KEUNBUAN J.—Hanasinghe and Sahira Umma.
19MPresent: Howard C.J. and Keuneman J.RANASINGHE, Appellant, and SAHIRA UMMA, Respondent.
10-—-D. C. Kegalla, 1,175.
Decree—Satisfaction of decree by agent of judgment-debtors—Certification of
payment—Civil Procedure Code, s. 349.
Where a decree is satisfied by a third party acting on behalf of the
Judgment-debtors, payment may be certified under section 349 of the
Civil Procedure Code on the application of the judgment-debtors.
PPKAL from an order of the District Judge of Kegalla.
H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him E. B. WUcremanayaTce'), for substituted,plaintiff, appellant.
J. ~P. Chelvanayagam (with him M. I. M. Haniffa), for first to thirddefendants, respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
July 21, 1944. Krttjteman J.—
In this case judgment was entered on October 5, 1939, in favour ofthe three original plaintiffs against the 1st to the 3rd defendants forBs. 12,000 and interest, and a hypothecary decree was entered. OnOctober 28, 1940, the decree was assigned to the appellant, who wassubstituted as plaintiff.
Admittedly payments had before the assignment been made underthe decree, and the only sum now claimed by the substituted plaintiffis Rs. 506.32 as principal and Rs. 813.18 as interest, making a totalof Rs. 1,319.40.
The 1st to the 3rd defendants have applied that satisfaction of thedecree be entered under the following circumstances: —
In his affidavit the 1st defendant states that shortly after the decreewas entered he sold some of the mortgaged lands to Sumana Karuna-wathie, who undertook to satisfy the claim of the original plaintiffsin this action out of the consideration of the deed of transfer, and thata sum of Rs. 10,693.68 had been paid by her in full satisfaction.
It is in evidence (see document A 1) that Karunawathie had a claimagainst the orignal plaintiffs for Rs. 2,134. She sued for this amountin D. G. Kegalla, 1,264, and decree was entered in her favour. Butby & settlement incorporated in that decree, the original plaintiffs inthis case undertook to deduct this sum of Rs. 2,134 from the amountdue in the present ease, and to accept the balance due in this case, afterthis deduction, in satisfaction of the decree in the present case. There-after Karunawathie paid the whole amount due in this case—less thededuction mentioned—and in fact, as it turns out, she paid more thanwas necessary under that arrangement.
It is admitted that section 345 of the Civil Procedure Code does notapply in this case, because the cross-decrees are not between the sameparties, but the respondents contend that this adjustment can be certifiedas an adjustment of the decree to the satisfaction of the decree-holderwithin the terms of section 349.
Hassan and Badulla Police.
The appellant’s answer is that the settlement was not between thedecree-holder and the judgment-debtors, and that the settlement inD. C. Kegalla, 1,264 was only executory and did not result in satisfactionof the present decree.
I think the affidavit of the 1st defendant shows that in D. C. Kegalla,1,264 Karunawathie, though undoubtedly acting in her own interest,was also acting for the present defendants. The settlement may there-fore be regarded as made by her as agent of the present defendants.At the least, it was a settlement made by her for the benefit of thepresent defendants, and under our law the present defendants can takeadvantage of it. It is clear that the original plaintiffs were consentingparties.
Further, before the date of the assignment to the substituted plaintiff,Karunawathie paid the whole of the balance due in the present case,less the sum of Es. 2,134, for which the original plaintiffs had consentedto give credit in this case. The effect of this payment was to extinguishthe decree in the present case. (See in this connection Ponnamperuma v.Wic kremanayake1.
In the circumstances I am of opinion that the defendants are entitledto claim that this adjustment should be certified. The substitutedplaintiff as the transferee of the decree held the same “subject to theequities (if any) which the judgment-debtors might have enforced againstthe original decree-holder.” (See section 340.)
The District Judge did not order that the adjustment should be certified.Jn this he was wrong, and I now make order that the adjustment whichI have referred to be certified. Subject to this, the appeal is dismissedwith costs.
Howard C.J.—I agree.
RANASINGHE, Appellant, and SAHIRA UMMA, Respondent