017-NLR-NLR-V-09-RASAVASAGRAM-v.-SIWANDI.pdf
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1906.
•February 6.
Present: Mr. Justice Wood Renton.
RASAVASAGRAM v. SIWANDI.P. C., Trincomalee, 2,693.
" Obstructorimpede"—Mererefusal—Absenceof physical resistance~
Ordinance No. 3 of 1897, s. 6 (1).
Section6(1) ofOrdinanceNo. 3 of 1897enacts that “ if an; per-
son without lawful authority or excuse (proof whereof shall lie on him).
orif heobstructsor impedes orassists in obstructing or
impedinganyinspectoror otherofficer appointedunder this
Ordinance, or anypoliceofficer, in theexecutionofanyprovision
of this Ordinance,or ofany regulationmadethereunder,heshall
be guilty of an offence against this Ordinance. ”
Whereapersondid notuse any actual physical resistance, but
repeatedlyanddistinctly,refused toallow the officer of the proper
authority to execute his order—
Held, that the conduct of the person amounted to “ obstruction "within the meaning of the above section, and was punishable underthe section.
A
PPEAL by the complainant from an acquittal. The factsand arguments appear sufficiently in the judgment.
Bawa, for complainant, appellant.
Balasingham, for accused, respondent.
6th February, 1906.WoodRenton J.—
I have to deal with an exceedingly interesting question of law,and I commence by thanking counsel on both sides for theclearness and brevity with which they argued it. Section 6 ofOrdinance No. 8 of 1897 provides that if any person without any law-ful authority or excuse contravene any regulation made under theOrdinance, which deals inter alia with the segregation of cases of con-tagious diseases, “ or obstructs or impedes ” any officer acting underany such regulation, he shall be liable to a statutory^penalty. Certainregulations have been made under this Ordinance, and of these No.27 empowers the proper authority to cause persons who are sufler-ing from smallpox, to be removed to some public hospital or other placeprovided by the Government. In the present case a man and a womanwere suffering from smallpox, and the “ proper authority ” visitsthe house in which they are living, clearly conveys to the womanthe fact that he is acting under a statutory regulation, and makes anorder for t^e segregation of them both, under his statutory power.
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It appears that no actual physical resistance was offered by thewoman, who is the accused, to the execution of the order, but it isdear from the evidenoe that she repeatedly and distinctly refused toallow the officer of the proper authority to execute his order eitheras regards herself or as regards her husband. If the order was to beexecuted at all, it could only be executed by force, and it follows thatthe act of the woman was an act which rendered force necessary.Force was not in fact used.
The question which I have to decide is, whether a person who be-haves in this way does not " obstruct or impede ” the discharge of theofficer’s duty. If we take the words “ obstruct " or “ impede ” in theirplain English meaning, it is clear that she does so, for she places anobstacle in his way, and that is “to obstruct’’ or “impede” him. Hisprimary duty there is not to use force; it is to remove the patient,and that she prevents. I see no reason for placing on the words“ obstruct ” or “ impede,” as they occur in section 6 of OrdinanceNo. 3 of 1897, any other than their simple English meaning. It willbe observed that our local Ordinance does not speak of “ voluntaryobstruction ” a phrase which may have led the Indian Courts totheir decisions in such cases as Queen Empress v. Hussain (1).It speaks simply of “ obstructing ” or “ impeding, ” and thedecision of Moncreiff J. in the case of Davidson v. Lebbe (2),seems to me to be practically on all fours with the present case.Each case must be decided on its own merits. I think, withoutattempting to lay down any general rule which may fetter the Courtsin any subsequent cases, that if what I may call legal compulsion ispresent, if it is conveyed to a person in such a position as the accused,that the officer who seeks to remove the patient is acting understatutory authority which she is bound to obey, and if she exhibitsnot merely reluctance to comply with the order, but such apositive refusal to do so, that the order can only be carried out byphysical violence, it is competent for a Court to hold, as I hold underthe circumstances of the present case, that the person is guiltyof a contravention of section 6 of Ordinance No. 3 of 1897. I set asidethe judgment and acquittal and convict the accused of both theoffences' with which she is charged, and impose a fine of Rs. 10, beinga fine of Rs. 5 on each of the two counts.
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a) 15 B. H. c. Rep. 718.(2) (1902) 2 JBrowne 281.
1909.
February 6.
WoodBenton J.