001-NLR-NLR-V-15-RATWATTE-v.-NUGAWELLA-et-al.pdf
THE
NEW LAW REPORTS OF CEYLON.VOLUME XV.Present: Laseelles C.J. and Middleton -J.
RATWATTE «. NUGAWELLA et al.
126—D. C. (Interlocutory) Kandy, 20,598.
Misfoinder of defendants—Cause of action—Civil Procedure Code, s. 14.
Plaintiff, who was suspended by the Kandy District Committeebom the office of trustee, brought this action against all themembers jf the Committee, alleging that his suspension was illegal(1' on the ground that the defendants were not entitled to act asthe District Committee by reason of irregularities in their election-and of want of qualification; (2) and on the ground that the defend-ants, even if they were a duly constituted body, did not act iu. conformity with the Ordinance.
The District Judge held that the defendants ought not to havebeen joined in one action, and called upon the plaintiff to electwhich of the defendants he would proceed against.
Held, that the order was wrong.
I
N this case the plaintiff, who is the Basnaike Nilame andtrustee of the Kataragam Dewale, Kandy, sued the defendants,
who. jointly professing to act as the District Committee of theDistrict of Kandy under the provisions of the Buddhist TemporalitiesOrdinance, suspended the plaintiff from his office of BasnaikeNilame and trustee for alleged neglect of duty, to have it declaredthat the defendants were not legally elected, and were not thereforethe District Committee, or entitled to act as such Committee. Theplaintiff also averred that four of the defendants, namely, the third,fourth, sixth, and seventh defendants, had not at the date of theirelection the qualifications required to entitle them to be so elected,and that the Committee was not therefore legally constituted, andthat therefore the proceedings taken by the defendants against theplaintiff were null and void, and of no avail in law. The plaintiffalso denied that he had been guilty of any neglect of duty, or wasfor any reason whatever liable to be suspended from his office ofBasnaike Nilame or trustee.
1911.
IJ. H. A 9M1* (8/50)
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1911. The plaintiff- prayed that the defendants be declared not to be theRaiwatu v. legally constituted District Committee, or entitled to act as such;Ntujawella. and that the proceedings taken by them against the plaintiff bedeclared null and void; and the plaintiff declared to be the BasnaikeNilame and trustee of the Kataragam Dewale, and entitled to thepossession of the said dewale.
Objection was taken to the joinder of all the defendants in oneaction.
The District Judge (F. R. Dias, Esq.) made the following-order : —
The plaint as framed is somewhat, complex, and so far as I understandit the . plaintiff is attacking the defendants on two grounds:(1) That the
election of each of the seven defendants is null and void on variousgrounds,and (2)that theseven defendantsacting jointlycommitted an
actionable wrong by suspending him from his office of Basnaike Nilame.Objection has been taken by defendants’ counsel to the joinder of allthese defendants in the one action, inasmuch as it would be embarrassingto eachof themto defendhimselfinsuchan action, andeach personas
defence must of necessity be independent of that of the others. I quite' appreciate Mr. Elliott’s reasons for his embarrassment, and certainlythink that each of these seven, gentlemen should not be called upon todefend his own election while his six friends look on till their turncomes. Not onlywould the thingbecostly and vexations to theparties,
but it would be next to – impossible for the Court to deal adequately withseven election petitions all rolled into one.
After all, the action, no matter how- it is framed, is intended totest the validityof theelectionofeachof these seven individuals.
I must decline to enter upon such an inquiry, and call upon theplaintiffto electwhich individualhewillproceed againstif he wants
to do so.
With regard to that part of the plaintiff’s case which only complainsof a joint act by the defendants to his prejudice, my ruling is that therehas been no misjoinder.
The resultofthese proceedingsisthat the plaintiff will be permitted
to prove, ifhecan, that the act hecomplains of was wrongful,but for
that purposehewill not be allowedin this action to contest thevalidity
of the defendants' elections.
The plaintiff appealed.
Bawa, for appellant.—The learned Judge was wrong in holdingthat there was a misjoinder of parties. The cause of action againstthe defendants is the wrongful suspension. The irregularities inthe election of the various members of the Committee are not thecauses of action. The appellant complains of the joint act of all themembers. The plaintiff cannot proceed 'against each member of theCommittee individually.
■ Elliott, for the respondents.—The District Judge finds that it wouldbe most inconvenient to hear the case against the several defendantstogether. The District Judge is the best person to decide in a matter
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like that. The irregularities complained of are not the same in the 1911.case of the several defendants. The election of one is attacked on Raiwatte v.one ground and of another on another. The cause of action against N>'9oweUathe defendants is not the same. Counsel referred to Tewary et al.v. Pershad et cl.;1 Banghami v. Kirihamy;2 Civil Procedure Code,section 14.
Bawat in reply.
Cur. adv. vult.
September 22, 1911. Lascelles C.J.—
have eome to the conclusion that the order of the learned DistrictJudge cannot be sustained. The plaint is open to criticism, andparagraph 5 seems to have been drawn without regard to thefact that under “ The Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance, 1906/'separate elections are held for each of the subdistricts which makeup the district.
Accepting the definition of “ cause of action " in the Civil ProcedureCode, the plaint appears to me to disclose two causes of action.
First, the plaintiff complains that his suspension is illegal, on theground that the defendants, who purport to act _as the DistrictCommittee of Kandy, and who suspended him from' office, are cotentitled to act as such by reason of irregularities in thefr election andof want of qualification.
Secondly, the plaintiff complains that his suspension is illegal, onthe ground that the defendants, even if they are a duly constitutedCommittee, did not act in conformity with the Ordinance.
To this action it would appear that all the defendants are neces-sary parties, for I understand that irregularities are alleged against'the election of each of them.
The District Judge, as I understand, considers that these defend-ants ought not to have been joined in one action, and has called uponthe plaintiff to elect which of the defendants he will proceed againston the first cause of action; subject to this, he has limited the trialto the second cause of action. In my opinion this order is erroneous.
It cannot be maintained that the defendants are not persons “ againstwhom the right to relief exists jointly, severally, or in the alternativein respect of the same cause of action ” (Civil Procedure Code,section 14).
The objection to the status of the defendants as members of theDistrict Committee is one which affects each of them severally.
On the ground of .convenience, I see no advantage in the coursetaken by the learned District Judge. By remitting the plaintiff toa separate action against each of the defendants, these proceedingswill necessarily be prolonged for a considerable period.
There is, I think, some ground for the complaint that this actionhas been so framed, whether intentionally or not, as to cause themaximum of embarassment to the defendants, but I think the triali 11867) 8 W. R. 16.*■. {1903) 7 N. L. R. 857.
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1811.
LaSOEEEES
CJ.
Jtatwatte v.Nugawella
of the action would be facilitated if the learned District Judgerequires the plaintiff to furnish particulars of the irregularities anddisqualifications on which he relies in the case of each defendant.The learned District Judge will then be able to arrange for thedisposal of the cases against the several defendants on different days,and so obviate the necessity for the attendance of the large numberof witnesses which we were told were in attendance at the hearing.
The appeal must be allowed, and the action remitted for trial indue course; but in view of the vague and embarrassing manner inwhich the plaintiff has launched his case, I think the costs of thisappeal should be costs in the cause.
Middleton J.—I agree.
Appeal allowed.