HOWAED C.J.—-Petris and Seneviratne.
'There is also a further bar to a successful prosecution of the appellant’sclaim. In view of Mr. Peiris’ application of November 25, 1941, on behalfof the appellant to withdraw plan No. 8,923, it must be inferred that thelatter had notice that Mr. Abeyesinghe was to conduct the sale. Theappellant had notice of the application for sale and failed to file objections.He was cognizant of the fact that Mr. Abeyesinghe had previously beenappointed to conduct the sale and it is in evidence that he was aware ofthe fact that Mr. Abeyesinghe was making arrangements for the sale.He could have applied to the Court for the appointment of anotherauctioneer. In these circumstances I do not consider that he can nowbe heard to object to the sale on the ground that he had no opportunity toobject tc Mr. Abeyesinghe’s appointment. In this connection I wouldinvite attention to Samarasinghe v. Amaradewakare1 and Aninachellamv. Arunachellam,2.
Further considerations affecting the appellant’s right to take advantageof any irregularity in the sale has been brought to our notice by Mr. Weera-sooria. The property was bought by the first respondent and nofraudulent conduct by way of collusion with the auctioneer or secondrespondent has been established. In these circumstances he cannot bedeprived of his property. Perera v. Lebbe3 was cited in support of thisproposition. The headnote of this case is as follows: —
“ A property, the sale of which the owner had prohibited by his lastwill, and which was subject to a trust, was sold under the authority ofthe Court, and was purchased by defendant from one of the executors.
The plaintiff, who is the sole surviving executor and trustee under thelast will, brought this action for declaration of title.
Held, defendant could not be deprived of the property on the groundof any irregularities in the order for sale, or in the procedure by whichthat order was obtained, if he purchased the property bona fide for valueand without notice of the trust.”
The same principle was also formulated in the Privy Council case of RewaMahton v. Ram Kishen Singh4-.
For the reasons I have given, I have come to the conclusion that theDistrict Judge came to a right conclusion and the appeal must be dismissedwith costs.
Soertsz J.-—-I agree.
Appeal dismissed.
1 11 C. L. R. 13.
* I. L. R. 12 Mad. 20.
» 19 N. L. R. 308.
* J. L. R. 14 Calc. 19.