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PFIZER LIMITEDV.RASANAYAGAMCOURT OF APPEALGUNASEKERA, JC.A. 146/85 &
C.A. 147/85L.T. CASE NO. 21/620EARLIER NO. 8/11245/80OCTOBER 04, 10, 29, 1990NOVEMBER 07, 22, 1990JANUARY 30, 1991FEBRUARY 08, 1991MARCH 13, 1991 AND.
JULY 25, 1991
Industrial Dispute – Industrial Disputes Act – Constructive termination and vacation otpost -'Questions of fact – Error of law – Appeal only on questions of law – Assessmentof compensation.
After the amendment bringing in s. 33(1) D, the Labour Tribunal is empowered togrant compensation simpliciter and not necessarily as an alternative to reinstatement.The President held the action of the Company to report to a junior officer istantamount to a demotion and hence there has been a constructive termination. Thefinding was arrived at after giving consideration to all the relevant evidence on thepoint. The appellant had failed to satisfy the court that there was an error of law. Asan appeal against an order of a Labour Tribunal is available only on a question oflaw, the appeal failed.
In the cross-appeal, the respondent workman was to show that many uncontradiicteditems of evidence on the assessment of compensation had not been considered. Tomake a just and equitable order every material question involved in a dispute mustbe considered and failure to do so is an error of law.
CAPfizer Limited v. Rasanayagam (Gunasekera J.)
In assessing compensation the essential question is this. What is. the actual financialloss caused by the unfair dismissal? With regard to financial loss there is –
First, the loss of earnings from the date of dismissal – the pay (net after tax),allowances, bonuses, value of the use of a car for private purposes, value of aresidence and domestic servants and all other perquisites and benefits having amonetary value. Since the applicant could have worked for 6 years more the salaryat retirement should have been taken into account.
The matters to be considered should be at least an approximate computation ofimmediate loss, prospect of future loss and loss of retirement benefits. A stated basisof the computation is essential.
Cases referred to:
Caledonian (Ceylon) Tea & Rubber Estates Ltd. V. Hilman (1979)1 NLR 421,431, 438
Ceylon Transport Board v. Wijeratne 77 NLR 481
Hayleys Ltd. v. De Silva 64 NLR 130, 139, 140
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon v. Jayasinghe (1982) 2 Sri LR 595, 600
Sri Lanka State Plantation Corportion v. Lanka Podu Sevaka Sangamaya (1990)1Sri LR 84.
M.A. Jayasooriya v. The Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation SC9/89 spl LA215/88 C.A. 449/83 LT 10/1032/82 S.C. Minutes of 30 May 1991.
Silva v. Kuruppu SC 182/69 S.C. Minutes of 14.10.71.
APPEAL by the employer from the order of the President, Labour Tribunal and crossappeal by the employee on quantum of compensation.
K.Thevaraja for applicant-respondent in C.A. 146/185
Kadiragamar with K. Thevaraja and S. Sittampalam for applicant – appellant
M.Nehru P.C. with R. Surendran for respondent – respondent
Cur. adv. vult.
The Applicant W.J. Rasanayagam who had commenced his careeras a Medical Representative under the Respondent AppellantCompany in 1958 made an application to the Labour Tribunal thathis services as Sales Manager (National Hospital Services) wereunlawfully and unjustifiably terminated by the Respondent AppellantCompany by letter dated 21.8.79 marked A8 and claimed by wayof relief compensation for wrongful termination.
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The Respondent Appellant Company in its answer denied that it hadterminated the services of the Applicant and took up the position thatthe Applicant workman had vacated post and prayed that theapplication be dismissed.
After a long and protracted inquiry the learned President havingconsidered the evidence both oral and documentary and the writtensubmissions filed on behalf of the parties came to a finding that theAppellant Company had by its letter of 21.8.79 constructivelyterminated the services of the Applicant Respondent and ordered thepayment of. Rs. 179,500 made up as follows:-
Rs. 144,000 being 4 years salary as compensation,
Rs. 33,000 being 11 years salary for the 22 years of service as
gratuity and Rs. 2,500 as costs.
The Respondent Appellant Company as well as the applicant haveappealed against this order in Appeal C.A. 146/85. The RespondentAppellant Company has prayed that the order awarding relief to theapplicant workman be set aside and the application made to theLabour Tribunal be dismissed. In Appeal C.A. 147/85 the applicantworkman has prayed that the amount of compensation ordered bythe learned President be set aside and that he be awarded enhancedcompensation as supported by the evidence of the Applicant.
