PREMALAL DE SILVA V. INSPECTOR RODRIGO AND OTHERS

025-SLLR-SLLR-1991-V2-PREMALAL-DE-SILVA-V.-INSPECTOR-RODRIGO-AND-OTHERS.pdf


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Premalal De Silva v. Inspector Rodrigo and Others
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PREMALAL DE SILVAV.
INSPECTOR RODRIGO AND OTHERS
SUPREME COURT.
H. A. G. DE SILVA, J., KULATUNGA, AND DHEERARATNE, J.
S.C. APPLICATION NO. 24/89MAY 28, JUNE 21 AND JULY 13, 1990.
Fundamental Rights ■ Illegal arrest and detention – Torture – Articles II,13 (I) and (2) 13 (4) and 14 (l)(g) of the Constitution – sections 32 (l) (h)and 36 and 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. IS of 1979.
The petitioner a Hotn'e Guard, was arrested on 19 May 1989 by thePanadura Police without a warrant on suspicion of being concerned in arobbery at a cigarette agency which had taken place on 07 May' 1989. Hewas tortured and subjected to cruel inhuman or regarding treatment orpunishment.
Held: (1) There was cogent evidence that the petitioner was arrested on19.05.1989 and not on 23.05.1989 as stated by the Police.
The respondents have (ailed to produce sufficient material to jus-tify the suspicion that the petitioner was concerned in an offence; and hence
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the arrest of the petitioner was unlawful for failure to satisfy the requirementsof section 32(1 )(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act.
The petitioner’s detention after his arrest on the 19th withoutsending him before a Magistrate as required by sections 36 and 37 of theCode of Criminal Procedure Act was unlawful.
While in Police custody fbe petitioner was subjected to torture andinhuman treatment.
Of the Police Officers involved only 2nd and 3rd respondents havebeen adequately identified.
The arrest of the petitioner is violative of his rights under Article13(1) and his detention is violative of his rights under Article 13(2) and (4).Whilst in police custody he was subjected to torture and inhuman treatmentin breach of Article 11 of the Constitution. The 2nd and 3rd respondentsand the State are jointly and severally liable to compensate the petitioner.
If the petitioner has disappeared the compensation is payable tohis legal representatives.
Cases referred to:
Velumurugu v. A. G. & Others 1 FRD 180, 197 — 199
Goonewardena v. Perera [1983] 1 Sri LR 305, 313
Kapugeekiyana v. Hettiarachchi [1984] 2 Sri LR 153, 165
Withanachchi v. Cyril Herat, Leelaratne v. Cyril Herat S.C. Nos. 144 —145/86 S.C. Minutes of 01.07.1988
Joseph Perera v. Attorney-General S.C. Nos. 107-109/86 S. C. Minutesof 25.05.87
Gunasekera v. de Fonseka 75 NLR 246
Dumbell v. Roberts (1944) 1 All ER 326
Muttusamy v. Kannangara 52 NLR 324, 327, 330
Amal Sudath Silva v. Kodituwakku [1987] 2 Sri LR 119, 127
APPLICATION for violation of fundamental rights by illegal arrest, deten-tion, torture and inhuman treatment.
P. D. Gomes for Petitioner.
Kanthilal Kumarasiri for 1 to 5 Respondents.
Hector Yapa D.S. with Surath Piyasena S.S.C for 6th and 7th respondents.
Cur.adv.vult.
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September 05, 1990.
