SOERTSZ 8.P.J.—Paktaun v. Hamid (Price Control Inspector).
1946Present: Soertsz S.P.J.
PAKTSUN, Appellant, and HAMTD (PRICE CONTROLINSPECTOR), Respondent.
219—M. C. Colombo, 1,546.
Catering establishment—Change of locality or ownership-—Effect of—Defence(Restriction of Meals) (No. 3) Regulations, 1944, Regulation 2 (1).
The question whether, for the purpose of regulation 2 (1) of the Defence(Restriction of Meals) (No. 3) Regulations, 1944, a catering establishmentwhich was in existence before September 1, 1939, can be regarded asretaining that status after it has changed its locality or its ownershipdepends on the facts of each case.
^ PPEAT, from a conviction by the Magistrate of Colombo.
V. Perera, K.C. (with, him S. N. Rajaratnam), for the accused,appellant.
T.K. Curtis, (7.(7., for the complainant, respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
March 19, 1946. Soertsz S.P.J.—
The sole question in this case is whether the Free China Hotel can fairlybe described as a continuation of a catering establishment in existencebefore September 1, 1939, or whether it is a new catering establishment,
Jameela Uinma v. Abdul Azeez.
that is to say an establishment not in existence on September 1, 1939.If the latter is the case, it is quite clear that the meals in respect of whichcomplaint has been made, are meals served in contravention of theRestrictions of Meals Regulations applicable to catering establishmentsnot in existence on September 1, 1939. There is no rule of thumb andindeed no such rule can be laid down for determining whether a cateringestablishment is new in the sense already indicated or not. A cateringestablishment may change its locality or its ownership or even bothlocality and ownership after September 1, 1939, and still remain to beclassified for the purpose of these regulations a pre-first September 1939establishment. It must all depend on the facts of each case. In thiscase, in view of the change in venue, in ownership, in the manner of itsopening, or the change in the kind of catering, in the class of clientele,in the volume of business transacted, in comparison with the businesscarried on at No. 60, Rifle street, the Magistrate was not merely entitledto take the view he did, but could hardly have taken any other view. I
I dismiss the appeal.