036-NLR-NLR-V-75-PLATE-LIMITED-Petitioner-and-CEYLON-THEATRES-LIMITED-Respondent.pdf
FERNANDO, V.—Plati Ltd. v. Ceylon Theatres Ltd.
217
[In the Coubt of Appeal op Ceylon]
1972 Present: Fernando, P., Sirimane, J., and Siva Supramanlam, J.
PLATE LIMITED, Petitioner, and CEYLONTHEATRES LIMITED, Respondent
Application No. 6 of 19728. C. 326 {F)/66—D. C. Colombo, 56449IM
Court of Appeal Act, No. 44 of 1971—Section 8 (I) (d)—Application forleave to appeal(hereunder—Question of general or public importance—Quantum of doubt as tothe correctness of the judgment of the Supreme Court—Rent Act, No. 7 of 1972—“ Excepted premises ",
Where the question that is involved in an appeal is of general or publioimportance, the doubt as to the correctness of the judgment from which it issought to appeal need not necessarily be a serious one in order to enable theCourt of Appeal to grant leave to appeal under section 8 (1) (d) of the Court ofAppeal Act.. It would be sufficient if some doubt arises about the correctnessof the judgment; such doubt need not invariably prosent itself to the minds ofa majority of the Judges hearing the application for leave to appeal.
• Quaere, whether the point th3t part of “ excepted premises ” is itself exceptedpremises may not, in respect of business premises, be raised again under thenew Rent Aet No. 7 of 1072.
Application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the SupremeCourt.
W. Jayewardene, Q.C., with M. L. de Silva and Miss I. Marasinghe,for the defendant-petitioner.
8. Nadesan, Q.C., with W. 8. Weerasooria, for the plaintiff-respondent.
Cur. adv. wilt.
April 24, 1972. Febnando, P.—
The defendant-company has applied to the Court for leave to appealfrom a judgment of the Supreme Court dismissing its appeal againsta judgment of the District Court which ordered, inter alia, that it beejected from certain premises.
Section 8 (1) (d) of the Court of Appeal Act, No. 44 of 1971, vests in us adiscretion in the matter of the grant of leave to appeal provided we aresatisfied that the proposed appeal involves a question of general or
publio importance.
20 – Volume LXXV
218
FERNANDO, P.—Plait Lid. v. Ceylon Theatres Ltd.
The Supreme Court has bold that the premises occupied by thedefendant-company as a tenant of the plaintiff-company, although theyare a part of larger premises, are “ excepted premises ” within the meaningof the Rent Restriction Act tC'ap- 274) as the larger premises wereexcepted premises.
For the plaintiff, it was submitted to us that, as the Rent RestrictionAct has since been repealed by Section 46 of the Rent Act, No. 7 of 1972(which came into operation on March 1, 1972), any question arisingunder the repealed Act cannot now be one of general or public importance.As to this submission, Mr. Jayewardene has drawn our attention to thenew Rent Act which purports to be an Act to amend and to consolidatethe law relating to rent restriction, and has submitted that the Courtslean towards a presumption that a consolidating statute was not intendedto alter the law. He has further submitted that, in any event, Section6 (3) of the Interpretation Ordinance leaves unaffected an}- rightsacquired under the repealed written law. Moreover, the petition of thedefendant contains a statement subscribed to by counsel who drafted itthat the question involved in the appeal affects a considerable number oftenants throughout Ceylon to whom the owners of larger buildings andhouses uneconomic for singly occupation have let out emaff portions underthe alleged cover of the exception of the larger entity from the protectionwhich the Rent Restriction Act affords to tenants. We see no sufficientreason to discount the statement in the petition.
From such examination of the new Rent Act as we were able to makeduring the course of the argument, we see at present no reason why thecontentions raised in this case around the point that part of “ exceptedpremises ” is itself excepted premises may not, in respect of businesspremises, be raised again under the new Rent Act.
We recognise that the principles upon which leave to appeal might begranted by this Court do not admit of anything approaching exhaustive-definition. Mr. Nadesan suggested that leave to appeal should not begranted unless doubt is entertained about the correctness of the judg-ment from which it is sought to appeal. Where the question that isinvolved in the appeal is of general or publio importance, and isotherwise fit for consideration, the doubt that arises need not necessarilybe a serious one. We think it is sufficient if some doubt arises on such aquestion, and that doubt need not invariably present itself to the mindsof a majority of the Judges hearing tho application. The questioninvolved here is, moreover, a difficult one, and we note that the appealhad to be heard in the Supreme Court before three Judges as the twoJudgesJjeforc whom it was first argued were apparently di.vided'in theiropinions thereon./
We would grant the application for leave to appeal. The applicantis entitled-to its costs.
Application granted.