KULATUNGA, J.:
The petitioner who is employed as a Home Guard attachedto the Mount Lavinia Police Station was arrested without awarrant by the Panadura Police on suspicion of being con-cerned in a robbery at a cigarette agency which took place on
He alleges that he was arrested on 19.05.89 withoutfollowing the procedure established by law and without givingany reasons; that he was unlawfully detained at the PanaduraPolice Station until the evening of 23.05.89 during whichperiod he was also subjected to torture and to cruel, inhumanor degrading treatment or punishment; and that the 1st to 5threspondents have infringed his rights under Articles 11, 13(1),13(2), 13(4) and 14(l)(g) of the Constitution. He prays for adeclaration accordingly and for damages. At the hearingbefore us, learned Counsel for the petitioner informed us thathe would not press the claim under Article 14(lXg)>
The petitioner states that on 19.05.89 at about 9.00 p.m. hewas awaiting a bus close to the Panadura bus-stand when the1st respondent (OIC Crimes – Panadura Police) and otherofficers arrived in a jeep. He was ordered to get into the jeepand was taken to the Panadura Police. No reason for his arrestwas given i One Deepal Perera who had been present states inhis affidavit (P2) that a Police jeep arrived and the petitionerwas told to get in (’’s^oocS”). He thought that as the peti-tioner was attached to the Police he was being given a lift. On
he learnt that the petitioner had been arrested andvisited him at the Panadura Police Station. The petitionerappeared to be in pain. He later sent a message about it to thepetitioner’s house. The petitioner’s own account of the eventssubsequent to his arrest is as follows:
On 20.05.89 the 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents took him toa room and ordered him to remove'his shirt. He was takentied up in a crouched position with his hands over his knees
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and suspended on a pole passed through his hands and knees.The two ends of the pole were placed on two tables. The 3rdrespondent then rotated him and the 2nd respondent struck hissoles with an iron rod. The 4th respondent too assaulted himwith the iron rod. The 3rd respondent walked on his body andkicked him. At the same time, they questioned him about arobbery said to have been committed with one Sisira at acigarette agency. One Sisira was brought in and the policequestioned him as to whether the petitioner is the other personwho joined in the robbery to which Sisira answered in thenegative. As a result of the assault, he sustained injuries on hishands and legs.
On 21.05.89 Deepal Perera visited him. On 22.05.89 hisparents visited him, at the Police Station with Sisira Kodikara.Attorney-at-Law and made inquiries with a view to securinghis release. On 23.05.89 his father Jinson de Silva visited him.On both days the police said that the petitioner will be pro-duced before a Magistrate on 23.05.89. His parents waited inthe Magistrate’s Court but he was not produced. The petition-er’s mother Greta de Soysa had tried to meet the DeputyInspector-General of Police, Western Province to make acomplaint but the Superintendent of Police told her that sheneed not do so as the petitioner will be produced before theMagistrate on 23.05.89. In support of some of the avermentsthe petitioner has produced an affidavit from his fathermarked P3.
As the petitioner was not produced in Court on 23.05.89despite the assurance given by the police the petitioner’smother addressed an affidavit dated 23.05.89 (P4) to the DIG,Western Province wherein she gives an account of the arrest ofthe petitioner on 19.05.89 and the subsequent torture by thepolice and requests that he be produced before a Court andgiven necessary medical treatment.
In the afternoon on 23.05.89 the police produced the peti-tioner before the D.M.O. Panadura where he was x-rayed and
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given some injections. Thereafter, he was produced before theMagistrate at her residence and was remanded to fiscal cus-tody. This is admitted by the 2nd respondent (Sub InspectorRatwatte). On 24.05.89 on a motion filed on behalf of the peti-tioner (P5) the Magistrate directed that he be produced beforethe Judicial Medical Officer, Colombo for examination. TheJMO examined him on 26.05.89 and made his report (P6). Theshort history given by the petitioner and recorded in P6 is asfollows:—
“Assault by S.I. Ratwatte and two other police officerswith iron rods after tying his hand and feet and suspend-ing him on two tables with a bar passed behind hisknees on 20.05.89”.
The petitioner had the following injuries:—
Ligature mark across the dorsum of R/wrist 2 Vi” X
W”;
Ligature mark across the dorsum of L/wrist 2Vi” X
Vi”;
Healing wound 3” XI” — front of the L/Low uppe-rarm, extending down to the elbow;
Healing wound 1” X Vi” anterior — lateral upper—L/forearm;
Lacerated wound Vi” — Low, on the R/palm at thebase of the right ring finger;
Healing wound 3” — lVi” on the back and level aspectof the L/knee;
& 8. Infected lacerations — each 1” long in front of the
lower R/Ieg 1” apart;
Contused abrasions — Vi” X Vi” front of mid left leg;
Healing wound — W’ X Vi” back of the lower R/leg;
Healing wound (laceration) Vi” long on the big toe ofthe R/foot.
The JMO states that the injuries 1-11 are consistent withthe history given by the petitioner.
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According to the notes of investigation by the police(marked ‘A’) at the time of the petitioner’s arrest the onlyinjuries he had were a bleeding injury (abrasion) and an abra-sion of the big toe both on the left leg attributed to a fall onthe railway track along which the petitioner ran in a bid toescape arrest. If so, the injuries observed by the JMO on
have been caused subsequent to the arrest. It is notsuggested that they were self inflicted or caused after the peti-tioner was remanded to fiscal.custody on 23.05.89.
