H. N. G. FERNANDO, J.—Ramasamy Pillai v. Perumal Pillai
Present: H. N. G. Fernando, J.
P. RAMASAMY PILLAI, Appellant, and E. PERUMAL PILLAI,
S. C. 1291/60—M. C. Colombo, 36141 (A
Indualrial Disputes Act—Award made thereunder ordering payment of money—Execution of award—Scope of Magistrate’s jurisdiction—Section 33(2)—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 312 (2).
When an award is made under the Industrial Disputes Act ordering anemployer to pay a sum of money to a person employed by him and the latterapplies to the Magistrate under section 33(2) of the Act for an order that theamount payable be recovered in liko manner as a fine imposed by the Court,the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to impose a term of imprisonment indefault of the payment of the amount allowed by the award.
Appeal from an order of the Magistrate’s Court, Colombo.
S. Sharvananda, with J. V. C. Nathaniel, for Respondent-Appellant.Miss Maureen Seneviralne, for Applicant-Respondent.
A. de Silva, Crown Counsel, for Attorney-General as amicus curiae.
May 5, 1961. H. N. G. Fernando, J.—
The appellant had apparently been ordered by an award made under theIndustrial Disputes Act to pay a sum of money to a person employedby him. Thereafter the person in whose favour the award had beenmade applied to the Magistrate under section 33 (2) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, No. 43 of 1950, for an order that the amount payable berecovered in like manner as a fine imposed by the court. The Magistratethereupon ordered the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 1,100 (the amountstated in the award) but on being informed by the appellant that he wasunable to pay the amount, and could not pay it even if time is granted,the Magistrate made an order imposing a sontonco of tliroo months’simple imprisonment “ in default”. I take it that the Magistrate meantthat the appellant would have to serve a term of imprisonment if hedid not pay the fine. Counsel appearing at the appeal for both parties,and for the Attorney-General as amicus curiae, are agreed that section33 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not confer jurisdiction on aMagistrate to impose a term of imprisojunent oven in default of thepayment of the amount allowed by the award. That view of the matterwas upheld in a parallel connection in S. C. Case No. 29(M. C. Matale,No. 1679—S. C. Minutes of 17/10/60.
T. S. FERNANDO, J.—De Zylva v. The Queen
Counsel for tho Respondent-Applicant has, howovor, pointed out thatthe Magistrate should wider section 312 (2) of the Criminal ProcedureCode issue a distress warrant for the levy of the amount stated in theaward. The order appealed from is therefore set aside and the reoordwill be returned to tho Magistrate for appropriate steps to be takenunder section 312 (2).
Order set aside.
P. RAMASAMY PILLAI, Appellant, and E. PERUMAL PILLAI, Respondent