063-NLR-NLR-V-57-PETER-FERNANDO-Appellant-and-ABEYSINGHE-S.-I.-M.-Police-Respondent’.pdf
1955Present : Weerasooriya, J.
PETER FERNANDO, Appellant, and ABEYSINGHE (8. I. M.
Police), Respondent
S. C. 1,16S—M. C. Panadura, 39,972
Interpretation Ordinance {Cap. 2)—Section G (.3) (0)—Offence fatlhuj under repealedstatute—Charge in respect of it under repealing statute—Legality—Motor CarOrdinance, So. 43 of 1033—Motor Traffic Act, -Vo. 11 of 1031, ss. 2 {!), 14 (1),214.
When a penal statute is superseded by another statute a person cannot beprosecuted under the repealing statute for an offence which was committedwhen the repealed statute was in forco. It is, however, open to the prosecution,by virtue of section C (3) (l») of the Interpretation Ordinance, to charge theoffender under the relevant provisions of the earlier statute not withstandingits subsequent repeal.
Section 244 of the Motor Traffic Act, No. 14 of 1951, docs not enable a pro-secution under that Act for failure to register a car in breach of the repealedMotor Car Ordinance, No. 4o of 193S.
.^^PPEAB from tt judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Panadura.
S. Ponniah, with C. C-hclhtppah, for Ihc accused appellant.
Shiva Pasupati, Grown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
November 24, 1953. YYekrasooiuya, J.—
The appellant was charged with the following offence, that on or aboutthe 1st day of October, 1950, lie possessed a motor car No. Z 7960 andfailed to register the same in his name in breach of Section 2 (1) read withSection 14 (1) of the Motor Traffic Act- No. 14 of 1951 and that he therebycommitted an offence punishable under Section 226 of that Act. Theinitial difficulty in the way of Ihc prosecution was to prove that theappellant committed ail offence under the Act . which came into operationonly in 1951, in respect- of ail act done in 1950. The evidence disclosesthat on the 1st October, 1950, possession of lliis car was transferred byway of sale to five appellant, who, thereafter, continued to be the personentitled to the possession of it, but he took no action to have himselfregistered as the owner thereof. In respect of his possession of the caron or about the 1st of October, 1950, without that car having beenregistered in his name, he would have committed an offence under therepealed Motor Car Ordinance No. 45 of 1938 and it was open to theprosecution to have charged him under the relevant provisions of thatOrdinance notwithstanding its subseejuent repeal. This is made clear'by Section 6 (3) (b) of the Interpretation Ordinance.
Appeal allowed.
The learned Magistrate, however, seems to have taken the view that.Section 244 of the Motor Traffic Act No. 14 of 1951 enables the prosecu-tion of the appellant as for an offence committed under that Act in respectof his possession of the ear in 1950. I cannot sec any tiling in Section 24 4which warrants this view. The conviction and sentence are set asidoand the accused is acquitted.■