In the circumstances, Mr. Kumarasiri, Counsel for the 1stto 5th respondents was constrained to concede that an assaultmay have taken place at the Police Station; and he confinedmuch of his argument to the submission that even if an assaulthas been proved no personal liability on the part of any of therespondents has been established.
The respondents admit the arrest of the petitioner but denythe allegation that the petitioner was arrested on 19.05.89.According to them, the petitioner was suspected for a series ofrobberies. On 23.05,89, Police Sergeant Wickremanayake act-ing on information received from a subordinate officer regard-ing the Vhereabouts of the petitioner obtained the permissionof the OIC (Crimes) and left on inquiry at about 9.30 a.m.with PS 13953 and PC 15212. They spotted the petitioneraround 12.30 p.m. in the Panadura town. When the policemoved towards the petitioner, he started running along therailway track and fell down. Thereafter, he jumped towards alower area in the river. He was arrested with the use of min-imum force and after explaining to him the charge he was pro-duced at the Police Station at 1.25 p.m. Thereafter his state-ment was recorded at 3.30 p.m. He was produced before theDMO and brought back to the Police Station at 4.00 p.m. Hewas produced before the Magistrate at 5.20 p.m. at her resi-dence where he was remanded to Fiscal custody. In between thepolice gave him his lunch and dinner (Vide the notes of inves-tigations marked ‘A’ and entries regarding prisoners detained
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Pmu*Ul De Silr* v. foupector Rodrigo tad Othtrt (Kalttuagt, J.)
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marked ‘B’). It is the submission of the petitioner’s Counselthat documents *A’ and ‘B’ are not a truthful record of eventsregarding the petitioner.
On 02.06.89 the petitioner was subjected to an identifica-tion parade at which the witnesses failed to identify him andhe was enlarged on bail on 08.06.89 on a condition that heshould report to the Panadura Police Station once a week. On
he filed this application. No plaint has been filedcharging him with any offence. In the meantime, on 02.02.90 abrother of the petitioner complained to this Court that thepetitioner reported to the Panadura Police Station on 31.12.89accompanied by his mother. As they delayed returning, theirfather also went to the Police in search of them but none ofthem returned. During an inquiry into this complaint by thisCourt, it transpired that the petitioner had reported to thePolice Station on 31.12.89 but the respondents denied that thepetitioner or his parents were detained at the Police Station. Italso transpired that a message has been relayed to all Police Sta-tions regarding the petitioner but he has not been traced. Atthe hearing before us, the Counsel for the petitioner submittedthat the petitioner and his parents have disappeared. However,there is no evidence for holding that the respondents areresponsible for such disappearance.
To revert to the case for the 1st – 5th respondents each ofthem has denied personal involvement in the impugned arrest,detention and ill treatment of the petitioner; and their Counselhas submitted that even if this Court were to hold that thepetitioner has proved his allegations he has failed to establishpersonal liability on their part. During the argument, Counselproduced marked ‘Y’ a statement made by the petitioner
before the Magistrate on 28.06.89 and drew our attention tocertain contradictions between that statement and Deepal Per-era’s affidavit (P2). It was also submitted that between thepetitioner’s affidavit and his statement ‘Y’ there are certaincontradictions. Counsel submitted that in view of these con-
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tradictions, this Court should dismiss the allegations againstindividual respondents.
In his statement ‘Y’ the petitioner states that at the time ofhis arrest on 19.05.89 he was told to get into the jeep andwhen he inquired why, he was forcibly dragged and takenaway; that on 20.05.89 the 2nd respondent Ratwatte took himupstairs; the 4th respondent PC 13820 and the 3rd respondentPiyaseeli Silva (probably a typing mistake for Piyasiri Silva)tied up and suspended him with a pole between two tables; the2nd respondent struck him with an iron rod and questionedhim about a robbery at a cigarette agency; he was also shownone Sisira and asked whether he knew him; then the 4threspondent struck him with the iron rod; the 3rd respondentalso struck him with the iron rod.
It is pointed out that the statement ‘Y’ makes no referenceto the 1st respondent; that it refers to a forcible arrest whereasDeepal Perera in his affidavit (P2) says that he thought thatthe petitioner was being given a lift; that in the statement ‘Y’the petitioner states that the 3rd respondent struck him withan iron rod whereas in his petition he states that the 3rdrespondent kicked him. More relevantly, the petition describesthe 4th respondent as PC 13520. It does not disclose his name.The statement ‘Y’ makes no reference to any Police Constablebearing distinctive number 13520 but refers to a Police Con-stable bearing number 13820. Here too the name of the Con-stable has not been disclosed but the acts attributed to PC13520 (the 4th respondent) in the petition are now attributedto PC 13820. Consequently PC 13820 Cyril Jayaratne cameforward and filed an affidavit answering the allegations madeagainst the 4th respondent in the petition even though the peti-tioner has not taken steps to join him by an amendment to thepetition.
