091-NLR-NLR-V-63-M.-MARTHELIS-PERERA-Appellant-and-D.-M.-JAYASEKARA-Respondent.pdf
Marthelis Pererd v. Jayasekera
487
1961Present: T. S. Fernando, J.M. MARTHELIS PERERA, Appellant, andM. JAYASEKERA, RespondentS. C. 121 of 1960—C. R. Colombo, 76145
Rent Restriction Act—“ Reasonable requirement ”—" Alternative accommodation
In considering whether premises are reasonably required for the occupationof a landlord the question of alternative accommodation is a relevant fact tobe taken into account.
The fact that a person has purchased rented premises with the intention ofgoing into occupation thereof is not by itself sufficient to show that he reason-ably requires those premises.
488
T. S. FERNANDO, J-—^Marthelis Per era v. Jayasekera
PPEAL. from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Colombo.
O.P. S. de Silva, for the defendant-appellant.
S. D. Jayawardene, for the plaintiff-respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
October 18, 1961. T. S. Fernando, J.—
This appeal has been ably presented at the argument by learnedcounsel for the defendant who has contended that not merely has thelearned Commissioner of Requests overlooked the existence of certainevidence but that he has misdirected himself on the question of thereasonable requirement of the premises in question by the landlord.
When adverting to the question of alternative accommodation, thelearned Commissioner observes that there is no evidence to show thatthe tenant had made may inquiries regarding such accommodation. Ithas, however, been pointed out to me that the defendant did say he hadbeen searching unsuccessfully for a house for his occupation and thisstatement went unchallenged in cross-examination. As Soertsz J.observed in Abeytoardene v. Nicholle1, the question of alternativeaccommodation is a relevant fact to be taken into account along withother facts in considering the question of reasonableness of requirement.
The plaintiff lives in the adjoining premises which belong to her father,but her case is that the father wishes to donate those premises to hersister who is to be married shortly. There is no reason advanced orsuggested why the sister cannot live with her husband-to-be or continueto live where she is at present. The principal reason indicated in thejudgment for deciding the only issue in the case in favour of the plaintiffis that there is no good reason why she should be deprived of occupationof the house which she bought with the intention of going into occupationthereof. As Sansoni J. said in Suppiah Chettiyar v. Samarakooni 2,“ while one sympathises with a man who invests a large sum of moneyin property in the expectation of getting vacant possession, that factoronly indicates his anxiety to obtain the premises but is not a measure ofthe reasonableness of bis claim In considering whether premises arereasonably required for the occupation of a landlord, it has been heldthat a Court must take into account not only the position of the landlordbut also that of the tenant together with any other factor that may bedirectly relevant to the acquisition of the premises by the landlord—Qunasena v. Sangaralingam Filial Co.3. The defendant is a carter byoccupation and he has a wife and two children living with him in thesepremises. He has been in occupation of these premises as a tenant forsome eighteen years. There does not appear to have been a consideration
i {1944) 27 C. L. W. at 102.8 (1954) 56 N. L. R. at 163.
• (1948) 49 N. L. R at 476.
Attorney-General v. Piyasena
480
of the relative hardships to the landlord and to the tenant by the learnedCommissioner; and in these circumstances it is open to me now toconsider that question on the evidence led at the trial. X am satisfiedthat on the evidence disclosed in this case the plaintiff has failed toestablish that the premises are reasonably required for occupation byher and her family. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff*s actionmust fail.
I would set aside the order made in the Court of Requests and directthat the plaintiff’s action be dismissed with costs in both Courts.
Appeal allowed.