030-NLR-NLR-V-56-NORTH-WESTERN-BLUE-LINE-BUS-CO.LTD-Appellant-and-GREEN-LINE-OMNIBUS-CO.-LTD-.pdf
118 North-Western Blue Line Bus Co., Ltd., v. Green'Line Omnibus Oo., Lid.
1954
Present : Sanson 1 J.NORTH-WESTERN BLUE LINE BUS CO., LTD., Appellant,and GREEN LINE OMNIBUS CO., LTD., et al.,RespondentsS. C. 1,245—Motor Traffic Appeal 138
Motor Traffic Act, No. 14 of 1951—Right of appeal to Supreme Court—Appealableperiod—Computation—Sections 210, 211, 212.
The appealable period of twenty-one days in section 212 (2) of the MotorTraffic Act runs from the date of the determination or order of the TransportAppeals Tribunal and not from the date on which notice of the determinationor order is served on the appellant.
(1937) 8 C. L. W. 123.
SANSONI .T-—North- Western Blue Line Bits do., Ltd., v. Green Line
Omnibus Go., LUl.
117
/.PPEAL against a decision of the Transport Appeals Tribunal.
H. V. Perera, Q.C., with II. W. Tambiah and S. Sharvananda, for theappellant.•
H. If'. Jayewurdene, Q.G.> with K. Shinya, for the respondents.
Cur. adv. trull.
October 8, 1954. Sansont J.—
This is an appeal filed under the provisions of section 212 of the MotorTraffic Act, No. 14 of 1951, against the decision of the Transport Appeals.Tribunal dated lltli July, 1953. Mr. H. W. Jayawarrlene who appearsfor the 1st respondent has taken the preliminary objection that the appealhas been filed out of time and should be rejected on this account. Thepetition of appeal was filed on 11th August, 1953. I am dealing with thepreliminary objection on the basis that the date of the decision underappeal is the date it bears on its face, and that the appellant companyreceived on 25th July the notice in writing of the Tribunal’s decisionwhich was posted to it on 24th July.
Section 212 (2) provides that “ the petition of appeal …. shallbe presented to the Tribunal by the appellant within 21 days after thedate of the Tribunal’s decision against which the appeal is preferred ”.Section 212 (4) requires the Tribunal to cause the petition to be transmit-ted to this Court, but only where the petition “ is presented to the Tribunalin the. manner and within the time specified in sub-sectiop (2)”. I haveno doubt that if the petition was not filed within the prescribed time theappellant is not entitled to be heard.
Now section 211 (1) provides how the Tribunal should inquire into amatter coming up before it by way of appeal from any determination ororder of the Commissioner of Motor Traffic. Then follow the provisionsregulating the manner of giving the decision of the Tribunal, viz., section211 (2)—“ After the hearing of an appeal the Tribunal shall give suchdecision thereon as it may think fit ”.
“ In every case where the decision of the Tribunal upon any
appeal makes it necessary so to do, the Tribunal shall eithermake a fresh determination, or vary the determination ofthe Commissioner and issue all such directions as may benecessary to enable the Commissioner to give effect to thedetermination as so varied ”.
“ In the event of any difference of opinion among the members
of the Tribunal, the decision' of the majority shall be thedecision of the Tribunal ”.
118 SANSONI J.—North- Western Blue Line'Bue Co., Ltd., v. Green Line
Omnibus Co., Ltd. –
.D
“ The Secretary shall give notice in -writing of the decision of the
Tribunal upon any appeal to the appellant, to the Commis-sioner and to every other respondent to the appeal
“ Subject to the provisions of section 212, the decision of the
Tribunal shall be final and conclusive
It was submitted for the appellant that the decision of the Tribunaldoes not become effective until it is formally given in the sense of beingpronounced in the presence of, or otherwise communicated to, the parties,and the period of 21 days will commence to run only from the day it was sopronounced or communicated. Section 212 (2) is not, in ray opinion,open to such a construction ; the words “ the date of the Tribunal’sdecision ” are clear and unambiguous. The phraseology is markedlydifferent from that adopted in sections 184 and 754 of the Civil ProcedureCode. Section 184 requires a Court to “pronounce judgment in openCourt either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given….”. Section 754 requires a petition of appeal to be presented
within a specified number of days “ from the date when the decree ororder appealed against was pronounced It will be seen on the otherhand that the sub-sections of section 211 of the Motor Traffic Actcontemplate a giving of the decision of the Tribunal to be followed by theSecretary giving notice of such decision to the parties to the appeal. Itis not contemplated that the parties should have prior notice of thedate on which the decision will be given. Nor again is it provided insection 212 (2) that the period of 21 days should run from the date onwhich the parties receive notice of the decision of the Tribunal. It seemsquite clear from an examination of sections 211 and 212 that the calcula-tion of the appealable time has nothing to do with “ the date on whichthe parties receive notice of the decision ”. To read the words “ the dateof the Tribunal’s decision ” appearing in section 212 (2) as though theywere “ the date of service of notice of the Tribunal’s decision ” would beto do far more than interpret the words. What is more, there are clearindications that the words were not intended to have that meaning if oneconsiders section 210 which provides for the manner of preferring appealsto the Tribunal against any determination or order of the Commissioner.Section 210 (3) reads—
“ Every statement of appeal shall be transmitted to the Secretaryto the Tribunal within fourteen days of the service on the appellant—
of notice of the determination or order against which the appealis preferred, in a case where the notice sets out the reasonstherefor ; or.
(ft) in any other case of the statement of reasons referred to in section03 or section 97, as the case may be ”.
Here then is a definite provision that the appealable period runs notfrom thn^a|ie of the determination or order but from the service of noticeof the determination or order. It is not for .me to say why a distinction
SANSONI J.—Sapi Nona u. Inspector of Police, Hor ana
119
was drawn in the two cases, but a distinction plainly exists. I wouldpoint out, however, that if it takes the Secretary to the Tribunal from the11th July to the 24th July to send out the written notice of the Tribunal’sdecision to the parties, a day may come when an aggrieved party whowishes to appeal against the Tribunal’s decision will barely have time toperuse the decision if he wants to be sure of lodging his appeal within the .prescribed time. Mr. H. V. Perera asked what the position of a partyadversely affected would be if he received notice of the decision onlyafter 21 days had passed. I am relieved that such a question does notcall for an answer in this appeal. I Mould only add that delay ingiving the notice is bound to cause hardship, and such delays should bescrupulously avoided.*
I uphold the preliminary objection and reject this appeal. Theappellant must pay the 1st respondent its costs.
Appeal rejectedm