This Court has to make its determination in respect of theallegations concerned in the petition on the basis of the abovematerial and in the light of the applicable principles of law, in
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particular as regards the nature and the degree of proofrequired of the petitioner. On this question, the rule is that thepetitioner must prove his allegations to the satisfaction of thisCourt. The degree of proof is not so high as in a criminal case.The test is that applied in civil cases but the degree of proofcould vary depending on the subject matter. Thus where theallegation is a serious one such as torture and inhuman treat-ment by the executive and administrative authorities of theState a high degree of probability proportionate to the subjectmatter is necessary.
Velumurugu v. A.G. & Others (1) Goonewardena v. Perera (2)Kapugeekiyana v. Hettiarachchi (3)
Upon a careful consideration of the available evidence, Iaccept the petitioner’s version that he was arrested on
The petitioner is corroborated by Deepal Perera andhis parents. All of them have given a day to day account ofevents from the 19th to 23rd which does not savour of a fabri-cation and is intrinsically probable. No doubt there is a con-tradiction between the petitioner and Deepal Perera as to themanner of arrest in that whilst the petitioner states that he wasforced into the jeep Deepal Perera thought that the police weregiving the petitioner a lift when he was asked to get into thejeep. This in my view is not a material contradiction. Theexpression “fflfCDOoS" used by the police is equivocal and it ispossible that at 9.30 p.m. after sighting the police party DeepalPerera himself may not have remained long enough at thescene to witness everything that happened. In any event, theaccount given by the petitioner’s parents as to the events isconvincing. In consequence of information given by DeepalPerera they visited the Police Station on the 22nd with SisiraKodikara, Attomey-at-Law. Counsel for the respondentscommented that no affidavit from Sisira Kodikara has beenproduced but that by itself does not affect the credibility of thewitnesses. The record in MC Panadura 82836 shows that
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although Mervyn Silva Attorney-at-Law represented the peti-tioner before the Magistrate, Sisira Kodikara too had takencertain action on his behalf. Thus on 31.05.89 he has appliedfor a certified copy of proceedings had before the Magistrate.This was followed by a motion for calling the case to enablethe petitioner to make a statement. The interest that this law-yer had evinced in so assisting the petitioner tends to supportthe averment in the petition that on 20.05.89 he had accom-panied the petitioner’s parents to the Panadura Police Stationwith a view to securing the release of the petitioner.
It is highly improbable that all the investigations purport-ing to have been conducted by the police from the arrest tothe remanding of the petitioner could have been carried outbetween 12.30 p.m. and 5.20 p.m. on the 23rd. In this connec-tion, I accept the submission of the learned Deputy SolicitorGeneral that the fact that the petitioner’s mother was readywith her affidavit to the DIG Police (P5) on the 23rd supportsthe allegation that the petitioner had been arrested prior tothat day. It seems to me that this submission is decisive on thepoint and has considerably assisted this Court in making itsfinding as to the date of the arrest. I wish to express myappreciation of the assistance given by the Deputy SolicitorGeneral and his fair presentation of the case.
Whilst the available evidence considered with the attendantcircumstances is ^cogent enough to establish the date of thearrest, the evidence as to who arrested the petitioner is not socogent. The petition implicates the 1st respondent but the peti-tioner’s subsequent statement (Y) makes no reference to him.The 1st respondent’s own affidavit states that on 23.05.89 hewas the Acting OIC of the Police Station, Horana. This wouldnot help him as that alibi does not cover any previous period;but that alone is not sufficient to turn the scales against him,in the circumstances of this case. No motive has been allegedas to why the 1st respondent is implicated. Yet there is a pos-sibility that he became involved by reason of his being the
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OIC (Crimes). I would therefore exonerate him but expressconcern over the manner in which the petitioner was treatedby officers attached to his branch. Even if he was not con-cerned in the petitioner’s arrest, it is quite unsatisfactory ifsubordinate officers were able to detain the petitioner for over4 days and ill treat him without the 1st respondent beingaware of it. It certainly shows that the crimes branch waswithout supervision.
