069-NLR-NLR-V-62-S.-B.-L.-PERERA-Petitioner-and-THE-CHAIRMAN-URBAN-COUNCIL-DEHIWALA-MT.-LAVIN.pdf
H. N. G. FERNANDO, J-—Per era, v. Chairman, Urban Council, Dehiwela- 383
Jkft. Lavinia
1960Present : H. N. G. Fernando, J.S.B. L. PERERA, Petitioner, and THJE CITAIRMAN, URBANCOUNCIL., DEHIWELA-MT. LAVINIA, Respondent
S. C. 608—In the matter of an Application for a Mandate in thenature of a Writ of Mandamus under Section 42 of the Courts
Ordinance {Gap. 6)
Mandamus—Urban Council—Right to compel Chairman to exercise some powerwhich the Council has decided to exercise—Urban Councils Ordinance.
An executive officer of a Local Authority cannot be compelled, by mandamussought by a private individual, to carry out a resolution of the Local Authorityrelative to the exercise of its powers but not to the performance of any statutoryduty imposed on it.
Application for a writ of rnandamus.
A. de Silva, in support.
Cur. adv. vult.
February 2, 1960. II. N. G. Fernando, J.—
This was an application for a Writ of Mandamus against the respondent• who is the Chairman of an Urban Council. The petitioner alleges interalia that he made an application to the Urban Council for the exchangeof a certain land of which he was the owner, that is to say, for the transfer
384 H. IT. G. FER1TA1TX>0, J.—Perera v. Chairman, Urban Council, Dehitoela-
M.t. Lavinia
to him by the Council of land vested in the Council in exchange for theland owned by-him. He alleged that the application was recommendedfor acceptance by the Working Committee of the Council and thereafterapproved by the Council by resolution but that the respondent haddeclined to execute the resolution. He seeks from this Court a Writ ofMandamus directing the respondent to give effect to the recommendationsby taking steps to effect the exchange of land.
I was not referred to any provision of the Urban Councils Ordinancewhich confers on the petitioner a statutory right to a grant of land inexchange for his own land, and I accordingly invited counsel for thepetitioner to submit authorities in support of the proposition that aChairman of an Urban Council can be compelled at the instance of a privateindividual to carry out a resolution of the Council relative to the exerciseof its powers but not to the performance of any statutory duty imposedon the Council. After reserving judgment I have been referred to twoEnglish cases :—Attorney General v. De Winton1 and Regina v.Saunders a. In each of these cases the Crown successfully sued an officerof a statutory body impeaching the accounts of the body on the groundthat expenses not legally chargeable to the funds of the body had been socharged. Even if it can be said ( and I do not agree that it can) that similarsuits would lie at the instance of a private individual to impeach theaccounts of a statutory authority, these two cases certainly do not supportthe proposition that this Court has jurisdiction at the instance of a privateindividual to compel an executive officer of a Local Authority to exercisesome power which the authority has decided to exercise. I refuse theapplication.
Application refused.
1 (1906) 2 Chancery 106.
2 (1854) 3 E. ds B. 763.