The Applicant's case was that he joined the services of theRespondent Appellant Company as Medical Representative in 1958with the amalgamation of Pfizer Limited with Dumex at a time whenRubasinghe the Marketing Director was then a District Supervisorwho was his senior. In 1959 he was designated Sales Inspector andthereafter in 1960 appointed Field Co-ordinator. In about 1968 asField Co-ordinator of the Company he interviewed and recruitedseveral Medical Representatives including one Robin John whom hetrained on the instructions of the Company. In 1976 the aforesaidRobin John was promoted Management Trainee with a salary of Rs.1200 per month and in 1978 was made the Pharmaceutical ProductsManager with a salary of Rs. 1400 per month. The Managing Directorof the Company J.A. Stewart left Sri Lanka after his assignment hereand Stone took over his place as Managing Director in November1978. By Memo dated 29,3.78 marked A2 the applicant was
CAPfizer Limited v. Rasanayagam (Gunasekera J.)
appointed as the National Sales Manager who was required to reportto the Marketing Director Rubasinghe. As at February 1978 theapplicant was placed on a gross salary of Rs.2925 which includeas merit increment of Rs. 235 and the 1978 Budget allowanceof Rs. 50 and was placed in the Administrative grade A2 in theCompany. On 29.3.78 he received a Memo from the MarketingDirector Rubasinghe which was copied to John, requiring him tofurnish some information from the field with the assistance of theofficers working in the field in order to evolve a new credit policyfor the purpose of increasing the Company's business. When hequestioned the Marketing Director as to why it was copied toJohn who was the Pharmaceutical Products Manager he wasinformed that it was done merely for administrative reasons and heflew into a rage and stated "Not only will I copy to Robin John, Iwill make you report to Robin John". The Applicant claimed that wasan ingidious way of suggesting that John was superior to him in theCompany and took up the position that it was an illegitimate orderwith the purpose of undermining his superior position in theCompany. Thereafter he stated that he got a low increment of Rs.75 for the year 1978 and he protested to the new Managing Directorwho requested him to speak to the Marketing Director and thereafterhe wrote X4 dated 7.2.79 to the Marketing Director with copy to theManaging Director protesting about the low increment and appealedfor a reconsideration of his increment. This was followed up by X5dated the 29th of June in which the applicant wrote to the MarketingDirector about the devious manner in which an attempt was madeto demote him to a subordinate position as a Professional ServiceRepresentative and understood the order to take up ProfessionalService Representative work in the Eastern Area as a constructivewrongful dismissal.
Learned President's Counsel appearing for the Appellant Companycontended that on the own admission of the Applicant in his pleadingthat the order of the Marketing Director referred to in X5 as a"Constructive Wrongful Dismissal" should be interpreted to mean thatthe Applicant Respondent had severed connections with the AppellantCompany from 29.6.1979 and thereafter taking the date 29.6.79 asthe alleged date of termination of the Applicant's services theapplication having been filed on 10.2.80 was out of time andtherefore prescribed.
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I am unable to agree with this contention of learned counsel for itis to be observed in the letter X5 itself that the Applicant hadrequested the Marketing Director to abandon his illegitimate actionand to make amends for past wrongful acts and followed it up byX6 date 18.7.79 and X7 dated 28.7.79 addressed to the ManagingDirector with copy to the Marketing Director that he would continueto report to the Marketing Director which is a clear indication that infact that Applicant did not consider that his services had been termi-nated at 29.6.79.
Mr. Nehru during the course of his submission contended that themoment an employee refuses to carry out orders and work and obeyinstructions given by the employer there is an abandonment ofemployment and in the instant case the applicant’s refusal to reportto John and carry out the work as directed by the Marketing Directoralthough he was physically present in the place of work constituteda vacation of post. Learned counsel's submission in this regard wasthat the learned President having correctly identified the issue in thiscase by observing that "This case in its entirety pivots round themain issue whether there was constructive termination of employmentby the Company or vacation of employment by the Applicant haserred in coming to a finding that it would not be wrongful to treatthis case as a case of construcive termination of employment".
