104-NLR-NLR-V-01-MOHAMMADU-LEBBE-et-al.-v.-KOREEN-et-al.pdf
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MOHAMMADTJ LEBBE et al. v. KOREEN et al.
D. C., Jaffna, 2,384.
District Court—Jurisdiction to interfere in religious dispute*—Right of holderof religious office to relief when disturbed in enjoyment of propertyattached to such office.
A District Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in the conoernt ofreligious communities unless, in the rules which any religious commu-nity has made for its members in relation to the religious object whichit has combined to maintain, a civil element enters, which brings thematter within the sphere of the civil jurisdiction of the courts.
A holder of an office who has been duly appointed thereto by thereligious community to which he belongs will be supported in theexercise of that office, if there is attached to it as an incident someestate in tenure of or right to the possession and enjoyment of movableor immovable property.
T
HIS was an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decree of dismissalThe facts of the case appear in the judgments of the
Supreme Court.
Dornhorst appeared for plaintiff appellant.
Cur. adv. vult.31st October, 1893. Withers, J.—
The plaintiffs claim to be joint officiating priests of a Moham-medan mosque known as Meydisen Pallivisal, and they allegethat the defendants have interrupted them in the exercise oftheir office, and refuse to allow them to enter the moBque for theperformance of the duties incumbent on them as such highpriests, and to exercise the rights and enjoy the privileges of theiroffice. After hearing some of the witnesses called for theplaintiff, the learned judge stopped the proceedings and dismissedthe action on the groqpd that his Court had no jurisdiction tointerfere in the concerns of religious communities.
The plaintiffs appealed from this judgment. There was noappearance for the respondents.
1893.
October 20and 31.
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1893.
October SOand 31.
With kbs, J.
I think the proposition of law laid down by the learned DistrictJudge requires some limitation.
In a recent case reported in 1 8. 0. 8. 354, I had occasion toobserve that a District Court has no jurisdiction to interfere inthe concerns of religious communities unless, in the rules whichany religious community has made for its members in relationto the religious object which it has combined to maintain andsupport, a civil element enters, which brings the matter within thesphere of the civil jurisdiction of the courts.
After giving illustrations of what I meant by the term civilelement, I went on to observe that the holder of an office, whohas been duly appointed thereto by the religiouB community towhich he belongs, or who succeeds in due course of such officeaccording to rules binding on the community, has been and will^always be supported in the exercise of that office, if there is attachedto it as an incident some estate in tenure of, or right to, thepossession and enjoyment of immovable or movable property.
As at present advised, I adhere to that opinion, and, so thinking,
I have no alternative to propose but that of remitting the case forfurther inquiry.
Incident to the tenure of the offices alleged to be held by theplaintiffs, and the performance of duties required of the holders,is said to be the privilege of receiving and keeping fees paid(gratuitously no doubt) by those for whom services are dulyperformed—services connected with prayers, marriages, funerals,&c. Whether the plaintiffs or either of them will make out acase for redress, is another matter, but, having regard to precedent,I am of opinion that the plaintiffs should be allowed fully to putforward their case on such material as they may be advised tosubmit to the Court, and for this reason the judgment of the lowerCourt should be set aside.i
Browne, A.J.—
On the 8th February, 1867, one Seku Meiyadin MuhammadoMeiyadeen and the first defendant executed and granted what istermed a charitable donation deed of a certain land “ in order“ that all the Mussulmans who belong to and embrace the religion“ of the Prophet Mohamet, called Purukare Vedam, may, with“ the grace of our Master Muheyadeen Abdul Cader reasonably“ and in acordance with the religious rules conduct and observe“ for ever, without any objection, all the penance and other rites“ belonging to and mentioned in the religious rules.” The deedcontained no other words than these to designate any trust or themanner or officers for its execution.
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In their plaint plaintiffs assert that a mosque was then built 1893.and dedicated by this deed “ as a place of worship for the use of
“ the Muhammadan public, to be used and managed according to '
“ the will of such of the said public as form the congregation of bbowhe,AJ.“ the said mosque,” and that at that time also one Sego MadarLebbe was at a meeting of the said Muhammadan publicappointed officiating priest of the said mosque, and held officeuntil 1882.
Plaintiffs then assert in brief that at a meeting of the saidMuhammadan public held in May, 1882, at the grand mosque,apparently some other mosque, the first plaintiff was appointedofficiating priest and to receive the profits of the office, and thatat another later meeting held in 1886, Becond plaintiff wasappointed joint officiating priest, and that they officiated “ in the“prosecution of the objects of the said dedication,” and received theincomes and perquisites of their office until the 26th June, 1892,when the defendants forcibly turned them out of the mosque andprevented them from performing their ceremonies and keep themdeprived of the profitable user of the said office ; and that sincesuch time second defendant has been wrongfully performing theceremonies of the said priesthood, and both defendants havebeen receiving and enjoying the perquisites of the said office : andthe plaintiffs pray for a declaration of their right to officiate and toreceive the incomes, emoluments, and profits; their reinstatement;the inhibition of defendants from resisting plaintiffs and fromofficiating and taking the emoluments ; and for damages andcosts.
The defendants deny that the plaintiffs were ever appointedpriests of the mosque, which first defendant says he built anddedicated as a place of worship, always remaining manager thereof,and that he (he does not say when) appointed second defendantpriest thereof.
I agree with my brother that the District Judge should nothave stopped hearing plaintiff’s evidence, and that his statementthat “a District Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in the“ concerns of religious communities ” is too general. Courts will<not interfere in purely ecclesiastical matters, such as a complaintthat a Muhammadan priest refused to perform funeral services[/2. (1867) 240~, or a question where a festival should, consistentlywith religion, be celebrated (Morg. 51), or in a mere matter ofchurch discipline (2fB. & V., 67). But our own courts have, erenow, entertained and decided questions affecting such rights as toappoint a dean (3 Lor. 238) or priests [L. M. sp. 17 (Muham-madan) and 13; and 1866. 60 (Christian)] or to celebrate a festival
VOL. I.2 z
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ISM. (Morg. 51) or rights to property, such as fabrics and ground andrevenues which were not voluntary as oifertories and fish rents
{vide the last two cases cited).
Bbowke at
’' No doubt, bo far as the case has as yet proceeded, the evidence of
what emoluments the plaintiffs have received has tended to showthem to be of such a character that plaintiffs could not show anyright to them, viz., such a right as they could enforce against thecontributories thereof to insist upon their payment. But even ifthe right to officiate was not functuous of any actual pecuniary orother benefit to the priest, it may be a right in and for the exerciseof which he may claim the protection of the courts, and theseplaintiffs appear prima facie to be entitled to call upon the courtsto decide whether they are entitled to have the prayers of theirplaint or any of them granted to them. I agree that the case mustbe remitted for further trial, and in the possibility thereof I maydraw attention to the fact that some of the questions which seempossible on the pleadings in this case, viz., as to who form thecongregation of the mosque (assuming plaintiffs substantiate byproof all the averments of the first paragraph of their plaint), andwhat meeting thereof could validly elect a priest formed thesubject of much discussion in the action 61,162. D. C.Colombo, dealing with the trust created by the award of Mr.Lorensz made in 5,214, testamentary, of that Court, respecting theadministration of the Cinnamon Gardens mosque, which followedupon the litigation of the action 53,373 of that Court.