046-SLLR-SLLR-1998-1-RAJAPAKSE-AND-OTHERS-v.-DISSANAYAKE-LABOUR-OFFICER-AND-ANOTHER.pdf

in relation to any office, means the person carrying on, orfor the time being responsible for the management of,the business for the purpose of which the office is main-tained,"
On the other hand, state counsel referred us to section 3 (5) ofthe Act and argued that the persons excluded from the purview ofthe Act are those who hold "an executive or managerial position ina public institution. . The expression “public institution" is definedas “any corporation, board or other body established by or under anywritten law, other than the Companies Ordinance, with capital whollyor partly provided by the Government by way of grant, loan or otherform". State counsel also referred us to section 68 (2), the materialpart of which reads thus: "For the purposes of this Act, a person shallbe deemed to be employed in or about the business of a shop oroffice if he is wholly or mainly employed.

in the service of the employer upon any work, whether in theshop or office or outside it, which is ancillary to the businesscarried on in that shop or office, and notwithstanding that he'receives no reward for his labour; but he shall not be deemedto be so employed if his only employment in the service ofthe employer is in the capacity of a caretaker or watcher."
In considering the question whether Cecil Perera who wasappointed as General Manager in terms of P1 falls within the purviewof the Act, it is intensely relevant to note that the Shop and OfficeEmployees (Regulation of Employment and Remuneration) Act is animportant piece of social legislation enacted in 1954 in the contextof the emerging concept of a welfare state. Part III of the Act whichdeals with "regulation of remuneration" defines the expression "em-ployee" in very wide terms – “In this part, employee means a personemployed in or about the business of a shop or office". On a readingof the entire Act, it seems to me that there is no warrant for givinga narrow or restrictive meaning to the word "employee". To do sowould tend to defeat the object of the Act and render its salutryprovisions largely nugatory. The facts in this case reveal that CecilPerera, though designated as General Manager, was in as vulnerable
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a position as any employee subordinate to him. I hold that the Actdoes not envisage a distinction between persons holding "a managerialposition" (ike Cecil Perera and other subordinate employees, ascontended for on behalf of the appellants.
Finally, Mr. Goonesekera submitted that the Magistrate was ingrave error in imposing a fine of Rs. 135,000 on the appellants. Withthis submission, I agree. Apart from the balance remuneration duefor the 3 months set out in the charge, the Magistrate has, contraryto the provisions of section 53 (1) of the Act taken into account afurther period of 8 months. In so doing the Magistrate has overlookedthe fact that section 53 (1) expressly limits the period to "four yearspreceding the date on which complaint under section 136 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure Act was made to court". It was agreed thatthe relevant date was 19.10.88. State counsel rightly conceded thatthe total fine the Magistrate could have lawfully imposed on theappellants is Rs. 41,000 (Rs. 36,000 for the 3 months set out in thecharge plus Rs. 5,000). I accordingly set aside the fine of Rs. 135,000imposed on the appellants, and substitute therefor a fine ofRs. 41,000.
Subject to the aforesaid variation in the quantum of the fine, theappeals are dismissed.
WIJETUNGA, J. – I agree.
ANANDACOOMARASWAMY, J. – I agree.
Appeal dismissed.
Quantum of fine varied.