( 860 )
SAMARASINHA v. ALLIA MARKAR.
P.0., Kegalla, 84,418.
Loeal Board—Ordinance No. 18 of 1898—Prosecution for nuisance—Authorityto proieotde—Dried protons—"Fish ”—OrdinanceNo.16of 1888, ■
s. 1, sub-section 8.
(Section 98 of the OrdinanceNo. 18 of 1896doesnotmake the
direction of the Local Board acondition precedent fortheprosecution
of a person for committing a nuisance. It merelyauthorizesthe Board
to direct such prosecutions.
Dried prawns come within the meaning of the word " fish" in sub-section 8 of section 1 of Ordinance No. 16 of 1863.
HE Inspector of the Local Board of Kegalla complained thatthe accused, being a boutique-keeper, did expose for sale putrid
dry fish unfit for human consumption, in breach of sub-section 8of section 1 oi Ordinance No. 15 of 1862.
The Police Magistrate, Mr. Allan Beven, found the accusedguilty and sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 10.
The accused appealed.
H. A. Jayawardene, for appellant.—The prosecution is authorizedby the Chairman of the Board, but that authority is not sufficient.The Local Board itself must give the authority (Ordinance No. 3of 1898, sections 22, 98, and 107). The District Medical Officer,,who was called to give evidence as to the unfitness of the prawnsexposed for sale for human consumption, was not appointed asthe Sanitary Officer of the Board. He had, therefore, no powerto condemn any food. The food condemned by the Ordinance bySub-section 8 of section 1 seems to be dry fish and not fresh fish.Here fresh prawns were sold.
Rimanathan, 8.-0., for respondent.
16th January, 1903. Wbhdt, J.—
Two points have been raised upon this appeal. The first is,that no prosecution for the offence in question could be maintainedwithout the sanction of the Local Board, and section 98 ofOrdinance No. 13 of 1898 was relied upon. It is sufficient to saythat that section does not make the direction of' the Board acondition precedent, but merely authorizes the Board to directany prosecution for any nuisance or proceedings to recover apenalty, and to pay the expenses consequent upon such proceedings.
( 861 )
The next point was, that the article exposed by the accused for 1903.sale was not “ fish ” within the meaning of seotion 1, sub-section JanwtrV8, of the Nuisances Ordinance of 1862. The article in question Wend®, p.j.was a quantity of dried prawns. It is not. contended that theprawns when fresh were not “ fish,” but it is submitted that whenthey became ” dry fish,” they ceased to be fish at all. I cannotassent to this argument. Apart from any general question as tothe meaning of the word fish, or as to its meaning in any otherenactment, it is dear to my mind that in the present instancethe word is used in its largest sense as indicating (like the otherterms used, poultry, game, flesh, fruit, and vegetable) one of thebroad classes into which the food of man is divisible.
I have no doubt that dried prawns come within the words; asthey certainly do within the spirit, of sub-section 8.
I therefore dismiss the appeal.
SAMARASINHA v. ALLIA MARKAR