Rosaline Nona and Jan Singho.
1945Present: Soertsz J.
ROSALINE NONA, Appellant, and JAN SINGHO, Respondent.
88—G. R., Colombo, 91,240.
Rent Restriction Ordinance—Authority of Board of Assessment to instituteaction—Procedure tobe followedwhere no authorityisobtained—
Right of appeal—Ordinance No. 60 of 1942, s. 8.
Section8ofthe BentRestriction Ordinance enablesa landlordto
institute an action inejectment with theauthorisation oftheBoard of
Wherenosuchauthorisationis obtained a landlordmay presenta
plaint in the Court of Bequests in the manner of an action in ejectmentbut the Court is debarred from entertaining the plaint till the Court is ofopinion thatoneorother oftheconditions appearing in clause 8(q) to(d)
Wherethereisa trialonquestions of tenancy ordeterminationof
tenancy, there is a right of appeal from a judgment or order having theeffect of a final judgment.
SOEETSZ J.—Hosaline Nona and Jan Singho.
^f^PPEAXi from a judgment of the Commissioner of Bequests, Colombo.
E. B. Wikremanayake, for defendant, appellant.
S. R. Wijayatilake, for plaintiff, respondent.
G-ur. adv. vult.
August 3, 1944. Soebtsz J.—
This case again affords an illustration of the confusion that appears toprevail in regard to the procedure to be adopted by Commissioners ofBequests in trying actions of ejectment instituted after the commence-ment of the Ordinance No. 60 of 1942. Section 8 of that Ordinanceenables a landlord to bring a case into Court as an ejectment case withtKe authorisation of the Board of Assessment. If no such authorisationhas been obtained section 8 enables, none the less, a landlord to present aplaint to the Court of Bequests framed in the manner of an action forejectment. But section 8 debars the Court concerned from entertainingthat action till the Court is of opinion that one or other of the conditionsappearing in clause 8a to d is satisfied. This means that the Courthas no power to try the proposed action till it has reached the opinionthat one of the conditions precedent has been satisfied.
In this instance the plaintiff came into Court and it appears from theplaint that the ground on which he sought to have his action entertainedby the Court was .that the rent was in arrears, that would be under clause8a. It was therefore incumbent upon the Court to try this preliminarymatter which has now been introduced by the Bent Bestrietion Ordinance,namely, whether, the Court has the power to try the case on the ground.that the Court is of opinion that the rent was in arrears. Instead ofsetting about the inquiry in that manner, the proceedings of October 25,1943, show that the learned Commissioner framed 10 issues, issues involv-ing the questions whether there was a tenancy or not and whether propernotice to quit had been given or not. Those were matters over which .theCourt had no jurisdiction till the Court had found that it had the powerto entertain the proposed action. Eventually the Court held that the rentwas in arrear, and also held that there was a tenancy of these particular pre-mises which had been determined by valid notice. Now if the Court hadset about this case in the manner I indicated, directly the Court answeredthe issue in regard to the rent being in arrear in favour of the landlordthe Court was entitled to entertain the action. The Court should thenhave gone on to try the other questions, namely the existence of a tenancyand the determination of it. The Court eventually did .that in this caseby taking both the inquiry and the trial together.
Mr. Wijayatilake on behalf of the respondent has taken a preliminaryobjection to .the hearing of- this appeal on the ground that there was noright of appeal upon a recent ruling pronounced by this Court. . But hereagain he is under a misconception because the defendant clearly had atight of appeal inasmuch as there was a trial on the questions of tenancyand the determination of the tenancy which are the questions thatusually arise in an ejectment case and from a final judgment or an orderhaving the effect of a final judgment there is a right of appeal in such an
WUBYEWABDENE J.—Ratnayake and Asiyath Umma.
Action. The preliminary objection is overruled, but Mr. Wikremanayakewas not able to satisfy me that .the findings of the Commissioner on thequestions of tenancy and the determination of the tenancy by validnotice are wrong.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
ROSALINE NONA, Appellant, and JAN SINGHO, Respondent