The question as to whether a given set of circumstances constitutesa vacation of employment or a constructive termination is a questionof fact to be determined by the Tribunal having regard to all the factsand circumstances which transpire in the evidence. In the instantcase the learned President having considered the evidence and thecorrespondence has reached the conclusion that the Applicant hadmade it very clear that he was willing to work the rest of his life forthe Company and all that he was protesting against was the ordermade by them to report to John who he says was his junior. TheCompany has never set out the reasons as to why this order oftheirs was lawful and also not given a reply to the matters raisedby him. in these circumstances the learned President has taken theview that the Company's position that they had treated him as havingvacated employment from 21.8.79 as indicated in their letter of21.8.79 would not appear to be acceptable.
Pfizer Limited v. Rasanayagam (Gunasekera J.)
The learned President's counsel strenuously argued that the use ofinsulting and insolent language and disparaging remarks about theManaging Director Mr. Stone and the Marketing Director Rubasinghein his correspondence was a clear indication of his intention to severhis connections with the Company and the learned President hasglossed over the use of such language by making the observationthat on a careful consideration of the correspondence in its entiretywith particular reference to the circumstances surrounding theexchange of such correspondence and the behaviour pattern of theapplicant in general at the inquiry before the Tribunal that it was hisview that the Applicant was an enthusiastic and methodical workman.In coming to this conclusion the learned President has indeed beenmindful of the language which could have been best avoided andseeks to justify the use of such 'strong' language as a result of theCompany too using similar language.
Another submission that was made by the learned counsel for theAppellant Company was that the Labour Tribunal had no jurisdictionto award compensation save and except as provided for in the'situations contemplated in Sections 33(3), 33(5) & 33(6) of theIndustrial Disputes Act. This would be true before the amendmentof 1962 which brought in section 33(1 )D to the Industrial DisputesAct which empowers a Tribunal to grant compensation simpliciter.
Sharvananda J. (as he then was) in the Caledonian (Ceylon) Tea &Rubber Estates Ltd. V. Hilman (1) stated that "The IndustrialDisputes (Amendment) Act 4/1962 amended section 33(1 )D by thedeletion of the words “as an alternative to his reinstatment".According to this amendment a decision as to the payment ofcompensation to a worker is no more postulated as an alternativeto a decision as to reinstatement.
Nigel Hatch in his commentary on the Industrial Disputes Act of SriLanka at page 349 states th&t "The amendments introduced by Act4/1962 enables the award of compensation simpliciter in terms ofsection 33(1 )D which is in addition to the remedy of compensationin lieu of reinstatment provided for by sections 33(3), (5) & (6). Theseamendments thus removed the limitations on the powers of theTribunals which were earlier confined to awarding compensation onlyas an alternative to reinstatement." Thus I see no substance in thisargument of learned President's counsel.
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S.R. de Silva in the Employers Federation of Ceylon Monograph 4on the Contract of Employment in paragraph 267 states that "Wherethe conduct of one party amounts to a constructive termination, thenthe Law deems the contract in question to have been terminated asa result of the action of the party who has so misconducted himself.Therefore if the employer has conducted himself in relation to theemployee in such a way as to amount to a constructive terminationof the contract then the termination of the contract will be deemedto be by the employer and such a termination attracts theconsequences of an express termination by the employer". In theinstant case the learned President after analysing the evidence hastaken the view that the action on the part of the Company to requireto report to John is tantamount to a demotion and hence that therehas been a constructive termination.
In the Calendonian (CeylonI Tea & Rubber Estate case SharvanandaJ. reiterated the now well settled law that “Where an appeal undersection 31(d)2 of the Industrial Disputes Act lies only on a questionof law that parties are bound by the Tribunal's findings of fact, unlessit could be said that the said findings are perverse and not supportedby any evidence. In the instant case there is evidence on record tosupport the findings of the learned President and I see no reasonto interfere with the findings. In the circumstances I affirm the findingof the learned President that this is a case of constructive terminationand dismiss the appeal of the Appellant Company without costs.
In Cross Appeal C.A. 147/85 which has been preferred by theApplicant Appellant, he is seeking to have the order of the learnedPresident awarding compensation, gratuity and costs in a sum ofRs.179,500/- set aside and prays that an enhanced amount beordered as claimed by him in his evidence.
Mr. L. Kadirigamar who appeared for the Applicant Appellant in thisappeal quite rightly prefaced his argument by submitting that if theAppellant failed to satisfy this court that there was an error of lawin the order of the learned President that this appeal must fail forthe reason that an appeal against an order of Labour Tribunal isavailable to this court only on a question of law.
