016-NLR-NLR-V-36-NESSAEMMAH-v.-SINNATAMBY.pdf
DALTON A.C.J.—Nessaemmah v. Sinnatamby.
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1933Present: Dalton A.C. J-
NESSAEMMAH v. SINNATAMBY.
137—C. R. Batticaloa, 8,873.
Hindu temple—Right of a worshipper—Civil right recognized by Courts of law.
The right of a person to worship at a Hindu temple is a civil rightenforceable in a Court of law.
A
PPEAL from a judgment of the Commissioner of Requests, Batti-caloa.
H. V. Perera (with him Kariapper and D. W. Fernando), for defendant,appellant.
N. E. Weerasooria (with him E. B. Wikramanayake and C. T. Olega-•agaram), for plaintiffs, respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
September 15, 1933. Dalton A.C.J.—
The only point arising on this appeal is whether the claim set forthin the plaint discloses a breach of a civil right, and gives rise to a causeof action that the Court has jurisdiction to try.
The following facts as found by the learned Commissioner are notdisputed in appeal. The temple concerned is a public temple dedicatedby the founders to the deity “ Pillayar ” for the advancement of theHindu religion and for the benefit of that section of the public whofollow that religion. The original founders’ intention and purpose wasthat every such beneficiary should have the absolute right and freedomto have access to any part of the temple premises. The temple hasbeen controlled and managed by two vannakkus or managers who areelected respectively by the Vellala community resident at Koddamunaiand the Karawe community resident at Amirthakali and the adjoiningvillages. Meetings of these two communities were also called fromtime to time to decide questions relating to and connected with the
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DALTON A.CJf.—Nessaemmah v. Sinnatamby.
management of the temple, the vannakkus acting together in mattersrelating to such management.
It appears that some trouble arose between some members of thedhoby community at Amirthakali and others, and that a meeting washeld by the members of the Karawe community at which the defendant,the vannakku representing the Karawe community, was present. Thismeeting decided that inasmuch as the dhobies of Amirthakali hadrefused to perform certain customary ceremonies, and had furtherdeclined to wash for the members of the congregation of the temple,those dhobies and their families and those who continued to engage theservices of such dhobies be prohibited from entering the inner portionof the temple until they consented to perform such ceremonies and towash for the congregation. It is admitted that the resolution was notpassed at a meeting composed of both Vellala and Karawe communities,and the Vellala vannakku took no part in the proceedings nor was hepresent at the meeting. I might add here that even if the resolutionwas passed by both communities it would make no difference to thedecision in this case.
The plaintiff and her husband are members of the Karawe communityand continued to engage the services of dhobies who were mentioned inthe resolution. On August 10, 1931, whilst she was engaged in worship-ping at the temple during the night poojah of the 8th day of the annualfestival held there, the defendant ordered her to quit the temple premises,and when she refused to go, put her out and prevented her from enteringagain or from worshipping there. She claims that she has been greatlyhumiliated and has suffered much pain of body and mind, and sufferedin her reputation, and that she has been prevented from exercising herlawful rights. The learned Commissioner found the defendant actedwithout any justification, and that the resolution under which hepurported to act was ultra vires, so far as it affected the temple in question,the rights of plaintiff being absolute, subject only to conformity withthe rules of the Hindu religion, and the law of the land. The case,however, having been brought mainly to test the right of the plaintiff,to ascertain whether there was a violation of that right, and if so whetherthat violation would give rise to a cause of action in the lower Court, heawarded her nominal damages and costs of suit.
Although there seems to be no local decision on the point, there areseveral Indian authorities and the cases cited show in such cases asthis that the right claimed by the plaintiff of entry to all p^rts of thetemple is of a civil nature and within the cognizance of the civil Courts(Venkatachalapati v. Subbarayadu and others '). This decision was follow-ed in Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Samaram Singrachariar % where Wallis J.in the course of his judgment states that the right of a worshipper toworship at a given temple is recognized by the Indian courts as a civilright, and the courts will enforce by suit a right of worship to which theplaintiff proves himself entitled. Appaya and another v. Padappa1 andother decisions are to the same effect. Mr. Perera has suggested thati 13 Mad. 293.2 30 Mad. 158.
3 23 Bom. 123.
Fernando v. Fernando.
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the Indian courts have, under the provisions of the Indian Civil Pro-cedure Code, given a wider construction to the term “ civil right ” thancould be given in Ceylon, but he has not satisfied me there is any goodground for that argument, so far as the right claimed in this case isconcerned. I think the learned Commissioner was correct in holdinghe had jurisdiction to try the cause of action set out in the plaint, andthe appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.