047-NLR-NLR-V-76-S.-V.-RASAMANICKAM-Petitioner-and-B.-ALFRED-and-another-Respondents.pdf
Itaaamanickam v. Alfred
236
1972 Present: Pathirana, J., and Rajaratnam, J.
S. V. RASAMAJMTCKAM, Petitioner, and B. ALFREDand another, Respondents
S. C. 541/72—Application for a Writ of Certiorari on the Assistant
Commissioner of Agrarian Services, Anuradhapura and another
Paddy land—Lease of it by owner—Sub-lease of a portion by lessee—Rights of the sub-lessee as against the owner—"Landlord”—Paddy Lands Act No. 1 of 1958, ss. 4 (IA), 4 (2), 63 (1).
Where the owner of a paddy land leases the entire land and thelessee, without cultivating the land, subleases a portion of the land,
. the sub-lessee, if he has cultivated his portion, is in the position of atenant-cultivator as against the owner, even if the owner hasobtained a decree of Court to eject his lessee. In such a case, theprovisions of section 4 (2) of the Paddy Lands Act are applicable.
ase.
PATHXRANA, J.—Basqmanichom v. Alfred
Application
for a Writ of Certiorari.
S. Sharvananda, with S. Mahenthiran, for the petitioner.
No appearance for the respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
September 25, 1972. Pathirana, J.—
This is an application made by the Petitioner who is thelandlord of an extent of paddy land for a Writ of Certiorari toquash the order made by 2nd Respondent the AssistantCortfenissioner of Agrarian Services, Anuradhapura, under thePaddy Lands Act, which held that the first respondent was thetenant cultivator of an extent of two acres out of the paddyland called “ Thimbirikaldawela Kadu” ten acres in extent andthat he be restored to the possession of the said extent of twoacres.
The petitioner’s case is that he and his wife Saraswathy arethe owners of this paddy field-in extent about 10 aeres and thatin' the-year 1956 he had leased this land to one S. Rajadurai andthat his lessee S. Rajadurai without cultivating the entire extentof 10 acres had let, out to the first respondent .two. acres,, to L.Ranasinghe who is the first respondent in. Application No. 542/72one-acre* and to J. G- Abilmu the first respondent in applicationSk- §43/72- three acres. The petitioner stated that he institutedin D. C. Anuradhapura No. 7500 an action against his lesseeS. Rajadurai and had him ejected from the entire field on13.tQ.1970. The first respondent notified the 2nd Respondent theAssistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services stating that hehad been evicted by the petitioner from the two acres (out ofan extent of 10 acres) which was leased to him by the saidS. Rajadurai and he asked for an inquiry and an order restoringhim to possession of the said land.
The petitioner stated at the inquiry before the secondrespondent that he opposed the application of the firstrespondent and urged that the second respondent had noauthority in law to proceed with the inquiry and/or make anorder contemplated by section 4 (1A) of the Paddy Lands Actagainst the petitioner. The second respondent by the order datedi3.12.1'971 had held that the first respondent was entitled to havethe use and occupation of the two acres of paddy which he hadcultivated under the- lessee S. Rajadurai and ordered, that, hebe restored to possession of these two acres under Section 4 (1 A)of the Paddy Lands Act. Under Section 4 (1C) where there is
237
rAXHJKANA. J.—fiasamanickam v. Alfred
no appeal from such an order such decision shall be final andconclusive and shall not be called in question in any legalproceedings in any Court. I agree with learned counsel for thepetitioner that for an order to have the final and conclusive effectwhich shall not be called in question in any court of law, suchorder must be made by an authority within the provisions of thelaw and. not outside its jurisdiction. The petitioner thereafterappealed against this order to the Board of Review constitutedunder the Paddy Lands Act. By order dated 16.8.1972 the Boardof Review dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. Under the PaddyLands Act the decision made by the Board of Review on suchan appeal “ shall be final and, conclusive and shall not bequestioned in 'any legal proceedings ”.
The petitioner’s case, however,.is that the second respondenthad no jurisdiction to make that order under the Paddy LandsAct, in that he! had exceeded his powers in granting relief underSection 4 (1A) to the first respondent, to the prejudice of thepetitioner. His position is that the first respondent is not a tenantcultivator within the meaning of the Paddy Lands Act under thepetitioner. The main reason urged' is that there was no legalnexus or* contractual relationship between the petitioner andthe first respondent and the petitioner was not the landlord ofthe first respondent in terms of Section 4(1A) of the Act andtherefore cannot be bound by the order made under the Act asthe petitioner had not let the paddy .field to the first respondent.The petitioner further contends, that having terminated the leasegranted by him to S. Rajadurai he is not bound by the sublettingby Rajadurai of'the two acres of paddy land to the firstrespondent and to the other tenant cultivators in applicationNos. 542/72 and 543/72. The petitioner, therefore, states that thesecond-respondent did not have the jurisdiction to proceed underand .make ah order against the petitioner under Section 4 (1A)of the Paddy Lands Act and therefore the entire proceedingsare a nullity.
The first respondent’had stated at the inquiry before thesecond respondent that he-was the tenant cultivator of the lesseefrom the year 1957 and that after the petitionerhad obtained judgment against his lessee S. Rajadurai andevicted him he was not allowed to cultivate the said paddy field.
