128-NLR-NLR-V-43-NAGASAMY-v.-HAMID.pdf
SOERTSZ J.—Nagasamy v. Hamid.
525
1942Present: Soertsz J.
NAGASAMY v. HAMID.14—C. R. Colombo, 72,706.
Labourer—Wages of tindal—Engaged in loading and unloading cargo—Seizurein execution—Civil Procedure Code, s. 218 (j).
A person, who is engaged in loading and tinloading cargo and whoengages other men to perform similar work, allots the work and himselfworks with them is a labourer within the meaning of section 218 (j) ofthe Civil Procedure Code.
PPEAL from an order of the Commissioner of Requests, Colombo.
C. Renganathan, for plaintiff, appellant.
S. S. Kulatilike (with him Subramaniam), for defendant, respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
June 18, 1942. Soertsz J.—
This case recalls to mind the fable of the crow with the piece of cheese,and the fox, who begged him for a song, flattering him into the beliefthat his voice surpassed, in sweetness, that of the nightingale, and walkedaway with the bit of cheese which the crow let drop when he opened hisbeak to make his ambitious attempt. The difference between thatinstance and this is that, here, the appellant has come to deal with amore sophisticated bird in the person of the respondent, who denies thesoft impeachment that he is a contractor, swears that he is a commonor garden labourer, even going to the length of resuscitating the worcjlcoolie, which our Government with a meticulous sense of delicacy hasput on its Index, Verborum Prohibitorum, and abashing himself with it,claims that he, like Longfellow’s Blacksmith, is entitled to “ look thewhole world in the face ” and declare that he “ owes not any man ”. Or,if not quite that, that, in virtue of section 218 (j) of the Code of CivilProcedure, his position is as good as that.
It is common experience that simple and familiar words are amongthose most difficult to define, as Dr. Johnson found when he was drivento explain the three letter word net as “ a reticulated fabric decussatedat regular intervals ”.
It is not surprising, therefore that a great deal of learning appearsto have been lavished in the Court below on the apparently simplequestion whether the respondent is a labourer. But after all, the wordlabourer is a word we use frequently in our daily intercourse, and even, iflacking the art, we find it difficult to frame a complete definition of it,we have a “ shrewd idea ” of what it means, and there ought to be nodifficulty in answering this question unless, as observed by Lord Atkinin the House of Lords in the recent case of Liversidge v. Anderson likeHumpty Dumpty in “ Alice Through The Looking Glass ”, the appellant isentitled to say, in as scornful a tone, " when I use a word it means justwhat I choose it to mean, neither more or less”. But if we disregardthe meaning the appellant chooses to give the word labourer, and
. _* USII) A.E.R. Vo!. 3 at p. 331,
526
SOERTSZ J.—Nagasamy v. 'Hamid.
consider the word for ourselves, the picture it conveys to our minds isthat of a man who engages regularly in manual work that calls forconsiderable physical exertion in some unskilled operation, and that,substantially is what lexicographers tell us, and what is implied in therulings given by the learned Judges in the cases referred to in the trialCourt.
There are, of course, many instances in which a man’s occupationinvolves him in multifarious tasks, some calling for skill, some forphysical exertion, some for both, and some of a purely disciplinarycharacter. This may "be said to be such an instance, and in such cases,as was pointed out by Brett M.R., in the case of Morgan v. The LondonGeneral Omnibus Company, cited in the Court below, one must look at“ the substantial business ” of the person concerned to decide whetherit can be called, manual labour. What, then, is the substantial businessof the- respondent ? The evidence shows that he is concerned in theloading and unloading of cargo from and to ship for the firm of Narottam& Pereira. For that purpose, he engages other men, allots their workand supervises it, and himself works with them in loading, unloading,and arranging the cargo. So far as that goes; the evidence of a witnesswho speaks with knowledge and authority is that “ there is no differencebetween the tindal (i.e., the respondent) and other workmen so far as thework is concerned ”. The fact that the respondent is called the Tindal,that he deals directly with the employing firm, that he is responsible to theHarbour authorities for the observance of Port Regulations and thingslike that, do not, in any way, alleviate the burden of his manual labour,they may, perhaps, give him a certain standing in his little world oflabourers by putting him in the position of Primus inter Pares. But thecrucial fact, the fact whereby there hangs the tale, is that the respondenttakes, more or less, an equal hand with the others in loading, unloadingand arranging cargo, which is their substantial business.
Another point was taken by the appellant’s Counsel. He contendedthat the money seized is not wages within the meaning of section 218 (j)of the Civil Procedure Code, but that* it represents the amount that wasdue on a contract between the firm of Narottam & Pereira and therespondent for the loading and unloading of cargo at so much per trip.Counsel submits that the respondent and those engaged with him in thedoing of this work were not on the pay-roll of Narottam & Pereira,and that the money was due to be paid to the respondent even if he himselfhad taken no actual part in the work of the loading and unloading.Counsel emphasizes the fact that remuneration was by the trip.
But the more we seek to change the thing by wrapping it in words of,different form, the more we find it to be, in substance, the same thing.To make a man a labourer, it is not necessary that he should be on someparticular pay-roll. Take the case of an “ outside ” railway porter.His work is casual. He takes whatever work he can find. He is paidby a score of different passengers in the course of a day. But nobodycan deny that he is a labourer. Nor does it matter this payment ismade by the trip. Those are matters pertaining to the manner in whichNarottam & Pereira choose to conduct their business.
JAYETILEKE J.—Jamis v. Dochinona.
527
-In regard to the agreement, that the respondent was due tc be paideven if he himself did not work with his hands in loading or unloading,the answer to that is, that in this case we are dealing with a man who,invariably, took an active part in loading and unloading and net with aman who did no more than supply labour for that purpose. Ultimately,the real question is how was the money that has been seized earned ?On the evidence in the case, there can be only one answer to that question,that is, that it was earned by the respondent and those who worked withhim by loading and unloading cargo—an operation requiring greatphysical exertion but no particular training or skill. It is, therefore,the wages of labourers. Obviously, the wages of the others who workedwith the respondent is not liable to seizure merely because it happensto be in the hands of the respondent. It is not his property. His ownwages is not liable to seizure because, although it is his property, it isexempted by the section which the respondent invokes.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.