M. S. T. P. SENADHIRA et al., Appellants, and THE BRIBERY COMMISSIONER, Responde

068-NLR-NLR-V-63-M.-S.-T.-P.-SENADHIRA-et-al.-Appellants-and-THE-BRIBERY-COMMISSIONER-Responde.pdf


SANSONI, J.—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner
did
1961Present: Sansoni, J., and T. S. Fernando, J.>1. S. T. P. SENADHIRA et al., Appellants, and THE BRIBERYCOMMISSIONER, RespondentS. C. 4-5 of 1960—Bribery Tribunal Case No. 19/1. 159/59
Bribery Tribunal—Members cannot exercise judicial power—Incapacity of Tribunalto convict a person and pass sentence on him—“ Judicial power ”—JudicialService Commission—Power to appoint judicial officers—“ Judicial officer ”—Procedure in Bribery Tribunals—Joinder of charges and accused persons—Permissibility—Bribery Act, No. 11 of 19-541 as amended bL. Bribery (Amend-ment) Act, No. 40 of 1958, ss. 5, 6, 19, 25 (2), 26, 28, 29, 41, 42, 45, 48 (2),52 [1), 66, 68, 69 A—Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, ss. 52, 55—Letters Patent, 1947, s. 9.
The power given to a Bribery Tribunal by section 66 (1) cf the Bribery Act,No. 11 of 1954 (as amended by Act No. ^0 of 1958) to convict, fine and imprisonpersons charged before it is unconstitutional inasmuch as ruch power, beingexclusively a judicial power, can be exercised only by a judicial officer appointedby the Judicial Service Commission in terms of section 55 of the Ceylon (Con-stitution) Order in Council, 1946. The members of a Bribery Tribunal were notso appointed, having been appointed by the Governor-General on the adviceof the Minister of Justice in terms of amended section 41 of the Bribery Act.
The right of appeal given by section 69A of the Bribery Act may be availedof by a convicted person to show that a Bribery Tribunal, although it is a validbody possessing certain powers, has assumed other powers which it could notexercise, as it was not properly constituted for^that purpose.
Section 52 (1) of the Bribery Act makes a Bribery Tribunal master of its ownprocedure so long as it does not offend against the principles of natural justice.Joinder, therefore, of charges and accused persons in the manner it thinks bestfitted to serve the ends of justice is permissible.
Appeals against two convictions for offences specified in Part II of theBribery Act, No. 11 of 1954.
H. V. Perera, Q.C., with Sunil Rodrigo, S. S. Basnayake and
N.S. A. Goonetilleke, for the 1st Accused-Appellant.
Colvin R. de Silva, with B. J. Fernando, for the 2nd Accused-Appellant.
V. S. A. Pullenayegum, Crown Counsel, for the Respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 27, 1961. Sansoni, J.—
The two appellants were prosecuted before a Bribery Tribunalconstituted under the Bribery Act, No. 11 of 1954, as amended by theBribery (Amendment) Act, No. 40 of 1958.
14—LXIII
2J. N. 3 562—2,033 (12/61)
314
SANSONT, J.—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner
The first appellant, a junior assistant vainer in the ValuationDepartment, was charged with two offences. The first was that, beinga public servant, he solicited a gratification of Rs. 20,000 as an inducementor a reward for performing an official act, to wit, reducing the valuation ofproperties belonging to the estate of a deceased person. The secondoffence was that he solicited a gratification of Rs. 20,000 which he was notauthorised by law or the terms of his employment to receive. Eachoffence is punishable under section 19 of the Bribery Act No. 11 of 1954with seven years rigorous imprisonment or a fine of Rs. 5,000 or both.The second appellant was charged with having abetted the offences withwhich the first appellant was charged, and thereby committed offencespunishable under section 19 read with section 25 (2) of the Act.
After trial, both appellants Were found guilty of the charges preferredagainst them ; the first appellant was sentenced to a term of nine monthsrigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 on the first count and tonine months rigorous imprisonment on the other count, the sentences torun concurrently. The second appellant was sentenced to a term ofsix months rigorous imprisonment on each of the two counts with whichhe was charged, the sentences to run concurrently. Two warrants ofcommitment, directed to the Fiscal of the Western Province and theSuperintendent of the Prison at Welikada, signed by the President of theTribunal, commanded these officers to carry the sentences into execution.
At the hearing before us two objections were raised to the convictions.The first was that the power given to a Bribery Tribunal by amendedsection 66 (1) to pass sentence on an accused person whom it has foundguilty is unconstitutional. The other objection was to the joinder of bothappellants in one trial.
When the hearing of the appeal began, Mr. Pullenayegum raised apreliminary objection to the appeal being heard, apparently because hewas under the impression that the appellants were challenging the validityof the entire Bribery Act. Basing his argument on the case of The XingEmperor v. Benoari Lai Sarma 1 he submitted that where an Act isattacked as invalid, the right of appeal conferred by the Act cannot beexercised, and some remedy other than appeal should be sought.Mr. H. V. Perera, in reply to this objection, said that he was not chal-lenging the validity of the whole Act, nor was he even going to argue that aBribery Tribunal is an unconstitutional body. His objection to theconvictions, he said, was that they were bad in so far as the BriberyTribunal purported to exercise the power of convicting, fining andimprisoning persons charged before it. He claimed that section 69Aof the Act gave him a right of appeal which he was entitled to exercise byasking that the sentence of imprisonment and fine be set aside. Withregard to the finding of guilt made against his client, he did not attackthat finding as unconstitutional, but he submitted that the finding couldnot stand in view of the objection of misjoinder taken by him*
»11945) 4. C. 14,
SaNSONT, J.—Senadhira v. tTho Bribery Commissioner
315
Since section 69A gives a convicted person a right of appeal against aconviction for any error in law or in fact, I think the appellants have aright of appeal in this case. They are entitled to show, if they can, thatthe whole or a part of the order is illegal ; and that the Tribunal, while avalid body possessing certain powers, has assumed other powers whichit could not exercise, as it was not properly constituted for that purpose.
The first point taken by the appellants raises a question of greatconstitutional importance and involves the interpretation of section 55of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, which I shall refer tohereafter as the Order in Council. That section reads :
The appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of
judicial officers is hereby vested in the Judicial Service Com-mission.
Any judicial officer may resign his office by writing under his hand
addressed to the Governor-General.
Every judicial officer appointed before the date on which this Part
of this Order comes into operation and in office on that dateshall continue in office as if he had been appointed under thisPart of this Order.
The Judicial Service Commission may, by Order published in the
Government Gazette, delegate to the Secretary to the Commissionthe power to authorise all transfers, other than transfers in-volving increase of salary, or to make acting appointmentsin such cases and subject to such limitation as may be specifiedin the Order.
In this section “ appointment ” includes an acting or temporary
appointment and ‘'judicial officer” means the holder of anyjudicial office but does not include a Judge of the Supreme Courtor a Commissioner of Assize.
This section requires that the members of a Bribery Tribunal, before theyfunction as judicial officers, should be appointed to the Tribunal by theJudicial Service Commission. They were not so appointed, having beenappointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Minister cfJustice, in terms of amended section 41 of the Act. It is not the appellants’contention that the members of a Bribery Tribunal appointed in that wayhave no status at all, for it is conceded that they can be appointed by theGovernor-General; the contention is that members who have been soappointed cannot exercise judicial power. The argument,, in brief, wasthat while a Bribery Tribunal can perform certain functions assigned to itby the Act, its members are not validly appointed to exercise judicialpower : the Constitution requires that any person exercising such powershould be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission : th r fore,even if any provisions of the Act purport to confer that power on them,particularly the power to pass a sentence of fine or imprisonment, theyare nob entitled in law to exercise it if they were appointed in the mannerstipulated in the Act.
516SA^JSOJfl, J.—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commieeioner
We were taken through the Bribery Act as originally enacted, and asamended in 1958. The former section 5 empowered the Attorney-General,if he was satisfied that there was a prima facie case of bribery, to indict theoffender, if he was not a public servant, before the Supreme Court or theDistrict Court. Where the offender was a public servant, he could beso indicted, or he could be arraigned before a Board of Inquiry. Theamended section 5 empowers the Bribery Commissioner, an officerbrought into being bjr the amending Act, to prosecute any person, if he issatisfied that there is a prima facie case of the commission of an offencespecified in Part 2 of the Act, before a Bribery Tribunal. Sweepingamendments were introduced in 1958 which abolished trials before theDistrict Court or the Supreme Court and inquiries before Boards cfInquiry. Boards of Inquiry were abolished, and Bribery Tribunalscame into existence : the former had the power to inquire into charges ofbribery against public servants brought before them by the Attorney-General, and to decide whether or not the accused person was guilty ;that decision would be communicated to the authority that had appointedthe accused person, and certain statutory penalties automatically super-vened. The Board also had certain powers of punishment, which it is notnecessary to detail here ; nor do I consider it necessary to discuss whether,or to what extent, the establishment of such Boards was in accord with theConstitution. Bribery Tribunals were constituted under amended section42 “for the trial of persons prosecuted for bribery”, with power to“ hear, try and determine any prosecution for bribery made againstany person before the Tribunal”. All the offences of bribery specifiedin Part 2 of the Act, all of them punishable with rigorous imprisonmentfor a term not exceeding seven 3rears or a line not exceeding Rs. 5,000,or both, became triable by the newly constituted Bribery Tribunals andwere no longer triable by the Courts. Section 28, as amended, providesthat a sentence of imprisonment passed by a Bribery Tribunal, on a personconvicted by the Tribunal of bribery, shall be executed in the samemanner as if the Tribunal were a Court ; and that a fine or penalty imposedby a Bribery Tribunal may be recovered on an application made to aDistrict Court by the Attorney-General. Section 68 empowers a Tribunalto enforce its authority and obedience to its orders by punishing, as forcontempt, any disregard of or disobedience to its authority committedin its presence or in the course of any proceedings before it. Por thispurpose it has been given all the powers conferred on a Court by Section 57of the Courts Ordinance and Chapter 65 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Reverting now to section 55 of the Order in Council, sub-section (5)provides that a “ judicial officer ” means “ the holder of any judicial officebut does not include a Judge of the Supreme Court or a Commissioner ofAssize ”. Section 3 defines “judicial office ” as “any paid judicial office ”.Section 45 of the Bribery Act, as amended, provides that the membersof the Panel appointed by the Governor-General (from which the membersof a Bribery Tribunal are selected) shall be paid such remuneration asmay be fixed by the Minister of Justice in consultation with the Minister of
317
SANSOBft, J.—ySenadhira v. J%a Bribery C&npmissioner ^ _ .
^l ■' ' "-■ *' ~V *r –
Finance from tune to time. If the members'^ of a Bribery Tribunal
function as judicial officers when they exercise judicial power, it cannot be
doubted that they act in breach of section 55 of the Order in Council so
long as they have not been appointed by the Judicial Service Commission ;
and any exercise of judicial power by members not so appointed is
necessarily invalid.
•
It is essential to read the Order in Council as a whole, letting each Partshed light on the other Parts, so that theyr may all be given effect to.Part 2 deals with the Governor-General. He is authorised to exercisesuch powers, authorities and functions of Her Majesty as she may bepleased to assign to him, but subject to the provisions'of the Order in Council.The Letters Patent, 1947, which determine the distribution of powersbetween the Queen and the Governor-General, by section 9 empower theGovernor-General to appoint “ all such Judges, Commissioners, Justicesof the Peace and other officers as may lawfully be constituted or appointedby us”, but this again is subject to the provisions of the Orders in Council,1946 and 1947. Part 3 of the Order in Council deals with the legislatureand the power of Parliament to make laws “ subject to the provisions ofthis Order”. Part 5 deals with the executive ; the executive powerof the Island continues to be vested in Her Majesty, and it. may beexercised on her behalf by the Governor-General “ in accordance with theprovisions of this Order and of any other law for the time being in force”.Part 6 deals with the judicature. This threefold division of the legislativepower, the executive power and the judicial power, first mentioned inAristotle’s Politics, has been dealt with in Blackstone’s Commentariespublished in 176S. That learned author wrote that the “ legislativepower ” is vested by the English constitution in Parliament, theexecutive power ” in the King or Queen ; while with regard to the*" judicial power ” he said : f£ By the long and uniform usage of manyages, our Kings have delegated their whole judicial power to the Judgesof their several courts …. And, in order to maintain both the dignityand independence of the Judges in the superior courts, it is enacted by thestatute 13 Will. III. c. 2, that their commissions shall be made (not, asformerly, durante bene placito, but) quamdiu bene se gesserint, and theirsalaries ascertained and established; but that it may be lawful to removethem on the address of both houses of Parliament. And now, by thenoble improvements of that law, in the statute of 1 Geo. III. c. 23, enactedat the earnest recommendation of the King himself from the throne, theJudges are continued in their offices during their good behaviour, notwith-standing any demise of the Crown, (which was formerly held immediatelyto vacate their seats) and their full salaries are absolutely secured tothem during the continuance of their commissions ; his majesty havingbeen pleased to declare, ’’ that he looked upon the independence anduprightness of the Judges as essential to the impartial administration ofjustice, as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties of hissubjects ; and as most conducive to the honour of the Crown’. ”
2*J. X. R 562 (12/61)
318
SAITS ONI, J.—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner
III Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation Lord Atkin referredto the British North America Act, 1867 which protected the independenceof the judges in Canada by provisions that the judges of the Superior,District and County courts shall be appointed by the Governor-General,that the judges of the Superior courts shall hold office during goodbehaviour, and that the salaries of the judges of those three courts shallbe fixed and provided by the Parliament of Canada. He then said :“ These are three principal pillars in the temple of justice, and they arenot to be undermined.” We find these same safeguards in section 52of the Order in Council which deals with the judges of the Supreme Court.They and Commissioners of Assize are to be appointed by the Governor-General. The framers of our Constitution erected a fourth pillar in thattemple when the power of appointment, transfer, dismissal and dis-ciplinar3r control of judicial officers was vested in the Judicial ServiceCommission. Blackstone, having dealt at page 267 of Volume I with thejudicial power, explained on page 269 why a distinct and separate existenceof the judicial power is necessary in a free state. He wrote :“ In this
distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar bodyof men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure by the Crown,consists one main preservative of the public liberty which cannot subsistlong in any state, unless the administration of common justice be, in somedegree, separated both from the legislative and also from the executivepower. Were it joined with the legislative, the life, liberty and propertyof the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisionswould be then regulated only by their own opinions, and not by anyfundamental principles of law ; which though legislators may depart from,yet judges are bound to observe. Were it joined with the executive,this union might soon be an overbalance for the legislative.”
What is this “ judicial power ” which is exercised by judges, andwhen can it be said to be exercised ? From such inquiry as I have beenable to make into the subject, I have learnt that it is difficult to define theprecise limits of the power. There are, however, cases which raise nodoubt, and I need only consider where this particular case lies.
In the Canadian case mentioned earlier, the Privy Council had todecide whether certain provisions of an Act passed by the Ontariolegislature offended against the Canadian Constitution. It held thatwhile the Municipal Board constituted under the particular Act wasprimarily entrusted with administrative functions it was also entrusted,by certain sections of the Act, with the jurisdiction and powers of aSuperior Court, such as the power to set aside a contract and impose newterms upon the parties to it. “It is difficult ”, says the judgment, “ toavoid the conclusion that, whatever be the definition given to Court of•justice, or judicial power, the sections in question do purport to clothe theBosud with the functions of a Court, and to vest in it judicial powers.'” 1
1 (1938) A.O. 415.
SANSONT, J.—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner
310
It was further held in that case that so far as legislation purported to giveit judicial authority, that attempt must fail, since it was not validlyconstituted to receive judicial authority ; but as an administrative bodyits constitution was valid.
Another case cited by Mr. H. V. Perera was Attorney-General forAustralia v. The Queen 1. The Privy Council there considered whetherit was constitutional for the Commonwealth Parliament to grant bothjudicial and non-judicial powers to judges appointed for life. TheCommonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration which was vestedwith administrative, arbitral and executive powers, was by certainsections of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-1952, also vestedwith judicial powers, such as powers to impose penalties for a breach of anorder or award, and to punish contempts of its power and authority.The Privy Council held that under the constitution it was not possible tovest in the Court a judicial power “ even to the extent of fining a citizen ordepriving him of his liberty.” It is pertinent to recall, at this point, theprovisions of section 68 which confer similar powers on a Bribery Tribunal.
In the course of his judgment Viscount Simonds distinguished betweenarbitral power and judicial power, and quoted from the Australian case ofWaterside Workers Federation of Australia v. Alexander (J.W.) Ltd. a.Isaacs, J. and Rich, J. there said :“ The essential difference is that the
judicial power is concerned with the ascertaining, declaration and enforce-ment of the rights and liabilities of the parties as they exist, or are deemedto exist, at the moment the proceedings are instituted ; whereas thefunction of the arbitral power in relation to industrial disputes is toascertain and declare, hut not enforce what in the opinion of the arbitratorought to be the respective rights and liabilities of the parties in relationto each other.” They further said that Parliament can give an arbitratorpower to inquire and declare what in his opinion ought to be the res-pective rights and liabilities with respect to the matters in dispute, andsay that when so declared those shall be their mutual rights andliabilities. The matter is then in the position of a valid Act enacting theidentical mutual rights and liabilities. In this way “ the arbitral functionis ancillary to the legislative function, and provides the factum upon whichthe law operates to create the right or duty. The judicial function is anentirely separate branch, and first ascertains whether the alleged right orduty exists in law, and, if it binds it, then proceeds if necessary to enforcethe law.” The italics in each case are mine. Griffith, C.J. said :“The
question whether any specific function does or does not appertain to thejudicial power depends upon its nature, and not upon the name by whichthe authority which exercises it is designated in a statute, or upon whatit is called in argument.” Barton, J. drew a clear distinction between acourt which could enforce its decisions and thereby performs strictlyjudicial functions, and such bodies as arbitrators whose proceedings
(1967) A.C. 288.
3 (1918) 25 C.LJ1. 434.
320
SAINS ONI, J.—Senadkira v. The Bribery Commissioner
lacked compulsive powers and especially the power of enforcement.The latter for this reason did not exercise judicial power, and they couldbe compared to commissions for investigating and pronouncing onquestions of fact for the information of the public or as a foundation forexecutive or legislative action. Both types of tribunals do work which isjudicial in the sense of bringing to bear the judicial faculty, but it is onlythe courts which were judicial in the sense of the exercise of power uponthe parties in their dispute. Guided by these observations, I regard thisexercise of power to enforce his decisions as the key to the meaningof the phrase " judicial officer ” in section 55 of the Order in Council.It is beyond question to my mind that, as was held in that case, thepower to convict for offences and the power to impose penalties andpunishments are matters appertaining exclusively to the judicial power.
Mr. Pullenayegum argued that the phrase should be limited to thosewho hold office as District Judges, Magistrates, Commissioners of Requestsand Presidents of Rural Courts. He relied on para. 397 of the Report ofthe Soulbury Commission as he was no doubt entitled to do. If we areconfined to the Report as an aid to the interpretation of section 55, thatmight be the only conclusion. But it is significant that the Order inCouncil does not follow the wording of the Report on this subject. Itdoes not even mention a Judicial Service. There has also to be consideredthe Ministers’ Draft, which recommended in Article 69 (3) that “ anappointment to a judicial office (other than Judges of the Supreme Court)should be made by the Governor-General on the recommendation of theJudicial Commission.”
There are, however, more weighty considerations that lead me to holdthat “ judicial officer ” includes all persons who exercise judicial power.To hold otherwise would be to hold that Parliament can establish newCourts with powers as great as, or even greater than, those possessedby the established Courts, and devise a new method of appointing thejudges who are to preside over them. Such substitute or parallel courtscould be given unlimited power over ee the life, liberty and property of thesubject,” to be exercised by persons to be appointed in any mannerParliament might choose. The idea is not fantastic. The 1958 amend-ments to the Bribery Act were designed to deprive the established Courtsof their jurisdiction to try charges of bribery, and to invest permanentlyestablished Bribery Tribunals with that jurisdiction. Let me repeatthat observation in different words. The Bribery Tribunals were Courtsset up in substitution for the established Courts, and they were entrustedwith the function of administering justice in a particular sphere.It must not, of course, be forgotten that the trial of criminalprosecutions is the main function of a Court exercising criminal juris-diction. Such an attempt made once could well be repeated. True,they are called Tribunals and not Courts, but “ whether persons wereJudges, whether tribunals were Courts, and whether they exercisedwhat is now called judicial power, depended and depends on substance
SANSONT, J.—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner
321
and not on mere name.” 1. These considerations seem to me to berelevant, because “ as good a test as I know of the significance of anopinion is to contemplate the consequences of its opposite.”
When Part 6 of the Order in Council speaks of the Judicature andrefers to Judges of the Supreme Court, Commissioners of Assize, andjudicial officers it seems to me to be dealing with all those persons to whomjudicial power may be delegated. It includes not only the officers of theestablished Courts but those akin to them in the sense that, withoutbeing judges, they exercise judicial power. The separate treatmentwhich the judicature receives has its antecedents in Blackstone’s thesisand rests, I think, on the fundamental belief that appointment by anindependent body like the Judicial Service Commission is an essentialsafeguard of personal liberty and judicial independence.
The question remains whether the provisions of the Act conferringjudicial power on the Tribunals are distinct and severable from the otherprovisions which confer other powers. Mr. Perera submitted that upto the point of finding a person brought before it guilty or not guilty themembers of the Tribunal were entitled to act, even though not appointedby the Judicial Service Commission. Certain statutory penalties anddisqualifications specified in section 29 would attach to a person foundguilty, and its decision would be reported to the persons or bodiesmentioned in section 66. But he submitted that the provisions ofsection 26, empowering a Tribunal to order the payment of a penalty bythe person convicted—a power which could formerly be exercised onlyby a Court—clearly confer a judicial power, and the members have notbeen validly appointed to exercise such power. I am inclined to agreewith that view. It is right that we should preserve as much of the will ofParliament as possible : and so far as that will, as expressed in a Statute,is not repugnant to the Constitution, we should uphold those provisionswhich we consider not to conflict with the Constitution. I see no objectionto the conferment of arbitral functions which involve the investigationand pronouncement of a finding on questions of fact, though I mustconfess that the manner in which arbitral and judicial functions have beenconferred on Tribunals makes this a border-fine case. To that extent thefinding of guilt in this case would be operative.
The only other matter for decision is the objection of misjoinder. Theargument for the appellants was founded on the terms of new section 5(1)which reads :
“ If the Bribery Commissioner is satisfied that there is a prima faciecase of the commission by any person of an offence specified in Part IIof this Act, such Commissioner or any advocate, proctor or officer autho-rised in writing by such Commissioner shall prosecute such personbefore a Bribery Tribunal.”
1 (1918) 25 C.L.R. at 451.
322Vadamaradchy Hindu Educational Society Ltd. v. Minister of Education
While it was coneeded that two persons could be charged and tried atone trial with two or more offences, provided they were offences of thesame kind and they were jointly liable, it was urged that the section didnot permit a joinder Buch as we have in the present case. It was alsopointed out for the appellants that section 6, which had made the provi-sions of the Criminal Procedure Code (except section 325) applicable toproceedings in any Court for bribery, was repealed in 1958 ; further, thatsection 48 (2) which required a Board of Inquiry “ to make a thoroughinquiry without regard to legal forms and solemnities ”, was also repealedin 1958. One can guess why these changes were made in 1958, but I donot think it would serve any purpose to go into further detail on thisaspect of the arguments. The matter seems to me to be concluded by theterms of new section 52 (1) which reads :
“ Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Bribery Tribunal may
regulate its own procedure.”
I agree with Mr. Pullenayegum that this provision makes a BriberyTribunal the master of its own procedure, so long as it does not offendagainst the principles of natural j ustice. A Tribunal is thereby empoweredto draw up a charge sheet and join such charges and accused persons in themanner it thinks best fitted to serve the ends of justice, for these arematters of procedure. I do not think that the joinder of the accusedpersons and charges in this case is open to objection, and I hold that therewas no misjoinder.
In the result I uphold the first objection raised on behalf of theappellants and make order quashing the convictions and the sentencespassed on them.
T. S. Fernando, J.—I agree.
Convictions and sentences quashed.