084-NLR-NLR-V-53-RAMON-Appellant-and-AHAMATH-S.I-Police-Respondent.pdf
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Ramson e. Ahamath
1951Present : Basnayake J.RAMSON, Appellant, and AHAMATH (S. I. Police), RespondentS. C. 658—M. C. Puttalam, 38,541
Motor Car Ordinance, No. 45 of 1938—Suspension of certificate of competence—
Procedure for such order—Section 75 (2) (e)—" Special reasons
An order suspending a certificate of competence should not be made underSection 75 (2) (e) of the Motor Car Ordinance, No. 46 of 1938, without affordingthe accused person an opportunity of placing before the Court factsin extenuation of his offence.
Obiter: A circumstance peculiar to the offender as distinguished from theoffence is not a “ special reason ” within the meaning of the expression inSection 75 (2) (c).
BA8NAYAJ5E J.—Ramson c. A Hamath
STS
j^V-PPEAIj from a judgment of the Magistrate's Court, Puttalam.
E. R. S. R. Caomaraswamy, for the accused appellant.
A. C. M. Ameer, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
August 28, 1951. Basnayake J.—
The appellant pleaded guilty to the following charges—
(а) of using a lorry for which a licence was not in force,
(б) of driving a lorry in relation to which a policy of insurance
or a security in respect of third party risks was not in force.
He was fined Bs. 50 in respect of each charge and the learned Magistratealso made order suspending the appellant's certificate of competence forone year.
Section 75 (2) (c) of the Motor Car Ordinance, No. 45 of 1938. providesthat: “ Where any person is convicted of the offence of contravening theprovisions of section 127, the Court shall make an order suspending thecertificate of competence of such person, or declaring such person tobe disqualified for obtaining a certificate of competence, for a period ofnot less than twelve months, unless in the circumstances of any case,for special reason- to be recorded in the proceedings, the Court is ofopinion that such order should not be made or that the period ofsuspension or disqualification should be less than twelve months.
It does not appear that the appellant was afforded an opportunityof placing before the Court any special reasons in regard to the offencescommitted by him. It is important that an accused person should beafforded an opportunity of placing before the Court facts in extenuationof his offence so that it may be the better able to exercise its discretionto mitigate the operation of the imperative terms of section 75 (2) (c).
I therefore set aside the order of suspension of the appellant’s certi-ficate of competence and direct that the case be sent back in order thatthe learned Magistrate may afford the appellant an opportunity ofplacing any facts he wishes to submit for his. consideration in the exerciseof his discretion under section 75 (2) (c).
I think it will be helpful if I were to state for the guidance of the learnedMagistrate the scope of the section, especially as the Motor Traffic Act,No. 14 of 1951, has a corresponding provision.
The section empowers the Magistrate to arrest the operation of thefirst part of section 75 (2) (e) if he is of opinion that having regard to thecircumstances of the case there are special reasons why the order of sus-pension or disqualification should either not be made or the period of
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BASNAYAXE J.—Ramson v. Ahamath
suspension or disqualification should be less than, the prescribed period.The Court should be of opinion that in the circumstances of the casebefore it, there are special reasons why the order should not be made.A “ special reason ” is one which is special to the facts of the particularcase, that is, special to the facts which constituted the offence. A cir-cumstance peculiar to the offender as distinguished from the offence is nota “ special reason
I am not aware of any decision of this Court on the scope of 'the expres-sion “ special reasons ” in our enactment. Though the correspondingprovision of the English Act is not in precisely the same terms as ourprovision, the English decisions thereon in my view are of assistance.I do not wish to burden this judgment "by reference to them individually,but it is sufficient to say that it has been held there that financial hard-ship, conviction for a first offence, a long driving record without complaint,forgetfulness or carelessness in not taking out a policy of insurance,a misapprehension of the legal effect of a policy, that disqualificationis too severe a penalty, and that the accused is a lorry driver who drivesfor his living, are not special reasons. On the other hand it has beenheld that there were special reasons where the insured was misled by theinsurance company, where an employed person drove a vehicle havingno reason to think its use was not covered by insurance, where an ownerlet his garage proprietor drive in the belief that such person would becovered in the ordinary course of business, and where through an over-sight a policy had not been renewed and the insurers informed the Courtthat they would have met any claim.
In the case of Whittal v. Kirby *, Lord Goddard adopted with approvalthe following meaning of the expression “ special reason ” laid down inthe Northern Ireland case of R. v. Croaaan 3 :
“ A ‘ special reason ’ within the exception is one which is special tothe facts of the particular case, that is, special to the facts whichconstitute the offence. It is in other words a mitigating or extenuatingcircumstance, not amounting in law to a defence to the charge, yetdirectly connected with the commission of the offence, and one which theCourt ought, properly to take into consideration when imposing punish-ment. A circumstance peculiar to the offender as distinguished fromthe offence is not a ' special reason ’ within the exception. ”
There is in my opinion nothing in pur Ordinance that makes this definitionof the meaning of ' special reason ’ inapplicable to our law. It can withadvantage be adopted by us.
Sent back for consideration of sentence.
<194911 Ad E. R. BS2.
* (1939) 1 N. I. 10 6 otpp. 112. 113.