040-NLR-NLR-V-36-MEDIS-et-al-v.-PUNCHIHEWA-et-al.pdf
19.8
DALTON J.—Mendis v. PunchiiteuNi,
1934Present: Dalton J.
MENDIS et al. v. PUNCHIHEWA et. al.
189-190—C. R. Gampola, 264.
School-leaving certificate—Refusal to issue—Action by pupil—No right to su<
The refusal on the part of the principal of a school to issue a schoolleaving certificate to a pupil does not give him a cause of action fodamages.
PPEAL from a judgment of the Commissioner of Requests, Gampola-N. E. Weerasooria, for defendants, appellants.
V. Ranawake (with him T. S. Fernando), for plaintiff, respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
May 1, 1934. Dalton J.—
This is an action by J. D. Mendis, a minor, 14 years of age, by his nextfriend, his elder brother, against the first defendant the manager and thesecond defendant the principal of a school called Anuruddha College,Nawalapitiya. The claim is for damages, the defendants, it is stated,having unlawfully declined to issue to the plaintiff a school-leavingcertificate, as a result of which he suffered loss and damages to the amountof Rs. 200. The Commissioner of Requests has found that plaintiff-suffered no damages and has awarded him the sum of one cent, as theplaintiff proved a wrong was done to him in the unjustifiable withholdingof the certificate. He also ordered the defendants to pay plaintiff’s costs.Both defendants appeal from this judgment.
DAL.TON J.—Mendis v. Punchihewa.
189
I might here state a few further facts. The Commissioner is satisfiedthat this is really a dispute between the boy’s brother-in-law, A. N. G,Gautamadasa, and the first defendant. Gautamadasa had been principalof the school, but the first defendant asked him to quit at the end ofOctober, 1931, whereupon the second defendant was -appointed in hisplace. The boy’s father lives at Moratuwa.. but when Gautamadasa wasprincipal, the boy lived and boarded with him whilst he was attendingthe school. There is nothing, however, to suggest the boy did not spendhis holidays in his own home, and there is no evidence to justify anyfinding that Gautamadasa was his guardian. A document was produced(D 1) in Gautamadasa’s own writing, inconsistent with any such sugges-tion. Further. Gautamadasa admitted he was the real plaintiff in thecase, the boy and his elder brother clearly being made use of by him tosatisfy his spite against the defendants.
In November. 1931. Gautamadasa wrote to the second defendantasking him to deliver to “ bearer ” the school certificates of “ my wards. J. B. Mendis and J. D. .Mendis ”, the principal having been instructedto remove their names from the registers as from November 1. Corre-spondence thereafter passed between these parties and the EducationDepartment, as a result of which the certificates were issued on Decem-ber 17. The defendants alleged there had. been a strike at the school earlyin November, into which inquiry had to be made, but Gautamadasadenies plaintiff had anything to do with it. The tone of one or two ofGautamadasa’s messages is certainly provocative, but the Commissioneris satisfied that the defendants delayed the issue of the certificates.through vindictiveness. If' that is so, it would certainly seem the conductof Gautamadasa under the circumstances was the more vindictive.
The defendants urge that 'no cause of action arises to the plaintiff inthe failure, under the circumstances -set- out inv the plaint, of defendants,to issue the school-leaving certificate. • That contention must be upheld.Under the Code of Regulations for Assisted English Schools, clause 15(iiL), on the pupil being withdrawn, the leaving certificate is to be handedto the parent or guardian, or to someone authorized in writing by theparent or guardian. The pupil is not entitled to demand it for obviousreasons, whilst Gautamadasa had no authority to demand it. The recordsof the school in his writing show that the father was ** the parent orguardian” for the purpose of the regulations. The father has taken nopart in these proceedings, possibly wisely, nor did he ever make anyrequest or demand for the certificate.
It was then urged for plaintiff that there was an implied contractbetween the boy’s father and the defendants, the right to the certificateunder the provisions of the regulations being a condition of that contract.Since it was for the benefit of the boy, the boy, it is argued, was entitledto come into Court and sue the defendants for a breach of this contract.Mr. Ranawake concedes he can find no authority for this argument apartfrom what he states are “ general principles ”. He cannot bring it withinthe provisions of such a case as Jinadasa v. Silva Whilst supportingthe judgment, he also concedes he is unable to adopt the reasoning of the
1 12 C. L. R, 179.
DALTON J.—Mendis v. Pvnchihewa.
200
Commissioner by which he has come to his conclusion. In the only casecited, upon which apparently both sides relied in the lower Court, Amarisv. Amarasinghe the plaintiff was the father of the boys, it being heldthere was an implied contract between him, the father, and the defendant,who was the head teacher of the school. That case is of no assistance toplaintiff in this case. The argument raised in the lower Court that therewas an implied contract between the pupil and the defendants was notpursued before me.
For these reasons I would hold that no cause of action arises to theplaintiff, and the action must fail. The appeal is allowed and the decreeentered is set aside, the plaintiff’s action being dismissed. The appellantsare entitled to their costs in both Courts. The person who should paythese costs is of course Gautamadasa, but under the circumstances I canmake no order to that effect.
Appeal allowed.
1 21 N. L. R. 176