045-NLR-NLR-V-46-RAMEN-Appellant-and-PERERA-Respondent.pdf
CANNON J.—Ramen and Perera.
138
1944Present: Gannon J.
RAMEN, Appellant, and. PERERA, Respondent.
58—C. R. Colombo, 93,268.
Rent restriction—Premises reasonably required for landlord's occupation—Position of tenant—Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942, s. 8.
Tn deciding the question under section 8 of the Bent Bestriction Ordi-nance whether the premises are reasonably required for the occupation ofthe landlord the Court should take into consideration the circumstancesof the tenant sb well.
^ PPEATj from a judgment of the Commissioner of Requests, Colombo.
E. B. Wikramanayake for the defendant, appellant.
J.E. M. Obeysekere (with him C. Renganathau), for the petitioner,respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
October 26, 1944. Cannon J.—
This is an appeal against a judgment given in favour of the landlordin an action for ejectment. The issue was whether certain premisesNo. 81, Hill street, Colombo, were reasonably required for occupationas a residence for the landlord within the meaning of the Rent RestrictionOrdinance, No. 60 of 1942, section 8. The ground of appeal is misdirectionin that the Commissioner has not taken into consideration the positionof the tenant.
The question arises:To what extent must the position of the tenant
be taken into consideration? In Raheem v. Jayawardane 1 Howard C.J.says:“ The learned Commissioner seemed to think that the landlord
discharges the burden of proof imposed on him by proving that he hasa good reason for requiring the premises …. Having regardto the words “ in the opinion of the court ” which occur in section 8 (c)of the local Ordinance, I do not think that the words “ reasonablyrequired ” cast on the landlord the burden of merely establishing a goodreason, so far as he himself is concerned, for requiring the premises asin the first part of section 5 (1) (9d) of the English Act. The Court hasto be satisfied, after taking into consideration other matters such asalternative accommodation at the disposal of the landlord and theposition of the tenant, that the requirement is a reasonable one. ” InAbeywardene v. Nicolle 2 the Commissioner decided that premiseswere not reasonably required in view of the ' relative position of theparties concerned ’. The inconvenience caused to the landlord wasthe Commissioner thought little when compared with the inconvenience’the tenant would have to face in finding another house. Mr. JusticeSoertsz in affirming the Commissioner’s decision, saw no misdirectionin the way he had considered the matter of alternative accommodation.The words “ reasonably required ” would at first sight, appear to requireno explanation to a reasonable man. Guiding principles are, however,desirable. Whether an action or a request is reasonable must dependupon a consideration of all the surrounding relevant facts. It restsJ 45 N. L. R. at p. 316.* 45 N. L. R. 354.
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CANNON J.— Ramen and Perera.
upon circumstantial as well as direct evidence. It follows that thecircumstances of the tenant as well as those of the landlord must be takeninto consideration and, although the Ceylon Ordinance, unlike theEnglish Statute, does not require the landlord to provide suitable alterna-tive accommodation, the availability or non-availability of alternativeaccommodation to the .tenant, as well as to the landlord, is a fact whichin my view, is a major circumstance. Though the landlord may havesound reasons for seeking possession, as Mr. Justice Acton said in anEnglish case cited by Soertsz, J. “ because the landlord’s wish for possessionwas reasonable, it does not follow that it was reasonable for the courtto gratify it ”.
The question to be answered may, it seems to me, be paraphrased thus.
Is the landlord’s requirement for occupation a reasouable one havingregard to the circumstances of both parties? And where the hardshipto neither party appears to overbalance that of the other, I think, thelandlord should succeed by virtue of his ownership.
In the present case, the landlord has shown good reasons. He gaveevidence that he resides at Kandana, about 11 miles from Colombo, heis a toddy and arrack renter and has a number of taverns in Colombo.He bought the premises in question for the occupation of himself andwants to live there with his family. Kandana, he said, was too distantto enable him to look after his business. He has an office at Hill street.Before he went to Kandana, he was a tenant of premises in Wolfendahlstreet, but went to Kandana during the time of the air raids. He ownsu car and motor lorries. He further stated that he bought the premisessolely for the reason of residing in them and, therefore, immediatelygave the defendant notice to quit. He was unable to say whether hecould get a rented out house in Colombo, and added “ I cannot livein a rented out house ”. The landlord, however, has alternativeaccommodation; and although it is 11 miles from his business, there isno hardship in the present times to a successful business man who hasmotor transport at his disposal. On the other "hand, the tenant gaveevidence that he has no alternative accommodfation although he haslooked for it, and his household comprises 15 persons.
The Commissioner in his reasons for judgment stated "I do not seeany circumstance in this case to doubt the bona fides and the reasonablenessof the plaintiff’s need for the house in question. As soon as he purchasedthe house plaintiff gave defendant notice to quit. I accept plaintiff’sevidence that he bought the house for the express purpose of residingin it. Plaintiff’s large business as a toddy and arrack renter requireshis daily presence in Colombo. His headquarters and office are situatedin the same street as the premises in question. At present he resides11 miles away from Colombo in a rented house. I can therefore wellbelieve plaintiff when he states that he finds i.t extremely inconvenientto continue to reside away from Colombo ”. The Commissioner hasevidently based his judgment on the good faith of the landlord andnot on the reasonableness of his requirement. He does not appear tohave taken into consideration the position of the tenant. On accountof this misdirection, the appeal must be allowed with costs.
Appeal allowed.