DALTON S.P.J.—R. M. A. R. A. R. R. M. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. 447
1935Present: Dalton S.P.J. and Soertsz AJ.
R. M. A. R. A. R. R. M. v. THE COMMISSIONER OF
S.C. 24 of 1935.
Privy Council—Decision of Supreme Court from a decision under Income TaxOrdinance—No right of appeal to Privy Council—Ordinance No. 2 of'1932, s. 74.
There is no right of appeal to the Privy Council from a judgment ofthe Supreme Court on a case stated under section 74 of the Income TaxOrdinance.
A PPLICATION for conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Councilfrom a judgment of the Supreme Court in a case stated under theIncome Tax Ordinance.
N. Nadarajah, for assessee-appollant, in support.
M.W. H. de Silva, Acting S.-G. (with him Basnayake, C.C.), forCommissioner of Income Tax, respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
December 20, 1935. Dalton S.P. J.—
This is an application for conditional leave to appeal to the PrivyCouncil from a decision of this Court of November 11 last in an appeal
448 DALTON S.P.J.—R. M. A. R. A. R. R. M. v. Commissioner o£ Income Tax, *
to this Court under the provisions o£ section 74 of'^he &ome TaxOrdinance, 1932. -The appeal came up, on a queajSton of law only, inthe form of a case stated by the Board of Review.
Mr. de Silva, for the respondent, the Income Tax Commissioner, hasopposed the application on two grounds : first, that no stamp duty hasbeen paid, as required by law, on the tfroxy and application filed, andsecondly, that the appellant has no right of appeal.
I will deal with the second point first. • Section 74 of the Ordinance issilent on the question as to whether or not there is any appeal from thedecision of this Court. It is urged for the appellant, however; that theproceeding is a “ civil suit or action ” within the meaning of section 4 ofthe Appeals (Privy CoUncil) Ordinance, No. 31 of 1909, the Ordinanceregulating the procedure on appeals to His Majesty in Council. Thatargument has been already replied to by the judgment of this Court inSoertsz v. Colombo Municipal Council1.
In that case, the tribunal of appeal, under the Housing and TownImprovement Ordinance, No. 19 of 1915, had stated a case for the opinionof this Court under section 92 of that Ordinance. Section 92 in effectcontains provisions on this question similar to those contained in section74 of the Income Tax Ordinance. In the judgment I have cited, thisCourt held there was no right of appeal to the Privy Council from ajudgment of this Court on a case stated under section 92. It was heldthat the decision of the Court on the point of law submitted in the casestated was not a judgment or order in a civil suit or action, as set out in-the Charter of 1833 creating the right of appeal.
Mr. Nadarajah had to concede that this decision under the HousingOrdinance, given under a section of an Ordinance' in almost identicalterms, on this question was a difficulty in his way. He urged, however,that the' application before us should be referred to a Bench of threeJudges, for the matter to be reconsidered, if we were not in agreementwith that decision. V
I see no reason whatsoever to disagree with the decision, in the casecited and would follow it in this application. The appellant thereforehas no right of appeal from a judgment of this Court on a case statedunder section 74' of the Income Tax Ordinance. Mr. de Silva concedesthat on such a matter in England a party who feels aggrieved is entitledto go to the.highest Court of Appeal that is open to His Majesty’s subjects,but in Ceylon such a party is by the local Income Tax Ordinance debarredfrom that right.
It is not necessary, in these circumstances, to deal with the first question' raised, the failure to stamp the documents as required by section 4 andPart II, Schedule B of the Stamp Ordinance, 1900. On that questionI would, however, add that the appellant has not explained how he or thedocuments are exempted from the stamp duty set out.
The application must be dismissed with costs.
Soertsz A.J.—I agree.
' Application dismissed.
» 38 N. R. 62.
PRINTED AT THE CEYLON GOVERNMENT PRESS, COLOMBO
R. M. A. R. A. R. R. M. v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX