040-SLLR-SLLR-1999-V-1-MOHAMED-v.-CEYLON-KNITWEAR-INDUSTRIES-LTD..pdf
CA
Mohamed v. Ceylon Knitwear Industries Ltd.
337
MOHAMED
v.CEYLON KNITWEAR INDUSTRIES LTD.
COURT OF APPEALISMAIL, J. (P/CA),
TILAKAWARDANE, J.
A. NO. 759/96
C. COLOMBO NO. 13616/LAUGUST 31, 1998SEPTEMBER 22, 1998JANUARY 29, 1999
Civil Procedure Code – Amendment No. 53 of 1980 – S. 337 (1), (2), (3) – Writof Execution – Application within a period of 10 years – Renewal after 10-yearperiod.
The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the District Court and enteredjudgment in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, on 5. 4. 1984. The plaintiff-respond-ent made an Application for the execution of the Decree for the first time on
2. 85, the Writ was not executed. The Court issued a Writ of Execution forthe second time when an application was made stating that a period of 10 yearshad not lapsed from the date of judgment. The plaintiff-respondent thereafter on2. 3. 95 made an Application for the renewal of the said Writ of Execution. Theobjections of the defendant-petitioner were rejected, and Court made order grantingthe Writ of Execution, on the basis that the judgment-creditor had lawfully appliedfor the issue of the Writ within the specified ten-year period and that it hadthereafter renewed it, from time to time, before its expiration in terms of s. 337(3) CPC.
Held:
1. The Application for the first renewal was made on 2.3.95, after theexpiration of a period of ten years from date of decree following thejudgment of the Court of Appeal on 5.4.84. The District Court had erredin granting the Application for the renewal of the Writ after ten yearscontrary to the provisions of s. 337 (1) read with s. 337 (3) CPC.
APPLICATION in Revision from the Order of the District Court of Colombo.
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Cases referred to:
Peries v. Cooray – (1909) 12 NLR 362.
Haji Omar v. Bodhidasa – (1994) 2 SLR 197.
R. C. Gunaratne for defendant-petitioner.
K.N. Choksy, PC with V. K. Choksy for plaintiff-respondent.
Cur. adv. vutt.
February 03, 1999.
ISMAIL, J. (P/CA)
The plaintiff-respondent company instituted an action against the 2nddefendant-petitioner and the three defendant-respondents above-namedseeking a declaration of title to the premises described in the 2ndschedule to the plaint and praying for the ejectment of the defendantstherefrom.
The District Judge held that the plaintiff company was entitled toa declaration of title to the premises but refused its prayer for theejectment of the contesting 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant-petitioner from the premises. The finding of the District Judge wasthat the 1st defendant was entitled to remain in occupation as a tenantof one portion of the premises and that the 2nd defendant's wife wasthe tenant of the other portion and as such that no order for ejectmentcould be made against the 2nd defendant. Judgment was enteredex parte against the 3rd and 4th defendant-respondents.
The Court of Appeal considered this judgment in appeal bearingNo. CA 822/75 (F). By its judgment dated 5.4.84, the Court of Appealfound that the 1st and 2nd defendants had failed to discharge theburden of proving that their occupation of the premises was lawful.The judgment of the District Court was, therefore, set aside andjudgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff-respondent company,as prayed for in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the plaint, as against all
CA Mohamed v. Ceylon Knitwear Industries Ltd. (Ismail, J. (P/CA))339
the defendants. Decree Nisi was ordered to be entered and issuedon the 3rd and 4th defendants.
The 2nd defendant-petitioner's application for special leave to appealto the Supreme Court bearing No. SC Special LA 52/84 against thejudgment of the Court of Appeal dated 5.4.84 was refused with costsby an order made on 4.7.84.
The plaintiff-respondent company made an' application for theexecution of the decree for the first time on 7.2.85 (JE37). The writwas not executed. The Court issued a writ of execution for the secondtime when an application was made on behalf of the plaintiff-respond-ent company on 11.3.94 (JE72), stating that a period of ten yearshad not elapsed from the date of the judgment in appeal in its favour.
