useoccupy and cultivate the whole or any part of the extent of paddyland let to him.”
It seems to me that the operative concept in the definition is thedeprivation of the tenant cultivator’s right to use occupy andcultivate the paddy land. The “deprivation” may be by using director indirect methods. A threat to evict or interference in theoccupation and use of the land does not amount to “eviction” withinthe meaning of the definition unless such interference results inphysical dispossession. This view is supported by the terms ofsection 3(8) which makes it clear that once the Agricultural Tribunal(or the Supreme Court in appeal) holds that there has been an“eviction” then “the person evicted shall be entitled to have theuse and occupation of such exent restored to him and theTribunalscKirihamy v. Dingirimaththaya (G.P.S.DE Silva, C.J.)179
shall in writing order that every person in occupation of such extentshall vacate it . . Section 3(8) (b) (i) and (ii). The wordsunderlined above strongly suggest physical dispossession.
The remedy of the tenant cultivator who complains of eviction isset out in section 3(3) which reads thus:-
“Where a tenant cultivator of any extent of paddy land notifies theAgricultural Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal’) withinwhose area of authority such extent lies that he has been evictedfrom such extent, such Tribunal may hold an inquiry for the purposeof deciding the question whether or not such person had beenevicted.”
Mr. D. R. P. Goonetilake relied heavily on the prohibition againstinterference “in the occupation and use of such extent by the tenantcultivator” (S.3(1) and the wider meaning given to the expression “inter-ference” by the “deeming” clause in section 3(14)). It seems to me thatwhile such “interference” in the use and occupation of the paddy landdoes not amount to eviction and the remedy postulated in section 3(3)is not available to the tenant cultivator, yet any such interference wouldconstitute an offence. Vide section 3(13). The material part of section3(13) enacts “If any person contravenes the provisions of this sectionhe shall be guilty of an offence…”
The Court of Appeal has misconstrued the definition of the word“evict” and was also in error in applying the principle laid down inHendrick Appuhamy v. John Appuhamy {supra) to the facts andcircumstances of the case before us. I accordingly hold that on thecause of action pleaded in the plaint the Plaintiff has no remedy norcan he claim any relief under the provisions of the Agricultural LandsLaw No. 42 of 1973. For these reasons the appeal is allowed, thejudgment of the Court of appeal is set aside and the judgment of theDistrict Court is restored. The Respondent must pay a sum of Rs. 500/
– as costs of appeal to the Appellant.
Before I conclude I wish to state that during the argument I indicatedto Counsel that I was inclined to the view that the principle set out inDolawatta v. Gamagd3) was applicable to this case. Counsel were
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[1996] 2 Sri LR.accordingly invited to make written submissions. Having read the writtensubmissions, in particular the written submissins of Mr.D.R.P.Goonetilake, I now realize that the view that I was inclined to take iswrong. I must place on record my appreciation of the assistance givenby Counsel for both parties.
RAMANATHAN, J. -1 agree.
WIJETUNGA, J. -1 agree.
Appeal allowed.