I shall now consider the question whether the petitioner’sarrest has been effected according to the procedure established!by law. The petitioner’s arrest must satisfy the requirements ofthe provisions of Section 32(l)(b) of the Code of CriminalProcedure Act, No. 15 of 1979 which states —
“Any peace officer may without an order from a Magis-trate and without a warrant arrrest any person
who has been concerned in any cognizable offenceor against whom a reasonable complaint has beenmade or credible information has been received or areasonable suspicion exists of his having been soconcerned”.
The petitioner was arrested in the course of investigationsinto a robbery which took place on 07.05.89 by unidentifiedpersons. According to PS Wickremanayake who claims to haveeffected the arrest, the petitioner was suspected of a series ofrobberies within the Panadura Police area and he was wantedfor questioning. No material has been placed before us to jus-tify such suspicion or more particularly a suspicion that thepetitioner was concerned in the robbery which was underinvestigation. Despite this, the Counsel for the 1st to 5threspondents strenously contended that it was unlawful for thepolice to have arrested the petitioner for purposes of investiga-tion. It appears to be the Counsel’s submission that if it isproved that the police did in fact entertain a suspicion on the
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basis of information in their possession this Court mustuphold the arrest in the interest of investigation. I cannotagree with this submission.
It is settled law that the reasonability of the arrest in suchcases has to be tested by Court. To enable the Court to do so,the police must furnish relevant material to the Court. If suchmaterial is furnished it is not the duty of the Court to deter-mine whether on the available material the arrest should havebeen made or not. The question for the Court is whether therewas material for a reasonable officer to cause the arrest. With-anachchi v. Cyril Herat, Leelaratne v. Cyril Herat (4).Proof ofthe commission of the offence is not required. A reasonablesuspicion or a reasonable complaint of the commission of anoffence suffices. The test is an objective one. Joseph Perera v.Attorney-General (5) Gunasekera v. de Fonseka (6). Police arenot required before acting to have anything like a prima faciecase for convicting. Dumbell v. Roberts (7).
A suspicion is proved to be reasonable if the facts disclosethat it was founded on matters within the police officers’ ownknowledge or on the statements made by some other personsin a way which justify him giving them credit Muttusamy v.Kannangara (8). Gratiaen J. considering whether the arrest ofthe accused without a warrant was lawful said (p. 330) —
“On the facts of this case, the legality of the arrestdepended »upon whether the accused were personsagainst whom a reasonable complaint had been made orcredible information had been received or a reasonablesuspicion existed of their having been concerned in thecommission of the offence of theft (Section 32(l)(b) ofthe Criminal Procedure Code). Inspector Kannangarahas nowhere in the course of his evidence referred to anycomplaint or information or suspicion the reasonable-ness of which could have been tested by the learnedMagistrate, whose function it was to inquire into theofficer’s state of mind at the time that he ordered thearrest”.
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Applying these principles to the case before us, I hold thatthe arrest of the petitioner is unlawful for failure to satisfy therequirements of Section 32(l)(b) of the Code of CriminalProcedure Act. He was arrested on 19.05.89 and detainedwithout sending him before a Magistrate as required by Sec-tion 36 of the Act. By producing the notes of investigationmarked ‘A’ and entries from the register of prisoners detained- ‘B’ – the respondents sought to clinch the issue as to thedate of arrest. No other material having the effect of discredit-ing the petitioner’s version that he was arrested on the 19thhas been produced. If so, the only way in which the police canexculpate themselves on the charge of illegal detention is byresorting to the simple devise of making entries of the kindevidenced by documents ‘A’ and ‘B’, shifting the date of thearrest, which entries would in the absence of convincing evi-dence as to the date of arrest appear to be genuine. I am satis-fied that there is convincing evidence that the petitioner wasarrested on the 19th and that the documents ‘A’ and ‘B’ donot constitute a truthful record of events. I hold that the peti-tioner’s detention after his arrest on the 19th without sendinghim before a Magistrate as required by Sections 36 and 37 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure Act is unlawful.
On the basis of the available evidence including the medicalevidence (P6) I have no doubt that the petitioner, whilst heremained in police custody was subjected to torture and inhu-man treatment. As regards personal responsibility, 1 hold thatno case has been proved against the 4th, 5th and 6th respond-ents. The 4th respondent has to be exonerated in view of thefact that he has been drawn into this case only as a result ofthe petitioner’s statement marked ‘Y’ and he has not beenidentified on the face of the petition itself. The 5th and 6threspondents are made parties purely by reason of their statusas Headquarters Inspector Panadura Police and the InspectorGeneral of Police respectively. Such status by itself would notconstitute sufficient evidence to give rise to personal responsi-bility for an alleged violation of fundamental rights. The 2nd
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respondent has been identified by name in the petition, in thepetitioner's statement to the JMO (P6) and in his statement*Y There is ample evidence to hold him personally responsi-ble.