The plaintiff-respondent company made an application on 2.3.95for the renewal of the said Writ of Execution for a pariod of one year.It has been pointed out that a motion filed for this purpose has beenminuted only on 4.5.95 as journal entry No. 73. The next journal entry(No. 74) dated 26.4.96 indicates that notice was ordered to be issuedon the 2nd defendant-petitioner granting him an opportunity to fileobjections against allowing a further renewal of the writ.
The Additional District Judge held an inquiry and has made orderrejecting the objections of the 2nd defendant-petitioner to the grantof a renewal of the writ. The order dated 23.10.96 has been madeon the basis that the judgment-creditor had lawfully applied for theissue of the Writ of Execution within the specified ten year periodand that it had thereafter renewed it, from time to time before itsexpiration in terms of section 337 (3) of the Civil Procedure Code.
The 2nd defendant-petitioner by this application in revision fileddated 07.11.96 has sought to have the aforesaid order set aside.
Learned counsel for the 2nd defendant-petitioner submitted that interms of the section 337 of the Civil Procedure Code, as amendedby Act No. 53 of 1980, an application for the execution of writ oran application for the renewal of the unexecuted writ cannot be made
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after the expiration of a period of the ten years from the date of thedecree sought to be executed.
The relevant provisions of section 337 of the Civil Procedure Code,as amended by Act No. 53 of 1980, are as follows:
337. (1) No application (whether it be the first or the subsequentapplication) to execute a decree, not being a decreegranting an injunction, shall be granted after the expirationof ten years from –
the date of the decree sought to be executed orof the decree, if any, on appeal affirming the same; or
{b)…
Nothing in this section shall prevent the Court from grantingan application for execution of a decree after theexpiration of the said term of ten years, where thejudgment-debtor has by fraud or force prevented theexecution of the decree at some time within ten yearsimmediately before the date of the application.
Subject to the provisions contained in subsection (2), aWrit of Execution, if unexecuted, shall reman in force forone year only from its issue, but –
such writ may, at anytime before its expiration, berenewed by the judgment-creditor for one year fromthe date of such renewal, and so on from time totime; or
a fresh writ may at any time after the expirationof an earlier writ be issued, till satisfaction of thedecree is obtained.
The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the District Courtand entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff-respondent company
CA Mohamed v. Ceylon Knitwear Industries Ltd. (Ismail, J. (P/CA))341
on 5.4.84. The applications for the execution of the decree were madefirstly on 7.2.85 and again on 11.3.94, both within a period of tenyears from the date of the judgment in appeal in terms of which thedecree should have been entered. The date of the refusal of theapplication for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is not material.The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the judgment-creditorcould not have made an application for the renewal of the writ on2.3.95 (JE73), as a period of ten years had elapsed from 5.4.84, thedate on which the judgment on appeal was delivered.
The position taken up by counsel for the plaintiff-respondent is thatthe ten-year period does not apply to the renewal of the writ. It wascontended that the only time constraint applicable to renewal is thatthe application for renewal must be made before the expiration of aperiod of one year from the date of the issue of the writ. The renewalhaving been applied for on 2.3.95 within one year of the order issuingthe writ for the second time on 11.3.94, it was contended that it wasa lawful application within the meaning of section 337 (3) (a) of theCode. It was emphasized that this was not an application for a freshwrit' under 337 (3) (b) in which event the ten-year period would haveapplied.
The amendment to section 337 of the Code has introduced a timelimit of a period of ten years within which a first or a subsequentapplication to execute a writ shall be granted. It was held in Periesv. Coora/’> that in terms of section 337 of the Code before itsamendment, there was no time limit within which a first applicationfor execution could be granted. It appears also that originally, beforethe repeal of section 5 of the Ordinance No. 22 of 1871, the rightof a judgment-creditor to a writ of execution was limited to cases wherethe decree was not more than ten years old.