Learned counsel for the Applicant Appellant contended, that theconcept of error of law applied to Labour Tribunal cases and
CAPfizer Limited v. Rasanayagam (Gunasekera J.)
submitted that an error of law arises where the Tribunal has failedto take into consideration relevant evidence which emerges duringthe course of the proceedings before the Labour Tribunal.
It was the submission of Mr. Kadiragamar that the learned Presidenthaving correctly come to a finding on the evidence that the servicesof the Applicant Appellant had been constructively terminated by theRespondent Company had taken into consideration relevant factorssuch as
the age of the applicant and the chances of his securingemployment elsewhere in the trade in which he was employed,
financial capacity of the employer,
the length of service,
the behaviour pattern of the tribunal at large,
the loss suffered by the applicant as a result of his cessation ofemployment with particular reference to the income derived byhim during the period of non employment.
the present high rate of inflation,
the past conduct of the workman; and
the circumstances and manner of his dismissal including thenature of the charges levelled against him as enunciated in thedecisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal suchas the Ceylon Transport Board V. Wijeratne (2), the Caledonian(Ceylon) Tea & Rubber Estates Ltd V. Hilman and the unreportedcase SC 33/73 L.T. 14(359/70) SCM 21,3.75 but has failed totake into consideration a very material and relevant body ofevidence which was uncontradicted.
Learned counsel formulated his proposition in regard to the error oflaw that arises in the instant case as follows:-
was the evidence given by the Applicant Appellant regardingincremental wages upto his reaching the retiring age of 60 as
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quantified in detail in document A138 relevant to the question ofthe computation of compensation.?
was that evidence of the applicant unchallenged.?
did the Tribunal take into consideration this evidence incomputing compensation.?
if not .has the tribunal failed to take into consideration a relevantfactor.?
(f) if so is there an error of law.?
in support of this contention learned counsel relied on the observationof Weerasooriya S.P.J. in Hayleys Ltd V. de Silva (3) "That the dutyto make a just an equitable order requires the court, by necessaryimplication to consider and decide every material question involvedin a dispute and the failure to do so would be an error of law".
It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant Appellant that the purposeof compensation is to place in the hand of the victim what he hadlost so far as money and do it (and as Soza J. in the AssociatedNewspapers of Ceylon Ltd V. Jayasinghe (4) had stated“compensation" connotes the money equivalance) and contended thatthe evidence of the Applicant that he could have worked for another6 years till he reached the retiring age of 60 if not for the wrongfultermination and that he would have got about Rs.7000 – 8000 permonth as salary remains uncontradicted which in his subsequentevidence was increased to Rs. 11000 per month as was supportedby the document A 138.
Relying on the dicta of Kulatunga J. in the case of the Sri LankaState Plantation Corporation v. Lanka Podu Sevaka Sangamaye (5)that the workmen who have not reached the age of retirement willbe entitled to reinstatement with effect from 1.5.1989 on terms notless favourable than those enjoyed by them before termination andtaking into account their right to a scale of salary which they wouldhave been entitled to had they been reinstated as ordered by theTribunal, learned counsel submitted that the learned President erredin not taking into account the uncontradicted evidence of theApplicant in regard to the toss he has suffered as a consequence
CAPfizer Limited v. Rasanayagam (Gunasekera J.)299
of the wrongful termination.
Although the learned President has considered several relevantfactors enumerated above in assessing the amount of compensationto be awarded he has totally failed to take into consideration theevidence of the Applicant which remained uncontradicted evenwithout a suggestion to the contrary in regard to the financial losshe has suffered as a consequence of the wrongful termination, andI am inclined to agree with the submissions of learned counsel forthe Applicant Appellant that there is an error of law in that thelearned President has failed to take into account relevant evidencein regard to the assessment of the quantum of compensation to beawarded.
