( 214 )
NILA HENAYA v. DISSANAYAKA APPUHAMI.-C. R., Kandy, 10,597.
Kandyan Lava—Acquired property of husband—Departure of widow from hishouse and subsequent marriage in another village—Forfeiture of lifeinterest of widow.
The life interest of a widow of a deceased Kandyan in his acquiredproperty does not cease by her departure from his house and hermarriage a second time in another village.
HE plaintiff prayed for a declaration of title in respect oftwo-thirds of an allotment of land which originally belonged
to one Dantuwa. He . died about 1882 leaving a widow, Setu,,and three children, Ukkuwa, Samara, and Ukku. Ukku died leav-ing children surviving him. Ukkuwa and Samara conveyed theirtwo-third shares of the land to the plaintiff. The land was theacquired property of Dantuwa, after whose death Setu, his widow,departed from his house and married a second time in anothervillage. She returned to Dantuwa’s house in 1897.
Her life interest in the land was sold upon a writ of executionagainst her in 1891 to the defendant.
The question for the decision of the Court was, whether Setuby her departure from her first husband’s house, and her subse-quent marriage, forfeited her life interest in the land.
The Commissioner held against the widow and gave judgmentfor the plaintiff.
The defendant appealed. The case came on for argument on28th October, 1902.
Bawa, for appellant.
Van Lang'enberg, for respondent.
Cut. adv. vilit.
( 215 )
9th March, 1903. Moncheiff, J.—
1 was asked to say in this oase whether Setu, a Kandyanwoman, a widow of a Kandyan named Dantuwa, having afterDantuwa’s death entered into an alliance with another man, andhaving five years subsequently returned to the mulgedarawithout objection from her children, was entitled to the posses-sion during life of her husband’s acquired property. In Monikav. Horatala (3 S. G. B. 167), decided by Lawrie and Withers; J.J'.,the former Judge says:“Ido not find authority of a kind which
I think sufficient, that the widow’s possession of enquired landwas to come to an end on a second marriage. One reason whyshe was allowed to possess it for her life was that in most casesit had been purchased by the savings and exertions of the wifeas much as of the husband.”
As there is nothing in Perera or Thomson, or so far as I knowanywhere else, in contradiction of this, I think that Setu’sinterest in the acquired property did not come to an end, butpassed to the defendant.
I believe I gave judgment to this effect in October, and that thecase was to be mentioned in a week’s time, when inquiry had beenmade with a view to showing the effect of the judgment upon thedecree made in the Court of Bequests. After four months therecord was returned to me without comment, without information,and without trace of any order or judgment made by me.
I send the case back to the Court of Requests in order that theCommissioner may consider in what way the decree is affected bymy .finding on the point argued before me, and may alter thedecree accordingly.
NILA HENAYA v. DISSANAYAKA APPUHAMI