The 3rd respondent has also been identified by name in thepetition and in the statement ‘Y’. However, there is a conflictbetween the petition and the statement ‘Y’ as regards the partplayed by this respondent when the petitioner was assaulted.According to the petition, he trampled and kicked the peti-tioner. According to ‘Y* he struck the petitioner with an ironrod. Yet on one matter the petitioner is consistent namely, thatthe 3rd respondent helped the 2nd respondent to prepare himfor torture. There is another matter which is significant namelythat the distinctive number assigned to this respondent in thepetition is 16237 but it appears from the affidavit of thisrespondent that the correct number is 16225. This would mil-itate against the suggestion that he has been falsely implicated.If that were so the petitioner who refers to him in the petitionby name would have taken the care to ascertain the correctnumber before he filed his application. In my view, theerroneous reference to the number is probably due to faultyobservation or recollection.
1 determine that the arrest of the petitioner is violative ofhis rights under Article 13(1) and his detention is violative ofhis rights under Article 13(2) and 13(4). I also determine thatthe petitioner was, whilst- in police custody, subjected to tor-ture and inhuman treatment in breach of Article 11 of theConstitution; and that the 2nd and 3rd respondents and thestate are jointly and severally liable to compensate the peti-tioner.
It remains to consider what relief may be granted to thepetitioner. The decision of this Court in Amal Sudath Silva v.Kodituwakku (9) is of relevance in this regard. In that case,the petitioner who had been arrested and detained for 5 nights
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by the Panadura Police had been subjected to torture andcruel treatment by the police.
Atukorale J. said (p. 127) —
'‘The facts of this case have revealed disturbing featuresregarding third degree methods adopted by certainpolice officers on suspects held in police custody. Suchmethods can only be described as barbaric, savage andinhuman. They are most revolting to one's sense ofhuman decency and dignity, particularly at the presenttime when every endeavour is being made to promoteand protect human rights. Nothing shocks the con-science of a man so much as the cowardly act of adelinquent police officer who subjects a helpless suspectin his charge to depraved and barbarous methods oftreatment within the confines of the very premises inwhich he is held in custody. Such action on the part ofthe police will only breed contempt for the law and willtend to make the public lose confidence in the ability ofthe police to maintain law and order. The petitioner maybe a hard-core criminal whose tribe deserves no sym-pathy. But if constitutional guarantees are to have anymeaning or value in our democratic set-up, it is essentialthat he be not denied the protection guaranteed by ourConstitution".
I am in respectful agreement with these views. I wish toadd that if the police continue with the practice of taking intocustody suspects on speculation or merely on the ground thatthey are persons of bad repute, in the hope of getting a breakin the investigations by interrogating them, it would end up inthe use of third degree methods, this presumably is what hap-pened in the case before us.
In Sudath Silva's case the Court ordered compensation in asum of Rs. 10,000/- and costs fixed at Rs. 1000/- to be paid tothe petitioner. Neither the pronouncements of the Court nor
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the award made appears to have deterred the police in resort-ing to the illegalities established in the instant case. In all thecircumstances, I determine that the petitioner is entitled to asum of Rs. 20,000/- as compensation and a further sum of Rs.2,000/- as costs from the 2nd and 3rd respondents and theState, jointly and severally. I direct that payment be madeaccordingly. I dismiss the application against the 1st, 4th, 5thand 6th respondents without costs.
In view of the material which has been placed before thisCourt to the effect that the petitioner has disappeared I haveconsidered whether this Court should make any direction asregards the payment of the sums ordered herein, in the eventof it being established that the petitioner is dead. Under Article126(4) the Supreme Court has the power “to grant such reliefor make such directions as it may deem just and equitable inthe circumstances in respect of any petition”. Thus the powerof this Court is very wide and would include the power tomake a direction as to the payment of the sums ordered, in thecircumstances set out by me. Accordingly, 1 direct that in theevent of it being established that the petitioner is dead, thecompensation and costs ordered in this judgment be paid tothe petitioner’s legal representatives.
I also direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded tothe Inspector-General of Police who is the 6th respondent tothese proceedings to enable him to consider further steps, byway of disciplinary action or otherwise, in the light of the find-ings of this Court.
H. A. G. de Silva, J. — I agree.Dheeraratne, J. — I agree.
Application allowed. Compensation ordered.