or words of substantially the same meaning or, if the
declaration containing the words

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to revoke the said deed marked P1 and also there is no proof what-soever to establish that the donor had been explained the contentsof the said section 5(1 )(d) by the attesting Notary.
In P.B. Ratnayake v M.S.BJ. Bandara(supra) which is aSupreme Court decision I would certainly prefer the viewexpressed in the dissenting judgment of G.P.S.de Silva, J. as hethen was with reference section 5(1 )(d) of the Kandyan LawDeclaration and Amendment Ordinance, No. 39 of 1938. HoweverI am bound to follow the majority decision in that case. The facts in 60that case were as follows:
On 11.6.1960 one Tikiri Kumarihamy Ellepola by DeedNo. 8247 gifted certain land to her sister JayalathaKumarihamy as a donation inter vivos absolute and irrev-ocable subject to the condition that the donee shall notmortgage or otherwise alienate the said premises butshall only possess and enjoy the fruits and producethereof and on her death the land was to devolve on herchildren and in the event of her dying issueless on thedonor and her children. The gift was accepted by the 70donee. Jayalatha Kumarihamy by Deed No. 5204 of5.10.1972 gifted the said land to her husband Ratnayakethe defendant-appellant. On 3.1.1973 Tikiri Kumarihamyby Deed No 39373 revoked the Deed of Gift No. 8247and on 17.2.1975 by Deed No. 72 gifted the said land toher son Bandara the plaintiff-respondent who suedRatnayake the defendant-appellant for declaration of title.
The operative words embodied in deed No. 8247 in that case wereas follows:
“For and in consideration of the natural love and affection 80
which I have and bear untoand for diverse
other good causes and considerations we hereunto spe-cially moving do hereby give, grant, convey, assure andmake over as a donation inter vivos absolute and irrevo-cable unto the said donee”
It was held:
Ran Banda and another v. Piyadasa and others
CA(Somawanse. J.)145
The Kandyan Law Declaration and AmendmentOrdinance, No. 39 of 1938 is an Ordinance to declare andamend the Kandyan Law. It seeks to amend the KandyanLaw and not to make a mere restatement of the law as itwas prior to 1939 when the intention to renounce the rightto revoke was inferred or deduced from the particularwords used. The amending Ordinance has enacted a uni-form rule requiring an express and not merely inferentialrenunciation of the right of revocation. The words"expressly renounced" in sec. 5(1 )(d) of the Ordinancerecognize a pre-existing right to revoke which everyKandyan donor had in Kandyan Law. What the Ordinancecontemplates is an express and deliberate renunciation bythe donor of his right to revoke. From the words “absoluteirrevocable" it may be implied that the Donor intended torevoke but such an expression would not constitute anexpress renunciation of the right to revoke.
There is a further requirement that the renunciation mustbe effected in a particular way, viz, by a declaration con-taining the words “I renounce the right to revoke” orwords of substantially the same meaning.
The Ordinance by sec. 5(1 )(d) has now vested in thedonor a statutory right to revoke and he is required toexercise that right in a particular way.
The words “absolute and irrevocable” are only an adjec-tival description of the gift by the essential requirement isa transitive very of express renunciation. Words merely offurther assurance are insufficient.
The use of the words “absolute and irrevocable” and “tohold the premises for ever” do not satisfy the requirementof sec. 5(1 )(d) of the Ordinance. Deed No. 8247 wasrevocable.
Applying the principle laid down in P.B. Ratnayake v M.S.B.J.Bandara (supra) to the instant case, I would say the right to revokehas been renounced by the donor in deed marked P1 in that theoperative words embodied therein specially refer to section 5(1 )(d)of the Ordinance, No. 39 of 1938 in renouncing his right to revoke.
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No other meaning could be attributed to the aforesaid operativewords embodied in deed marked P1. Reference to section 5(1 )(d)of Ordinance, No. 39 of 1938 makes it clear what the intention ofthe donor is, viz to renounce his right to revoke in conformity withthe provisions contained in section 5(1 )(d) of Ordinance, No. 39 of1938. Furthermore, it is to be seen that the Notary who attested thedeed marked P1 acknowledge the fact that before the partiessigned the deed that he read over and explained the contents of 130the deed to them which is recorded as follows;

It is to be noted that though the learned District Judge does notmake any reference to the Supreme Court decision in P.B.Ratnayake v M.S.B.J. Bandara (supra) nevertheless having con-sidered the earlier decisions has come to a correct finding that thedeed marked P1 is a valid deed and has proceeded to act upon the 130deed.
For the above reasons, I see no basis to interfere with the deci-sion of the learned District Judge. Accordingly the appeal of the 3rdand 6th defendants-appellants will stand dismissed with costs fixedat Rs. 5000/-.
CHANDRA EKANAYAKE, J. – I agreeAppeal dismissed.