022-NLR-NLR-V-70-N.-VISUVANATHAN-Appellant-and-M.-THURAIRAJAH-and-another-Respondents.pdf
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H. X. G. FERNANDO, C.J.— V isuvanalhan v. Thurairajah
1967 Present : H. N. G. Fernando, C.J., and G. P. A. Silva, J.N.VISUVANATHAN, Appellant, and M. THURAIRAJAH and
another, Respondents
iS. C. 721/64—D. C. Chavakachcheri, 2634/L
Paddy Lands Act—Section 63—Meaning of term “ tenant-cultivator ”.
The protection conferred by the Paddy Lands Act to an individual is enjoyedonly by a person who by his own labour and that of members of his familycultivates a paddy land. A person is not a “ tenant-cultivator ” within themeaning of the definition of that term in section 63 of the Paddy Lands Actif he employs hired labour for any two of the three different kinds ofwork contemplated in the definition, viz., ploughing, sow ing and reaping ; andin regard to the watching and tending of crops, this must be done only by thetenant himself or members of his family.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court, Chavakachcheri.
M. S. M. Nazeem, with M. Sivananthan, for the defendant-appellant/1
Ranganathan, Q.C., with R. Manikkavasagar, for the plaintiffs-respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
October 5, 1967. H. N. G. Fernando, C.J.—
The appeal in this case was against a decree of the learned DistrictJudge ordering the ejectment of the defendant from a paddy land and fordamages. The decree was entered on the basis that the defendant was alessee under the plaintiff, and committed default in complying with theconditions of his lease.
Learned Counsel for the defendant in appeal has argued that thedefendant was a tenant-cultivator within the meaning of the PaddyLands Act and that therefore his ejectment cannot be ordered exceptin terms of that Act.
According to the definition of ‘ tenant-cultivator ’ in section 63 of theAct, as amended in 1961, a tenant-cultivator is a person who “ by himselfor by any member of his family carries out (a) two or more of the operationsof ploughing, sowing and reaping, and (6) the operation of tending orwatching the crop in each season during which paddy is cultivated.”I am in agreement with the learned District Judge that the defendanthas not brought himself within the scope of the definition.
It would appear that the extent of 8 acres which is involved in thisaction is only part of a tract of 35 acres, the cultivation of which has beenundertaken by the defendant. His evidence at the trial was that hebought a tractor to plougluhis fields and drove the tractor whenever hecould ; if he was ill he employed a casual driver. Whenever he needed
84
Agathesu v. Ulukesu
labourers he engaged labourers for hire. Earlier, at an inquiry before theAssistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services, he had admitted that theharvesting was done with hired labour, sometimes on a contract basis andsometimes on payment in cash or in kind. On that occasion he admittedthat he has a licensed tractor driver to do the work of ploughing, and thathe employed labourers also for the purpose of sowing the land. Consideringthat the entire tract is of an extent of 35 acres it is most unlikely that thedefendant could in fact have himself done two (or even one) of theoperations of ploughing, sowing and reaping ; and indeed he could notseriously maintain that position in his evidence.
I think it well on this occasion to point out that the Act in defining■the expression “ tenant-cultivator ”, only clarifies the ordinary meaning•of that expression. The protection conferred by the Act to an individualis enjoyed only by a person who actually by his own labour and that ofmembers of his family, cultivates a paddy land. The definition contem-plates three different kinds of work (ploughing, sowing and reaping) forwhich actual labour is necessary, and if hired labour is in fact employedfor two of these kinds of work, then the cultivator is not a “ tenant-cultivator ” ; and in regard to the watching and tending of crops,thismust be done only by the tenant himself or members of his family. Theseconditions certainly have not been fulfilled in this case.
For these reasons the appeal was dismissed with costs after argument.Silva, J.—I agree.
Appeal dismissed.