025-NLR-NLR-V-58-M.-I.-M.-THASSIM-et-al.-Appellants-and-K.-S.-KADIGAWA-Respondent.pdf
1956Present ; K. D. de Silva, J.31. I. 3L THASSI3I el al., Appellants and Iv. S. KADIGAWABespondent
S. C. 500-501—Jf. C. Guile, 19,137
Itulchcrs Ordinance {Cap. '101)—Charge oj slaughtering cattle without a “ speciallicence "— i'alitlily.
The permit contemplated in section 11 of the Butchers (Amendment) Ordi-nance Xo. 44 of 1947 is'not tins same thing ns flie special licence referred to insection 10 of tho principal Ordinance. A charge, therefore, of slaughteringcattle without a “ special licence ” is not valid.
jAlPPEAL from a judgment of t lie 3Iagist.rate’s Court, Galle.
-4. C. Gunaratne., for the accused-appellants.
2’. A. de S. W ijesnndera, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
September 2S, 1956. Iv. D. d.e Silva, J.—
The two appellants were convicted under section 16 of the ButchersOrdinance (Chapter 201). The charge framed against them reads :‘•'You are hereby charged that you did within the jurisdiction of thisCourt at Haliwela on 10.10.1955 not being a licensed butcher didslaughter cattle, to wit:— a red bull,•without a special licence and therebycommitted an offence punishable under section 10 of Chapter 201Jj. E. C. ”
3b-. Gunaratne who appears for the appellants contends that theconviction cannot be sustained as the charge is defective. According tosection 16 of the Butchers Ordinance a special licence is required. Theprosecution has failed to realise that section 16 has been amended byOrdinance 44 of 1947. According to that amendment a special licenceis no longer required. What is necessary is only' a permit. In tho chargeframed against the appellants no reference has been made to the amendingOrdinance.
Learned Crown Counsel submits that no prejudice has been causedto the ajjpcllants by the defect in the charge. I am not prepared touphold the conviction on that ground. A special licence and a permitare two different things. When what is necessary is a permit an accusedperson cannot be expected to obtain a licence which perhaps is somethingmore formal than a permit. The prosecution officer concerned has beenvery negligent in framing the charge against the appellants.
I set aside the conviction of the appellants and acquit them.
Appeal allowed.