I am unable to accept the submission on behalf of the respondentthat the ten-year period applies only to an application for a writ andthat it does not apply to a renewal of a writ. I do not also acceptthe submission that once an application for the execution of a writhas been applied for within the ten-year period and has been issuedby Court, the renewal of such a writ need not be applied for withinthe period of ten years since the date of the decree.
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lam of the view that the provisions of section 337 (3) are subjectto the time period specified in subsection (1).
It is quite clear that the judgment-creditor did not apply for theexecution of the decree or seek a renewal on the basis that thejudgment-debtor has by fraud or force prevented the execution of thedecree within ten years immediately preceding the date of theapplication. The provisions of subsection (2) would therefore not beapplicable.
In Haji Omar v. BodhidasaF* it was contended that in terms ofsection 337 (3) of the Code, a Writ of Execution may be issued atany time until satisfaction of decree is obtained and that thereforethere is no time constraint for such application. Dheeraratne, J.observed as follows at page 193: "I am unable to justify such aninterpretation because the amended section 337 (1) states that noapplication to execute a decree shall be granted after the expirationof ten years from the date of the decree, and it is clear that whatis stated in subsection (3) must be read subject to that generalprovision contained in subsection (1) as regards the time frame.Besides, the opening words of subsection (3) 'subject to the provisionscontained in subsection (2)' would itself attract the limitation of tenyears specified in that subsection".
The application for the first renewal was made on 2.3.95 (JE 73)after the expiration of a period of ten years from date of the decreefollowing the judgment of the Court of Appeal on 5.4.84. The AdditionalDistrict Judge has erred in granting the application for the renewalof the writ made after ten years contrary to the provisions ofsection 337 (1) read with section 337 (3) of the Civil Procedure Code.The order of the Additional District Judge dated 23.10.96 istherefore set aside.
The application is allowed with costs fixed at Rs. 1,050 payableby the plaintiff-respondent to the defendant-petitioner.
TILAKAWARDANE, J. – I agree.
Application allowed.
CA
All Ceylon Commercial and Industrial Workers' Union
v. Nestle Lanka Ltd.
343
ALL CEYLON COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIALWORKERS' UNIONv.
NESTLE LANKA LTD.
COURT OF APPEALJAYASURIYA, J.
C.A. NO. 752/96ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGSNO. 8/A/1/92, and 1/364/93FEBRUARY 18. 1997JULY 25. 1997JANUARY 11. 1999
Industrial Disputes Act s. 4 (1) – Arbitration – Termination justifiable – Duty toact judicially – No evidence Rule – Error on the face of the record – Writ ofCertiorari.
The petitioner seeks to quash the award made by the Arbitrator wherein hehas held that the termination was justifiable.
Held:
Although Arbitrator does not exercise judicial power in the strict sense,it is his duty to act judicially, though ultimately he makes an award asmay appear to him to be just and equitable.
There is no evidence or material which could support the findings reachedby the Arbitrator, findings and decisions unsupported by evidence arecapricious, unreasonable or arbitrary.
A deciding authority which has made a finding of primary fact whollyunsupported by evidence or which has drawn an inference whollyunsupported by any of the primary facts found by it will be held to haveerred in point of law.
‘No evidence rule' does not contemplate a total lack of evidence it is equallyapplicable where the evidence taken as a whole, is not reasonably capableof supporting the finding or decision.
Writ of Certiorari to quash the award of the Arbitrator. .
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Cases referred to:
Attorney-General of Australia v. Regina -1957 2 All ER49.
South Ceylon Democratic Workers' Unionv. Setvadurai -71NLR 244.
Stratheden Tea Co., Ltd. v. Setvadurai -66 NLR 6.
Heath & Co. v. Kariyawasam and two others – 71 NLR382.
Nadaraja Ltd. v. Krishnadasan – 78 NLR 255.
Minister of National Revenue v. Wrights Canadian Ropes Ltd. – 1947A1 109.
Argosy Company Ltd. v. I. R. C. – 1971 – 1 WLR 514.
Osgood v.Nelson – 1872 LR 5 HL 636.
Maradana Mosque Trustees v. Mohamed – 1967 1 AC 13.
