089-NLR-NLR-V-70-L.-S.-S.-DEEN-Appellant-and-M.-A.-HALIM-Respondent.pdf
ABEYESUNDERE, J.—Deen v. Halim
401
1968Present: Abeyesnndere, J.S. S. DEEN, Appellant, and M. A. HALIM, Respondent
O.64/67- C. B. Kandy, 18326/RE
Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, No. 12 of 1966—Scope of s. 4 of Rent Restriction
Act, as amended by Act No. 12 of 1966, s. 12A.
Section 4 of the Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act Xo. 12 of 1966 must beinterpreted as not applying to an action instituted on any of the exceptedgrounds specified in section 12A of the Rent Restriction Act as amended byAct No. 12 of 1966. Accordingly, it is not applicable to an action seeking toeject a tenant on the ground of his being in arrears of rent for a period of morethan three months.
.A.PPEAL from an order of the Court of Requests, Kandy.
M.T. M. Sivardeen, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Nimal SenanayaJce, for the defendant-respondent.
March 2, 1968. Abeyesundere, J.—
This action was instituted on 8th June 1964 for the recovery of arrearsof rent due from the defendant to the plaintiff for a period of more thanthree months and for the ejectment of the defendant from the premisesin suit. The parties agreed that the arrears of rent and damages up toend of October, 1964 were Rs. 174/48, and, with the consent of theparties, judgment was entered for the plaintiff ordering ejectment of the
402
ABEYESUNDERE, J.— Deen v. Halim
defendant and granting the plaintiff damages in Rs. 174/48 up to October,1964, and thereafter Rs. 20/28 per month. But the defendant wasallowed to stay in the premises until 31st March, 1966. On 23rd March,1966 an application was made on behalf of the defendant to extend thedate of vacation of the premises by the defendant by another threemonths. With the consent of the parties the court ordered that writ ofejectment was not to issue till 15th June, 1966.
On 11th June, 1966, the proctor for the defendant, relying on the RentRestriction (Amendment) Act, No. 12 of 1966, filed a motion praying thatno further steps be taken in execution of writ. The proctor for theplaintiff agreed that the motion filed by the proctor for the defendant beinquired into. After inquiry the learned Commissioner of Requests byorder dated 13.3.67 held that the plaintiff was precluded by the aforesaidAct from taking execution proceedings in the action.
The reasoning of the learned Commissioner is that, even if an actionfor the ejectment of a tenant is instituted on any of the grounds specifiedin Section 12A of the Rent Restriction Act as amended by Act No. 12 of1966, Section 4 of the amending Act has the effect of declaring suchaction to be null and void. The said Section 4 provides that, if anaction instituted on or after 20th July, 1962, and before 10th May, 1966(which is the date of commencement of the amending Act), for the eject-ment of a tenant from any premises to which the Rent Restriction Actapplies, it shall, if such action is pending on 10th May, 1966, be deemedto have been null and void. The action of the plaintiff was institutedwithin the period specified in Section 4 of the amending Act and waspending on 10th May, 1966. It is correct that actions instituted on anyof the grounds specified in Section 12A are not specifically saved by anyprovision in section 4 of the amending Act. But Section 4 of the amend-ing Act must not be interpreted in such a way as to render ineffectivesection 12A which by virtue of the provisions of the said Section 4 isdeemed to have come into operation on 20th July, 1962. If Section 4 isheld to apply even to an action instituted on any of the grounds specifiedin Section 12A, it will have the effect of deeming that action to be nulland void and the effect thereof will be that Section 12A is renderedineffective. I am therefore of the view that Section 4 of the amendingAct must be interpreted as not applying to an action instituted on any ofthe grounds specified in Section 12A.
For the aforesaid reasons I set aside the order of the learnedCommissioner of Requests dated 13.3.67. The plaintiff-appellant isentitled to his costs of the appeal and also to his costs of the inquiry inthe Court of Requests.
Order set aside.