( 876 )
Present : Pereira J.
BEGIN AH AMY *. JOHNA139—P. G. GaUet 5,976.
Maintenance—Wife living in adultery.
In the case of an application for maintenance under theMaintenance Ordinance, 1889, the fact that the wife had at onetime anterior to the application been living in adultery ie insuffi-cient to disentitle her to an order under the Ordinance.
HE applieant in this case claimed maintenance for* herself andher son from her husband. The learned Magistrate refused
the application.He said : “ Her counsel contends that she is
entitled to -maintenance now that she is not living in adultery. Icannot uphold this contention. It would be dangerous to societyto do so. ” The applicant appealed.
T. de Silva, for the appellant.—The Magistrate is wrong inholding that the wife is disentitled to maintenance merely becauseprevious acts of adultery have been admitted. The Ordinancecontemplates living in adultery at the time of the maintenance(5 S. G. D. 32). A husband is bound to maintain children in lawfulcustody of wife though 6he may be living in adultery (3 Bal. 253).
De Jong, iot the respondent.—It is not clear that the son isentitled to maintenance.
Our. adv. vvhIt.
February 14, 1914. Pereira J.—
The Magistrate has refused to make an order for maintenance inthis case because the applicant had at one time been living inadultery. This is not a sufficient ground under the MaintenanceOrdinance, 1889, to disentitle a wife to maintenance. Section 5epeak6 of the wife living in. adultery at the time of the applicationunder the Ordinance (see 5 S. G. D. 32). If a husband choosesto let the marriage tie remain in spite of adultery on the part of hiswife, and the wife from choice or necessity returns to an honourablelife, the husband’s liabilities unquestionably revive. Considerationsof expediency like those referred to by the Magistrate cannot beallowed to enter into account. I set aside the order appealedfrom, and remit the case to the Court below to fix the amountpayable for the maintenance of the applicant and her 6on, and to makeorder accordingly. In the case of the latter, he must of course be ofsuch an age as to justify a claim for maintenance under the Ordinance.
REGINAHAMY v. JOHNA