In the case M.A. Jayasooriya v. The Sri Lanka State PlantationCorporation (6) Amerasinghe J. having considered the principles setout by Vaithiyalingam J. In the Ceylon Transport Board v. Wijeratne(supra) & Sharvananda J. in the Catendonian (Ceylon) Tea &Rubber Estate Ltd. v. Hilman (supra) whilst agreeing that the amountof compensation should not be 'mechanically' calculated has observedthat "It is preferable to have a computation which is expressly shownto relate to specific heads and items of loss". In the course of thejudgment he states "it is not satisfactory in my view to simply saythat a certain amount is just and equitable. There ought I think tobe a stated basis for the computation taking the award beyond therealm of mere assurance of fairness. This would enable the partiesand anyone reading the order to see that it is all in all just andequitable". With respect I agree with these observations for it is seenthat in the Caledonian (Ceylon) Tea & Rubber Estates v. Hilmancase the basis for reducing the quantum of compensation from 10years awarded by the tribunal to 7 years by Sharvananda J. is notapparent for all that was stated is "In the view of this court the grantof Rs. 216,000 errs on the excessive side. A just and equitabledecision in the circumstances would be to order the Appellant to payRs. 151,200 representing 7 years salary to the ApplicantRespondent". Similarly in the case of the Ceylon Transport Boardv. Wijeratne the basis for reducing the quantum of compensationfrom Rs. 140,400 the salary for 10 years less the 3 months salarywhich the applicant had received in lieu of Notice to Rs. 44,200 thatis 3 years salary is lacking.
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Amerasinghe J. in Jayasooriya's case (6) having agreed withSharvananda J. that in computing compensation "flexibility is essentialas circumstances may vary in each case and the weight to beattached to any particular factor depends on the context of eachcase" observes "That however there are certain parameters". Thereis data which is necessary to determine the orbit of every Tribunalso as to prevent it from straying off its course. The matters to beconsidered should be at least an approximate computation ofimmediate loss, i.e. loss of wages and benefits from the date ofdismissal up to the date of the final order of judgement, another withregard to prospective future loss and a third with regard to the lossof retirement benefits based as far as possible on a foundation ofsolid facts given to the Tribunal by the parties".
Further having stated that while it is not possible to enumerate allthe circumstances that may be relevant in every case AmerasingheJ. observes that “It may be stated that the essential question in thedetermination of unfair dismissal is this. What is the actual financialloss caused by the unfair dismissal for "compensation is an indemnityfor the loss". With regard to financial loss there is first the loss ofearning from the date of dismissal to the determination of the matterbefore the court, that is the date of the order of the Tribunal, or ifthere is an appeal to the date of the final determination of theAppellate Court. The phrase "loss of earning for this purpose wouidbe the dismissed employee's pay (net after tax), allowances, houses,the value of the use of a car for private purposes, the value of aresidence and domestic servants and all other perquisites andbenefits having a. monetary value to which he was entitled. Theburden is on the employee to adduce sufficient evidence to enablethe Tribunal to decide the loss he had incurred".
According to the evidence led in the instant case the Applicant'sservices were terminated on 21.8.79. The age of retirement being60 years he could have worked till October 1983 and at the date ofthe order of the Tribunal the Applicant was 10 months short of 60years and as at today is well past 65.
Thus for the purpose of computing the compensation to be awardedthe learned President should have taken the salary the Applicantwould have drawn at the age of retirement. Since the Applicant couldhave worked for the company for a period of 6 years had his
CAPfizer Limited v. Rasanayagam (Gunasekera J.)301
services not been terminated, I would now examine the evidence ledin the case regarding the loss incurred by the applicant.
The documents A2, A12, A45, A47, A76, X4, A49, A72 reveal thatthe Applicant had received a salary of Rs. 1500, 1650, 1865, 2015,2215, 2440, 2640, 2925 & 3000 per month respectively in the years1971 to 1979. In examination in chief in answer to the question -withreference to the salaries that are paid to the persons who arecontinued and who are now terminated what would your salary havebeen at the age of 60? The applicant's answer was "about Rs. 7000to 8000" Whilst under re-examination in answer to the Tribunal, theApplicant's evidence was that he would have carried on till October1985 if his services were not wrongfully terminated and stated thus,"I would have carried on till the age of 60, that is another 6 years.When I would reach the 60th year the salary I would have drawnbecause I prove myself through the years and the total I would havegot as salary is Rs. 590,640. Then end of every year we were givenone months salary bonus, and that would have worked up to Rs.51,470. I would have got my E.P.F., Employer's Contribution171/2% being Rs. 103,362. My contribution would have been Rs.118,128, then cost of action and travelling and expenses incorrespondence and legal expenses would come to about Rs.105,320. During the period subsequent to the termination of myemployment by the Company I have been working at two places asa consultant and I have collected Rs. 134,460".
This oral evidence of the Applicant regarding the loss of income wassubstantiated by document A138 in which he sets out a breakdownof the loss. His evidence in regard to the loss of income is atvariance and is inconsistent.