Allinson v.General Medical Council 1894 – 1 QB 750 at 760.
ft v. Roberts – 1908 1 KB 407 at 423.
Folkestone Corporation v. Brockman – 1914 AC 338 at 367.
ft v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. – 1922 AC 128 at 151.
ft v. Ludlow – 1947 KB 634.
O'reilly v. Mackman – 1983 2 AC 237.
ft. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ex parte shaw- 1951
1 KB 711.(Affirmed in 1952 1 KB 338).
Shell GasCompany v. All Ceylon Commercial and Industrial Workers'
Union 1998 – 1 SLR 118 at 124.
Ms. Chamantha Weerakoon-Unamboowa with Ms. Dilhani Perera for petitioner.
A. J. I. Tillakawardena with Upul Fernando and Nihal Samarasinghe for 1strespondent.
No appearance for 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
May 03, 1999.
JAYASURIYA, J.
The petitioner in its amended application has prayed for the issueof a mandate in the nature of a writ of certiorari quashing the awardmade by the fourth respondent dated 9th of July, 1996, which hadbeen produced marked P7. The second respondent in his capacityas Minister of Labour has made a reference in terms of section 4
of the Industrial Disputes Act to the fourth respondent and
CAAll Ceylon Commercial and Industrial Workers' Union
v. Nestle Lanka Ltd. (Jayasuriya, J.)345
appointed the fourth respondent as arbitrator to conciliate, arrive ata settlement and to determine the dispute which had arisen betweenthe petitioner-trade union and the first respondent. The third respond-ent in his capacity as Commissioner of Labour has stated the issuearising on the dispute between the aforesaid parties as follows :
"Is the termination of the services of the employee namedT. A. M. Hemasiri with effect from 10th of April, 1992, by the firstrespondent-employer justifiable? if the said termination is unjusti-fiable what are the reliefs the employee is entitled to from the firstrespondent company as his employer?"
The aforesaid employee had been employed in the service of theemployer from 15th November, 1983, in the post of a shift mechanicand he had been asked to show cause why disciplinary action oughtnot to be taken against him on the following grounds:
For preferring false allegations against the PersonnelManager of the employer-company.
For refusing to accept the letter dated 31st March, 1992,issued by the employer-company to the said employee. Thesaid letter has been marked in the arbitration proceedingsas R2.
For wrongfully inducing fellow-workers to refuse to acceptcertain circulars issued by the employer-company and forwrongfully taking steps to refuse to issue such circulars tofellow employees.
For compelling fellow-workers to affix their signature to theletter dated 19. 03. 92.
By the aforesaid acts for creating displeasure ill feeling anddisaffection between the management of the company andthe employees of the company.
By doing any one or more of the said acts that he hadcommitted grave misconduct.
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At the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings the fourthrespondent-arbitrator came to the conclusion that the aforesaidgrounds 3 and 4 had not been established by the employer-companyagainst the employee named Hemasiri; but that grounds 1. 2 and 5had been established and in the circumstances he concluded that thetermination of the services of employee Hemasiri by the employer-company was justified.
The employer had adduced the evidence before the arbitrator ofwitnesses S. N. Jayasinghe. Tennekoon Piyasena, Huralin Esk andthe employee T. A. M. Hemasiri has also given evidence on behalfof the trade Union, petitioner. In the course of the evidence led onbehalf of the company a letter dated 19th of March, 1992, signed bythe aforesaid employee Hemasiri and eight other fellow-workers wasproduced marked R1. In this letter marked R1 which was sent to themanagement of the employer-company, it has been asserted that thePersonnel Officer of the employer had arbitrarily appointed certainmembers to the canteen committee in the following terms :
As the allegations stated in the said letter were false the employer-company had issued a letter of warning and it was alleged that theaforesaid employee Hemasiri had wrongfully and in defiance refusedto accept the aforesaid letter of warning. It is this refusal which hasled to the dispute in respect of which a reference had been madeto the arbitrator for settlement. At the time that this letter R1 wasissued the said employee Hemasiri had been holding the post ofsecretary of the trade union which represented the workers whowere employed by the employer-company.
