021-SLLR-SLLR-2005-V-3-RUSHANTHA-PERERA-vs.-WIJESEKERA.pdf

The defendant-respondent filed answer denying the avermentscontained in the aforesaid paragraph 7 of the plaint and in paragraph 9 ofthe answer specifically took up the position that the plaintiff-petitionercannot maintain this action as presently constituted inasmuch as theplaintiff-petitioner has failed to properly state the date on which thepurported cause of action accrued to him. Paragraph 9 of the answerreads as follows:

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Thus it could be seen that when the defendant-respondent in paragraph9 of his answer specifically stated that the plaintiff-petitioner has failed toproperly state the date on which the purported cause of action accrued tohim the plaintiff-petitioner without seeking to amend the plaint so as togive the correct date, in fact disputed the aforesaid position taken by thedefendent-respondent and went on to state in his replication that bypargraphs 7 and 11 of the plaint he has stated correctly the dates onwhich the causes of action accrued to him. Having taken such a stand henow seeks to amend paragraph 7 of the plaint by substituting the words“October 2002” instead of the words “September 2002" found therein.
It is comm'pn'ground that the plaintiff-petitioner has sought to amendthe plaint on the second date of trial and the relevant provisions applicableto the amendment of pleadings after the day first fixed for trial are theprovisions contained in Section 93(2) of the Civil Procedure Code whichreads as follows:
93. (2) “On or after the day first fixed for the trial of the action and beforefinal judgement, no application for the amendment of any pleadings shallbe allowed unless the court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by thecourt, that grave and irremediable injustice will be caused if suchamendment is not permitted, and on no other ground, and that the partyso applying has not been guilty of laches".

It appears that thereafter the plaintiff-petitioner disputed theaforesaid position taken by the defendant-respondent and in paragraph 3of the replication the plaintiff-petitioner further stated that by paragraphs 7and 11 of the plaint he has separately averred the causes of action andthat he has properly stated the dates on which the causes of actionaccrued to him. Paragraph 3 of the replication reads as follows :

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Section 93(2) of the Civil Procedure Code has been considered in anumber of cases and in the case of Gunasekera vs. Abdul LatifP cited bycounsel for the plaintiff-petitioner himself it was held :
"Court will grant relief under section 93(2) of the Civil Procedure Codeonly if the delay can be reasonably explained. The provisions of section93(2) of the Civil Procedure Code are intended to be used whenamendments to pleadings are necessitated by unforeseen circumstances.Further it was held amendment to pleadings on or after the 1st date of trialcan be allowed only if the Court is satisfied that grave and irremediableinjustice will be caused if the amendment is not permitted and the partyapplying has not been guilty of laches. ”
Counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner while relying heavily on the aforesaiddecision goes onto say that the facts and circumstances of that caseGunasekera vs. Abdul Latiff (supra) are entirely different from the instantaction. Counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner also cited the decision in CeylonInsurance Co. Ltd., vs. Nanayakkara2. The facts were as follows :
The plaintiff-respondent instituted action against the defendant-petitionerclaiming a certain sum due on a contract of insurance. The defendantdisclaimed liability. Trial commenced on 28.07.95; after recording issues,it was postponed for 16.10.95. On this date certain objections were takenand when the trial resumed again on 09.01.97 a trial de novo was orderedon 13.05.97. On 07.05.97 the plaintiff sought to amend his pleadings,which was allowed by Court.
It was held in that case :
“1. section 93 (2) prohibits Court from allowing an application foramendment, unless it is satisfied that grave and irremediable injustice willbe caused if the amendment is not permitted and the party applying hasnot been guilty of laches.
The Court is required to record reasons for concluding that both conditionsreferred to have been satisfied.
2. The application to amend by pleading mistake or inadvertence can inno sense be regarded as necessitated by unforeseen circumstances. Theplaintiffs’ conduct point to one conclusion, viz. that they have acted without
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due diligence “ this error could have been discovered with reasonablediligence ; the need for the amendment did not arise unexpectedly.
It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner that therequirement that the application to amend pleadings on the basis of mistakeor inadvertence should have been necessitated by unforeseencircumstances as held in the aforesaid case has introduced a restrictionnot imposed by legislature.
In the case of Colombo Shipping Co. Ltd., vs.Chirayu Clothing (Pvt)Ltd.,3 it was held :
"Amendments on and after the first date of trial can now be allowedonly in very limited circumstances namely, when the court is satisfied thatgrave and irremediable injustice will be caused, if the amendment is notpermitted and the party is not guilty of laches”.
Also in the' case of Avudiappan vs. Indian Overseas Bank4 it was held :
"The amendments contemplated by section 93(2) are those that arenecessitated due to unforeseen circumstances. Laches does not meandeliberate delay, it means delay which cannot be reasonably explained.The plaint was filed in July 1988, the amendment was sought in September1994. No explanation was forthcoming from the respondent for the delay.Such a delay in seeking amendment of pleadings on the 5th day of trialcannot be countenanced. ”
In the case of Kuruppuarachchi vs. Andreas? wherein the Courtconsidered the effect of the amendment introduced to the Civil ProcedureCode by Act No. 9 of 1991 :
"The amendment introduced by Act No. 9 of 1991 was clearly intendedto prevent the undue postponement of trials by placing a significantrestriction on the power of court to permit amendment of pleadings ‘on orafter the day first fixed for trial of the action”.
The Court further went on to state at page 13 that:
“The relevance of those observations for the present purposes is thatthey indicate the rationale underlying the amendment introduced by ActNo. 9 of 1991. While court earlier "discouraged" amendment of pleadingson the date of trial. Now the court is precluded from allowingsuch amendments save on the ground postulated in the subsection.”(emphasis added)
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I would also cite the following decisions :
Ranaweeravs. Jinadasa6
Per Amerasinghe, J.
“No postponements must be granted or absence excused, except uponemergencies occurring after the fixing of the date, which could not havebeen anticipated or avoided with reasonable diligence, and which cannototherwise be provided for. ”
Also in the case of Paramalingam vs. Sirisena and Another1 it was held:
“Laches means negligence or unreasonable delay in asserting orenforcing a right. There are two equitable principles which come into playwhen a statute refers to a party being guilty of laches. The first doctrine isdelay defeats equities. The second is that equity aids the vigilant and notthe indolent’’.
In the instant application for leave the amendments the plaintiff-petitioneris seeking to effect are matters which existed at the time of the plaintiff-petitioner filing this action and within his knowledge and/or was madeaware by the defendant-respondent. The plaintiff-petitioner now cannot beheard to say that the date on which the purported cause of action accruedto him was another date. In the circumstances, I am unable to see howgrave and irremediable injustice would be caused to the plaintiff-petitionerunless the amendment is accepted by Court. It is very clear the plaintiff-petitioner has waived his right to amend the plaint by his averments in hisreplication. It is apparent that the learned Additional District Judge in aclosely considered order has come to a correct finding that the plaintiff-petitoner’s own conduct prevents him from amending the pleadings interms of section 93(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.
In the circumstances, I do not think any further consideration is necessaryas to the submissions made by counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner. I have nohesitation in rejecting the application for leave with costs fixed at Rs. 20,000/-.
WIMALACHANDRA J. -1 agree.
Application dismissed.