064-NLR-NLR-V-39-MURUGAPPAH-CHETTIAR–et-al.-v.-RAMANATHAN-CHETTIAR.pdf
Murugappah Chettiar v. Ramanathan^ Chettiar.
231
1937
Present: Hearae J. and Fernando AJ.
MURUGAPPAH CHETTIAR et al. v. RAMANATHAN
CHETTIAR
D. C. Colombo, 3J.31’.
Registration of business names—Erroneous statement in retvtrn—No defaultin furnishing particulars—Ordinance No. 6 of 19i8, ss. 4 and 9.
Where the particulars contained in a return made under section 4of the Registration of Business Names Ordinance are otherwise correctlyset out, an erroneous statement with regard to the residence of a partnerwould not alone amount to a default within the meaning of section 9
of the Ordinance.
* SI Bern. 784.
39/20
* 28 N. L. R. 41-
1 16 Law Ree. 78.
232
HE ARNE J.—Muru ga-ppdh Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar.
^ PPEAL from a judgment of the District Judge of Colombo.
Nagalingam, for defendant, appellant.
H. V. Per era, K.C. (with him Aiyar), for plaintiffs,. respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
July 30, 1937. Hearne J.—
The plaintiffs who described themselves as Murugappa Chettiar son ofRaman Chettiar and Murugappa Chettiar son of Adaikalam Chettiar,
“ carrying on business under the name, firm, and style of Moona RoonaRawenna Mana ’Vsued the defendant in order to recover a sum ofRs. 11,134.63, and in my opinion the trial Judge was justified, on theevidence, in holding that this sum was due and that the claim was notprescribed.
It was pleaded by the defendant that the plaintiffs could not maintaintheir suit as “ their business name had not been duly registered underthe Business Names Registration Ordinance ” and that the suit was notproperly constituted “ in that all the partners of the firm of ‘ M. R. R. M. ’had not been joined as plaintiffs ”. Issues arising out of these pleadingswere framed and the Judge decided them in favour of the plaintiffs. –
Having regard to the facts which emerged in evidence it would appearthat the defendant misconceived the issues. ,The name of the firm hadbeen duly registered as “ Moona Roona Rawenna Mana ’■’ and the onlypartners of the firm, as registered, are Murugappa Chettiar son of RamanChettiar and one Murugappa Chettiar son of Adaikalam Chettiar, thesame name and the same father’s name as appear in the caption of theplaint except that Murugappa is preceded by the words, whatever theysignify, “ Kana Yayna Ana.”
Now although the defendant’s objections proceeded, as I have indicated,upon a misconception it has been decided by this Court that “ if it comesto the notice of the Court that the provisions of the Ordinance (theRegistration of Business Names Ordinance) had not been complied with,the Court should, ex mero motu, give effect to the terms of section 9 of theOrdinance”. The trial Judge who was clearly aware of this decisionconsidered the matter and held that there “ was no proof that the personregistered as ‘ Kana Yayna Ana Murugappa Chetty ’ and the personreferred to in the plaint as ‘ Murugappa Chettiar ’ are not one and thesame person ”. No question was put to the first plaintiff when he was inthe witness box. It is true that the Judge was acting on his own knowl-edge of the customs of Chetties rather than on evidence when he says“ it might be noted that Chetties even as individuals do take initials oftheir illustrious forbears ”, but it is'clear that the most that can be saidto have come to the notice of the Court is not that Murugappa Chettiardid not give his full name for purposes of registration, but that for thepurpose of suing he used the name by which he was ordinarily known inbusiness. In my opinion the Judge was right in not giving effect to theprovisions of section 9 of the Ordinance.
Another objection under the same Ordinance was taken in what appearsto me rather a disingenuous way. For the purpose of registration under
HEARNE J.—Murugappah Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar. 233
section 4 the plaintiffs had in 1926, given their usual residence as ‘‘ Pudu-kotah State, India”. When a witness of the plaintiffs was in the boxthe answer was elicited from him in cross-examination that the fustplaintiff was from Ramnad and had never lived at Pudukotah. On thebasis of this answer the Judge was invited to hold that the erroneousinformation given to the Registrar of Business Names amounted to a“ default ” which under section 9 disabled the plaintiffs from recoveringin the suit they 'had brought. In my opinion, if the defendant desiredthat the Court should give effect to the terms of section 9 of the Ordinance,the first plaintiff who gave evidence should have been given the oppor -tunity of explaining the discrepancy between the registered “ residence ”on the one hand and the evidence of one of his witnesses on the other. Merelyto rely upon the answer of a witness who may have been misinformed andwho may not have realized the implication of the matter, especially as noissue had been framed, falls short in my opinion of the necessary minimumof evidence or of “ notice ” on which a Court, following Karuppen Chetty■v. Harrisons & Crosfield, Ltd. *, would act.
Apart, however, from the facts which, in my opinion, determine thisappeal, I would find it difficult to hold that where a firm delivers a state-ment in writing in the prescribed form containing the particulars requiredby section 4 of" the Ordinance, and where those particulars set out faith-fully the name of the business, its general nature, the names of thepartners, and the place of business an erroneous statement in regardto the usual residence of a partner can be regarded as a “default infurnishing a statement of particulars ” under section 9. Clearly theperson who verifies the particulars by signing them is liable, to the penaltiesprescribed by section 10 if the particular is “ material ” and false to theknowledge of the person who signs the particulars, but there has not been,in my opinion, default in the furnishing of a statement of particulars.It is possible to conceive of a statement of particulars being so erroneousand misleading as to amount to a “ default ” but a mis-statement in regardto the one particular of “ usual residence ” does not fall within thecategory of default contemplated by section 9./
In O’Connor and Ould v. Ralston3 Lord Darling considered the questionof the description of themselves by a firm of bookmakers as “account-*ants ”. He said that while *‘ turf accountants ” might pass as a synonymfor “ bookmakers ”, the expression “ accountant ” was a misdescription.
“As to whether” he went on to say “the plaintiffs by describingthemselves as. accountants made 4 default ’ in furnishing a statement ofparticulars within the meaning of section 8, sub-section (1), of the Registra-tion of Business Names Act, 1916, I incline to think that the word 4 default ’in the sub-section means not furnishing any particulars at all, and doesnot mean furnishing insufficient particulars. But I do not decide thepoint, because I base my decision in the present case upon anotherground ”.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Fernando A.J.—I agree.
* 24 N. L. S. 317.
Appeal dismissed.* 11920) 3 K. B. 451.