P. M. Gamage, Honorary Secretary of the CultivationCommittee has said that the names of the first respondent andthe other tenant -cultivators in the applications Nos. 452/72 and453/72 appear in every register kept by him in the field registersas tenant cultivators.
2"8PATH IRAN A, .T.—Rasaman i'-lca m v. Alfred
I am of the view that the second respondent had jurisdictionto inquire into the application made by the first respondentagainst the petitioner in which he alleged that he had beenevicted by the petitioner and therefore sought an order torestore him to possession of the paddy land. The first respondent’scase comes v/ithin Section 4 (2) of the Paddy Lands Act whichstates as follows : —
‘‘ (2 ) Where a person (hereafter in this subsection referredto as the lessor) lets any extent of paddy land to any otherperson (hereafter in this subsection referred to as the lessee)and the lessee does not become the tenant cultivator of suchextent by reason of the fact that he is not the cultivatorthereof, then if the lessee lets such extent to any person(hereafter in this subsection referred to as the subtenant) andthe subtenant becomes the tenant cultivator of such extentby reason of his being the cultivator thereof, the subtenant’srights as tenant cultivator of such extent shall not be affectedin any manner by the termination of the lease granted by thelessor to the lessee.”
Uncjer this section where the lessee lets an extent of paddyland to any person, such person who is described as a subtenantbecomes the tenant cultivator of such an extent by reason of hisbeing the cultivator thereof. The fact that the petitioner in thiscase had terminated the lease granted by him to his lesseeS. Rajadurai does not affect in any manner the first respondent’srights as tenant cultivator. Therefore by the operation of Section4 (2) the first respondent becomes the tenant cultivator of thetwo acres of the paddy land which he had cultivated. In myopinion there is no necessity under the circumstances of thiscase for there to be a contract between the petitioner and thefirst respondent in order to make the first respondent tenantcultivator in view of the provisions of Section 4 (2) of the Act.
The definition of “landlord” in Section 63 (1) of the PaddyLands Act reads as follows : —
“1 landlord ’ with reference to any extent of paddy land,means the person, other than an owner cultivator, who willfor the time being be entitled to the rent in respect of suchextent if it were let on rent to any person, and includes anytenant of such extent who lets it to any subtenant.”
A “ landlord ” in Section 63 (11 is not described as a personwho has a contractual relationship with the tenant cultivatorbut “ a person who will for the time being he entitled to rent
A, J.—Ecs?.nia7iic:;?7K r. Alfred231)
in respect of such extent if it were let on rent to any person
”. The petitioner in this case comes within the
definition of “ landlord ” in relation to the first respondent underthe definition of “landlord” in Section 63(1).
Counsel for the petitioner argued that only where the lesseelets the entire extent of the paddy land leased by him to asubtenant that the subtenant becomes the tenant cultivator and; that in this case as the lessee had let only two acres to the firstrespondent, the first respondent would not therefore become thetenant cultivator under Section 4 '(2). I am unable to agree withthis submission. The purpose of this Act is “ to provide securityof tenure to tenant cultivators ”. By giving this interpretationsuggested by counsel to Section 4(2) meaning and purposecannot be given to this statute in order to carry out its objects,namely, provide security of tenure to tenant cultivators. Thenarrow interpretation given by counsel would defeat the purposefor which this statute was enacted. In this context the observa-tions of Viscount Simon L. C. in the case of Nokes v. DoncasterAmalgamated Collieries Ltd.' 1940 Appeal Cases 1014 at 1022are relevant and useful : —
“ .. Judges are not called upon to apply their opinions ofsound policy so as to modify the plain meaning of statutorywords, but where, in construing general words the meaningof which is not entirely plain there are adequate reasons fordoubting whether the Legislature could have been intendingso wide an interpretation as would disregard fundamental" principles, then we may be justified in adopting a narrowerconstruction. At the same time, if the choice is between twointerpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achievethe manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid aconstruction which would reduce the legislation to futilityand should rather accept the bolder construction based on theview that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose ofbringing about an effective result. ”
The legislature in enacting Section 4 (2) would have beenaware that the large mass of peasants who form the vast majorityof tenant cultivators of this country do not have the expertiseor the material resources to cultivate large extents like 10 acresof paddy land but that invariably small extents or portions aregiven out to peasant tenant cultivators by owners or theirlessees for the purpose of cultivation. In my view the words“ suchextentinSection4(2) mean “ even a
portionof suchanextent ”.Ihold, that the second
1 19JO A.C. my i nt 1 (122.
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PATHIRANA, J.—itasamanickam v. Alfred
respondent had jurisdiction to inquire into this matter referredto by the first respondent under Section 4 (1A) of the PaddyLands Act
The petitioner is also not entitled to make this application fora writ of Certiorari in view of the provisions of the new Section22 of the Interpretation Ordiriance which has been introducedby the Interpretation Amendment Act No. 18 of 1972. The ordercomplained of ex facie is made within the powers conferred onthe second respondent the Assistant Commissioner of AgrarianServices under the provisions of the Paddy Lands Act.
We refused this application and the applications Nos. 542/72and 543/72 and I now deliver my reasons for the refusal of thoseapplications.
Rajaratnam, J.—I agree.
Application refused.