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Present: De Sampayo and Dalton JJ.NALLACARUPPEN CHETTY v. NANAYAKKARA,
391—D. C. Colombo, 11,593,
Stamps Ordinance—Bill of exchange payable on demand—Agreement topay money in instalments on specified dates—Ordinance No. 22of 1909, s. 3 (4 6).
Where the maker of a promissory note agreed to pay the sum_ due by instalments on specified dates.
Held, that it was a bill of exchange payable on demand withinthe meaning of section 3 (4 6) of the Stamps Ordinance.
The document having been admitted by the District Judge,such admission cannot be questioned in appeal in view ofsection 37 of the Stamps Ordinance.
from a judgment of the District Judge of Colombo.
F. de Silva, for defendant, appellant.
Keuneman, for plaintiff, respondent.
June 12, 1925. De Sampayo J.—
The plaintiff brings this action upon a promissory note madeby the defendant for Rs. 2,000 payable by instalments. A questionof the proper stamping of the promissory note has been raised.The promissory note is stamped with a stamp of 6 cents and it runsin this form :—
lt The maker promises to pay to the payee by monthly instalmentsas hereinafter set forth the sum of Rs. 2,000.’*
Then follow certain instalments payable practically at the end ofevery month down to October, 1918, and the final provision is thaton November 30, 1918, the balance Rs. 1,000 should be paid, butthe further provision is that in default of any instalment the entirebalance due on the note should be paid on demand. The DistrictJudge held that in view of the definition “ payable on demand ” inthe Stamp Ordinance this promissory note should be construed asa promissory note payable on demand and therefore rightly stampedwith a stamp of 6 cents. The definition referred to in the StampOrdinance is that which is contained in section 3 (4 b), where itdeclares that a bill of exchange payable on demand includes anolder for the payment of any sum of money weekly, monthly, or atany other stated periods. Mr. Silva for the defendant while
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Nallacarup-pan Ohettyv. Nanay ak-kara
admitting the correctness of the judgment as regards the definitionof a promissory note payable on demand, contends that the presentpromissory note is not one provided for in the sub-section referredto, because, he says, that no periods for the payment of instalmentsare mentioned but specified dates although they happened to bethe end of a month. There is no specific authority for interpretingthe words “ at other stated periods ” in the sense contended for.I think, considering that this is only a question of revenue we wouldbe right in giving the expression a broad construction in order tocarry out the intention of the parties. Apart from this questionof correct stamping Mr. Keuneman raises the question as to whetherthe appellant can continue to maintain the objection and basehis appeal on that point. Section 37 of the Stamp Ordinanceprovides that where an instrument has been admitted in evidencesuch admission shall not, except as provided in the following sub-section, which is not relevant to the present case, be called inquestion at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the groundthat the instrument has not been properly stamped. This .objectionwas raised in the District Court and after discussion the DistrictJudge thought—for our present purpose we may say rightly—thepromissory note was duly stamped, and accordingly he acted uponit and entered judgment. Can we now in view of section 37 over-rule that decision and say that the instrument is not properlystamped, and, therefore, ought not to have been admitted ? I donot think so. .1 think the decision in Hetliarachchy v. Wilfred1which is a decision on a similar point ought to be followed.
The appeal, therefore, must be taken as entirely out of order,and I would dismiss it with costs.
Dalton J.—I agree.
20 N. Z» B. m.