Witness Tennekoon Piyasena has testified before the arbitratorclearly that the employee Hemasiri refused to accept the letter ofwarning marked R2 which was issued by the management of theemployer-company. The aforesaid evidence is corroborated andadvanced in strength by the evidence of witness Huralin Esk. The
CA
All Ceylon Commercial and Industrial Workers' Union
v. Nestle Lanka Ltd. (Jayasuriya, J.)
347
evidence establishes further that the employee Hemasiri hadrefused to accept the warning letter R2 and also to show cause letterwhich was marked as R3.
The employee Hemasiri in his evidence has attempted to state thathe did not refuse to accept the letter of warning marked R2 but thathe had merely requested that the acceptance of the letter betemporarily delayed and that he believed that it was not wrongful onhis part to delay accepting the said letter. Further, the employeeHemasiri had attempted falsely to state that he was not the authorof the letter dated 19th of March, 1992, which was produced markedR1. The arbitraror has held having regard to the provisions of theCollective Agreement entered into between the employer and theemployee that employee Hemasiri had no right either to refuse toaccept the letter or to temporarily delay the acceptance of thesaid letter. Despite the evasive answer given by the employee Hemasiriit is manifestly established having regard to the attendantcircumstances proved and on the application of the principle of probabilitythat employee Hemasiri had refused to accept the letter of warningmarked R2. In these circumstances it is incumbent on the arbitrarorto determine whether such wilful refusal to accept the letter issuedby the employer-company addressed to an employee, amounts to anact of wilful disobedience to a legitimate request by the employer andalso whether it amounts to a wrongful act of defiance of the authorityof an employer by an employee. Thereafter, to determine whetherthese acts amount to grave misconduct. The arbitrator has concludedespecially as the employee held the responsible post of secretary ofthe trade union that it was entirely a wrongful act on his part tohave defiantly refused to accept the aforesaid letter. The arbitratorhas also held that without sufficient cause and justification he hasmade false allegations and accusations against the Personnel Officer.
The arbitrator thereafter proceeds to hold in respect of count fivethat by the aforesaid first two acts the employee Hemasiri has createddispleasure, disaffection and ill feeling between the workers and theemployer-company. There has been no evidence or materialwhatsoever elicited before the arbitraror which entitled him to arriveat the aforesaid inference and findings.
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The arbitrator to whom a reference has been made in terms ofsection 4 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act as amended is expectedto act judicially. He is required in arriving at his determinations todecide legal questions affecting the rights of the subject and hencehe is under a duty to act judicially. Although such arbitrator does notexercise judicial power in the strict sense, it is his duty to act judicially.In Attorney-General of Australia v. Regirnf'» Lord Simonds deliveringthe Privy Council judgment observed :
"It is desirable to repeat that the function of an industrialarbitrator is completely outside the realm of judicial power and isof a different order. However, the decisions clearly mark out thatsuch an arbitrator is required to act judicially."
See the decision in South Ceylon Democratic Workers' Union v.SelvaduraP'; Stratheden Tea Co., Ltd v. SelvaduraPK In Heath & Co.Ltd. v. Kariyawasam and 2 Others, Justice A. L. S. Sirimane deliveringthe Supreme Court judgment emphasizes that in the assessment ofthe evidence an arbitrator appointed under the Industrial Disputes Actmust act judicially and that if he does not, his award is liable to bequashed in an application for certiorari. Justice Sirimane describesthe findings reached by the arbitrator in that case as being so'completely contrary to the weight of evidence that one can onlydescribe it as being perverse.
It has been stressed that such an arbitrator's function is judicialin the sense that he has to hear parties, decide facts, apply ruleswith judicial impartiality and his decision is objective as that ofany court of law, though ultimately he makes such award as mayappear to him to be just and equitable. Vide the decision in NadarajaLtd. v. Krishnadasari^.