It was common ground that there were no fixed salary scales withfixed annual increments in this Company. According to the evidence,salaries and increments were adjusted annually according to the turnover of the business having regard to factors like inflation. Anexamination of the documents A2, X12, A45, A47, A49, A72, A76,X1 & X4 reveals that the average percentage increase of the salaryof the Applicant over a period of 9 years from 1970 – 1979 has beenabout 9% and this was the period when the Applicant according tohis own evidence Jiad no problem with the Management and hisrelationship with the Marketing Director Rubasinghe was cordial, in
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the claim for compensation for the balance period for which theApplicant could have worked for the Company till he reached theage of 60 he has ventured to give a hypothecial salary scale withthe percentage increase of the incremental wages as follows:-
1979 September to December Rs. 3220 10.085%
1980 Rs. 5000 56.25%
1981 Rs. 6000 20%
1982 Rs. 7500 25%
1983 Rs. 8750 16.6%
1984 Rs. 10000 14.28% &
1985 Rs. 1100 10%
There is no evidence of the basis for this hypothetical increase insalary and in view of the evidence of the Applicant that he wouldhave drawn a salary of Rs. 7000 to 8000 when he would havereached the age of retirement had his services not been wrongfullyterminated I am unable to hold that the applicant would have drawna monthly salary of Rs. 11,000 in the year 1985 as set out in thecompensation table A138 although his oral evidence supported bythe documentary evidence in A138 is that he lost a sum of Rs.590,640 by way of salary. Nor can I accept his evidence inexamination in chief that he would have drawn Rs. 7000 – 8000 permonth had he reached 60 years for there is no certainty althoughthis evidence was uncontradicted and unchallenged.
Since counsel submitted that in the event of my holding that thelearned President had erred in computing the basis of compensationto be awarded having regard to the interval of time that has passedsince the institution of the application relevant to this case that thiscase need not be remitted to the Labour Tribunal for a freshcomputation of compensation, I would now venture to determine thecompensation that should be awarded to the Applicant Appellant.
CA Pfizer Limited v. Rasanayagam (Gunasekera J.)303
It has been held by the Supreme Court in Silva v. Kuruppu (7), thatthe assessment of compensation is eminently a matter within theprovince of the President of the Labour Tribunal. In this case thelearned President having considered the evidence, both oral anddocumentary and the oral and written submissions of the counsel forthe parties has taken the view that 4 years salary (terminal salaryat the time of termination) would be adequate compensation forunjustified termination.
Having regard to the view I have taken and having for the reasonsstated, rejected the evidence of the Applicant that he would havedrawn Rs. 7000 – 8000 per month and Rs. 11000 in his documentA 138 although unchallenged, I am of the view that it would be asafe guide to base the calculation of computation on theunchallenged and uncontradicted evidence that has been establishedin regard to the Applicant's salary and incremental wages for theyears 1970 to 1979 which reflect an average increase of 9% perannum. On this basis I would hold that the Applicant would havegot a salary of Rs. 3270 per month in 1980, Rs. 3480 in 1981, Rs.3654 in 1982 & 4082 in 1983. Thus I hold that the ApplicantAppellant would be entitled to,
3270 x 12 = 39,240.00
3480 x 12 = 41,760.00
3654 x 12 = 43,848.00
4082 x 12 = 48,984.00
as loss of salary.
The uncontradicted evidence of the Applicant Appellant was that hewas entitled to a bonus of one months salary and therefore I wouldadd to the compensation a sum of Rs. 14,486 as bonus that theapplicant would have been entitled to for 4 years and a sum of Rs.55,107 as gratuity for 27 years of service and a sum of Rs. 10,000as costs totalling a sum of Rs. 253,425.
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Thus I set aside the order of the learned President awarding theapplicant Rs. 179,500 and make an order directing that the ApplicantAppellant be paid a sum of Rs. 253,425 as compensation.
This amount of Rs. 24,425 is awarded after giving credit to the Rs.134,460 which the Applicant Appellant had earned after his serviceswere terminated.
The Respondent Company is directed to deposit the aforesaid sumof Rs. 253,425 in the Office of the Assistant Commissioner of LabourColombo South to be withdrawn by the Applicant within one monthof the communication of this order.
Appeal of employer dismissed.
Cross – appeal allowed andcompensation enhanced.