096-NLR-NLR-V-28-SANTHANATCHY-v.-CHELLIAH.pdf
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Present: Garvin J.
8ANTHANATCHY r. CHELLIAH.
760—P. C. Colombo, 0,169.
Maintenance—liaising of age limit—A mending Ordinance—(ictrespectiveeffect—Ordinance Aro. 8 of lS89t s. 8.
The amendment to section 8 of the Maintenance Ordinance whichraises to sixteen the age limit, up to which an order for the main-tenance of a child extends, applies to orders in 'force at the time atwhich ihe amending Ordinance came into operation.
^PPEAL from an order of the Police Magistrate of Colombo.
H. V. Perem, for appellant.
James Joseph, for respondent.
May 6, 1927. Gaiivix J.—
On July 19, 1918, an order was made under the provisions of theMaintenance Ordinance, No. 2 of 1889, directing the appellant topay. a sum of Ks. 20 monthly for the maintenance of his illegitimatechild. No direction was given in the order for the continuance ofthe payments after the date when under the law the order ceases tobe of force. Section 8 of the Ordinance as it- appeared in the Statutebook at the date when this order was made declared that no orderfor maintenance of any illegitimate child …. shall, exceptfor the purpose of recovering money previously due under such order,be of any force or validity after the child in respect of whom it wasmade has attained the age of fourteen years …
In this case the child attained the age of fourteen yearson September 9, 1926.
By am amending Ordinance, No. 18 of 1925, which! came intooperation on October 27, 1925, the word sixteen was substituted forthe word fourteen in section 8, the material part of which now reads** after the child in respect of whom it was made has attained theage of sixteen years."
The question for decision is whether the order of July 19, 1918,expired on September 9, 1926, when the child in respect of whom itwas made attained the age of fourteen years, or whether it continuesin force for two years longer.
In making this alteration in the law, the Legislature adopted themethod of substituting the word ** sixteen ” for the word 44 fourteenin section 8 of the existing Ordinance. Save for this and theaddition of two words in the proviso to section 8, the Ordinance hasnot been altered.
( 470 )
1927*
Gabvin J.
Santhanatcly
v.
Ohelliak
The effect of this substitution is to repeal the limit to the durationof the order imported by the word “ fourteen M and to extend it tillthe illegitimate child for whose benefit it was made attains the ageof sixteen.
Now by section 3 of the Ordinance a Police Magistrate it-empowered to order a person to make a monthly allowance for themaintenance of his illegitimate child. Section 7 prescribes theperiod within which an application for maintenance of an illegiti-mate child should be made.
An order for maintenance is ordinarily made without any limitas to time. Section 8 gives the time of cessation, which prior to tht_alteration of the law was when the child attained the age of fourteen.
The limit is set by the Legislature, which has since altered the limitand declares that the force and validity of such an order shall nowcease when the child for whose benefit the order was made attain*the age of sixteen years.
The order under consideration was valid and in force when theamending Ordinance came into operation. How long is such. arorder to remain in force ? The old law which declared that it shallcease to' be of any force or validity when the child in respect of whichit'was made attains the age of fourteen has been repealed. Theorder is therefore still in force, and will continue in force up to thetime fixed for its cessation by the amending Ordinance, f.e., whenthe child attains the 'age of sixteen.
It is urged that the amending Ordinance does not affect order*made prior to that Ordinance, and that those orders must he heldto cease–to be of force in accordance with the law as it stood beforethe amendment. This is an instance of repeal by substitution.The liability to pay a monthly allowance is enforced by the oper-and that order continues in force until the law says it shall cease tobe 6£ fdree. The provision which fixed the time for the cessationof such orders has been repealed and is no longer in existence, butthe order was in force at the time of the repeal. There was thereforean order binding on the appellant without a time limit save thatwhich is contained in the substituted provision.
The terms of the section which the Legislature lias amended, andthe manner in which that amendment was effected, indicates itsintention to affect all orders for maintenance in force at the time.What-I think the Legislature intended to do, and what it has done,is to declare generally with reference to all orders of maintenance inforce at the time that they shall thereafter cease to be in force at thetime specified in the amendment, and not at the time specified in theprovision which it displaced.
The appeal is dismisse
A'pyeal dismissed.