Thus, there is no evidence or material which has been adducedwhich could support the aforesaid inference and findings reached bythe fourth respondent. Findings and decisions unsupported byevidence are capricious, unreasonable or arbitrary. Minister of NationalRevenue v. Wrights Canandian Ropes Ltd.{6>; Argosy Company Ltd.v. IRC™; Osgood v. Nelsorf®>; Maradana Mosque Trustees v. Mahamud9);
CAAll Ceylon Commercial and Industrial Workers' Union
v. Nestle Lanka Ltd. (Jayasuriya, J.)349
De Smith in his judicial review of Administrative Action — 4th editionpage 133 – sets out the principle that a deciding authority “which hasmade a finding of primary fact wholly unsupported by evidence orwhich has drawn an inference wholly unsupported by any of theprimary facts found by it will be held to have erred in point of law… The 'no evidence rule is well-established; … and it has establisheditself because superior courts exercising appellate or supervisoryjurisdiction in respect of errors of law need to have power to intervenewherever manifest and gross error is revealed."
The “no evidence rule" does not contemplate a total lack ofevidence; it is equally applicable where the evidence taken as a whole,is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding or decision (videAllinson v. General Medical Council'01 at 760 or where no decidingauthority could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence(vide R. v. Roberts<"• at 423).
Lord Atkinson in Folkestone Corporation v. Brockmart'2) at 367remarked : "an order made without any evidence to support it is truth,in my view, made without jurisdiction. Contra – R. v. Nat Bell LiquorsLtd.{'3) at 151 per Lord Sumner. R. v. LudloW'A) per Lord GoddardCJ. However, Lord Denning in 0‘reilly v. Mackmarf'5) at 253 hasimpugned the statement of the law pronounced by Lord Sumneras the darkest moment of the "Blackout of any developmentof Administrative Law". Other decisions have described a "no evidencefinding" as unreasonable, perverse and arbitrary and thereforeultra vires for other reasons".
Wade and Forsyth on Administrative Law – 7th edition at page316 – conclude that despite the absence of an authoritative decisionreviewing the justification for and against the "no evidence rule", "itseems clear that this ground of judicial review ought now to beregarded as established on a general basis … it conforms so wellto other developments in administrative law that one can only assumethat the older authorities to the contrary, impressive though they are,may now be consigned to the limbo of history. 'No evidence' seemsdestined to take its place as yet a further branch of the principle ofultra vires, so that Acts giving powers of determination will be taken
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to imply that the determination must be made upon some acceptableevidence. If it is not, it will be treated as arbitrary, capricious, andobviously unauthorised*.
In R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal – ex parteShaw 195101’ (affirmed in 1952 1 KB 338), the Divisional Court ofthe Kings Bench Division held that certiorari would issue to quashthe decision of a statutory administration tribunal for an error of lawon the face of the record, even though that tribunal was not a courtof record and although that error did not go to the jurisdiction of thetribunal. This decision pronounced by Lord Denning appeased at leastto a certain extent, the public demand for better justice in the welfarestate and it marked the commencement of a new era of judicial review.
I hold that there is an error on the face of the record which entitlesthis Court in the exercise of its power of certiorari to quash theaforesaid award as the finding in regard to ground five had beenreached bereft of any evidence or any material which has been elicitedbefore the arbitrator. In the circumstances we allow the applicationof the petitioner and make order quashing the award made bythe fourth respondent dated 9th July, 1996, which has been markedas P7 and which has been published in the Govt. GazetteExtraordinary No. 938/1 dated 26th of August, 1996.
We allow the application but having regard to the attendantcircumstances which have been disclosed upon this application, wemake no order as to costs. We direct and order the HonourableMinister of Labour to make another reference in terms of section 4(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1957 (as amended)appointing another arbitrator to settle the aforesaid dispute byarbitration. This direction is made in view of the principle laid downby Justice Sharvananda in the decision in Nadaraja Ud. v. Krishnadasan{supra) which is referred to and adopted in Shell Gas Company v.All Ceylon Commercial & Industrial Workers’ Uniori'7' at 124.The application is allowed without costs.
KULATILAKE, J. – I agree
Application allowed.