052-NLR-NLR-V-50-LESLIE-ISAACS-Appellant-and-CHIEF-INSPECTOR-OF-POLICE-Respondent.pdf
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Leslie Isaacs v. Chief Inspector of Police
1948Present : Wijeyewardene A.C.J.LESLIE ISAACS, Appellant, and CHIEF INSPECTOR OFPOLICE, Respondent
S. C. 771—M. C. Colombo {Joint), 23,670
BetHng on Horse Racing Ordinance—Room in which betting slips were taken
A.ccused present—Meaning of word “ used ”—Section 17, OrdinanceNo. 55 of 1943.
The accused was found in a room in which some person was seated• accepting betting slips.
Held, that he was rightly convicted under section 17 of OrdinanceNo. 55 of 1943. It was not necessary to prove that betting slips hadbeen accepted in that room on previous occasions.
WIJEYEWARDENE A.C.J.—Leslie Isaacs v. Chief Inspector of Police 201
PPEAJL from a judgment of the Joint Magistrate, Colombo.FI. W. Jayewardene, for accused, appellant.
A. C. M. Ameer, Croton Counsel,'for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
October 15, 1948. Wheyewaudem A.C.J.-—
The accused was convicted of an offence in breach of section 17 of theBetting on Horse Racing Ordinance as amended by Ordinance No. 55 of1943. The relevant parts of that section read :
“ Any person who is found in any premises kept or used for thepurpose of unlawful betting on a horse race …. shall bepresumed, until the contrary is proved, to be guilty of the offence ofunlawful betting on a horse race.”
The evidence for the prosecution was that the accused and otherswere in a room in No. 33, Canal Row, near a table at which one Franciswas seated, accepting betting slips. The defence put forward was thatthe accused was in a Reading room “ adjoining the room in which Franciswas ”. The Magistrate rejected the defence and convicted the accused.
In appeal it was argued that the “ room in which Francis was ” couldnot be regarded as “ premises ” coming within the ambit of section 17,as there was no evidence that betting slips were accepted in that roomon previous occasions. The learned Counsel for the appellant citedPowell v. The Kempton Parle Race Course Company, Limited 1 and Milnev. The Commissioner of Police for the City of London 2 which were decidedunder 16 and 17 Victoria Chapter 119. These authorities are not of muchassistance in the present case. In Powell v. The Kempton Parle RaceCourse Company, Limited {supra) the defendant company who were theowners of a race course admitted the public on race days to an enclosureadjacent to the race course on payment of an entrance fee. Some of thepersons admitted happened to be bookmakers, while some of the otherswent there for the purpose of backing horses with the bookmakers. Anyparticular bookmaker was usually found near a particular part of theenclosure on all race days, calling out the odds to attract backers. Thatuse of the enclosure was known to and permitted by the defendantcompany. It was held that the enclosure was not a place
“ opened, kept or used for the purpose of the owner, occupier orkeeper thereof, or any person using the same, or any person procuredor employed by or acting for or on behalf of such owner, occupier or
1 (1899) Appeal Cases 143.
* (1939) 3 All England Reports 399.
202
Jay as inghe v. Attorney-General
keeper or person using the same or of any person having the care ormanagement, oj in any manner conducting the business thereof bettingwith persons resorting thereto
In the course of his judgment Lord Halsbury said that the question fordecision was the meaning to be given to the word " used ” with specialreference to the phrase “ for the purpose of owner, occupier, or keeperthereof, or any person using the same betting with persons resortingthereto ” and added
“ It is not the repeated and designed, as distinguished from thecasual or infrequent, use which the employment of that word imports-here, but the character of the use as a use by some person having thedominion and control over the place, and conducting the business of abetting establishment with the persons resorting thereto. ”
In Milne v. The Commissioner of Police for the City of London (supra)'the Judges held against the contention that a person who employedpublic telephones for the purpose of sending messages to or receivingthem from the members of a club, who were in the club premises, madesuch an employment of the club premises as to make him a person usingthe club premises within the meaning of the Act.
It will be noted that the words used in section 17 of our Ordinance are“ kept or used The word “ used ” must have been intended to meansomething different from “ kept ” and to enlarge the scope of the section[vide observations of Lord Davey in Powell v. The Kempton Park RaceCourse Company, Limited (supra)]. I see no reason why I should limitthe meaning of “ used ” by construing it as “ used repeatedly ”,
I dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed-