051-NLR-NLR-V-77-M.-SALAHUDEEN-Petitioner-and-THE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL-Respondent.pdf
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SAMERAWICKPA1IE, J.-—Salahudeen v. Attorney-General
1970Present: Samerawickrame, J.
M.SALAHUDEEN, Petitioner, and THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, Respondent
C. C . A. Application 164/70—Application for bail under Section 15of the Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 7)
S. C. 312/68—M. C. Colombo, 3062/A
Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 7)—Sections 15, IS—Admission to bail—Rules applicable.
An application for bail tinder section 18 of the Court of CriminalAppeal Ordinance may be heard by a single judge in the firstinstance.
The release of a prisoner on bail pending an appeal to theCourt of Criminal Appeal will only be granted in exceptionalcircumstances.
A. PPLICATION for bail under SectioH 15 of the Court ofCriminal Appeal Ordinance.
A. C. de Zoysa, with W. Justin Perera, for the petitioner.
Ian Wikramanayake, Crown Counsel, for the respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 17, 1970. Samerawickrame, J.—
The first matter for consideration is whether this applicationcan be dealt with by a single judge. Section 18 of the Court ofCriminal Appeal Ordinance provides that the power to admit anappellant to bail may be exercised by any judge of the Court ofCriminal Appeal but if relief is refused the appellant shall be
SAMERAWICKRAME, J.—Salahitdeen v. Attorney-General
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entitled to have the application determined by the Court ofCriminal Appeal duly constituted for the hearing and determin-ing of appeals.
It is a settled principle that the release of a prisoner on bailpending an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal will only begranted in exceptional circumstances. The circumstances reliedon by the petitioner are set out in paragraphs 4 (d) and (e) ofthe affidavit as follows : —
“(d) I am a businessman and a substantial sum of money isdue to me from various credit customers. As such myphysical presence is essential to collect these dues.
I wish to retain senior counsel to conduct my appeal butI cannot do so if I fail to collect the monies due to me. ”
Though the petitioner states that he is a businessman and thatmoney is due to him from various credit customers he does notstate the nature of his business or any other detail regarding it.I find that the petitioner was bailed out on 20th June, 1969,pending trial and he was presumably able to look after hisbusiness until the date of trial which was the 10th of October,1970. Any dues from credit customers must therefore be eitherdues that he had failed to realise before 10th October, 1970, orsuch as have become recoverable after that date.
Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the case ofQueen v. Punchi Banda.1 In that case the petitioners had beensentenced to six months’ rigorous imprisonment and the appealfiled would not have been listed for hearing at the next sittingsof the Court of Criminal Appeal. In view of those facts and theopinion formed by the learned judge who heard the applicationfor bail that they were unlikely to abscond they were allowedbail. The petitioner in the present application has beensentenced to a term of three years’ rigorous imprisonment on aconviction for attempted culpable homicide. This case thereforecannot be brought within the principle set out in Queenv. Punchi Banda (supra).
I am of the view that it has not been shown that there areany exceptional circumstances which entitle the petitioner tobail. His application is accordingly refused.
Application refused.
(I960) 62 a. L.W. 16.