006-NLR-NLR-V-53-STANDERD-VACUUM-OIL-COMPANY-Appellant-and-JAYASURIYA-Respondent.pdf
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GUNASEKABA J.—Standard-Vacuum Oil Company r. Jaijasuriya
1951Present: Gratiaen J. and Gunasekara J.STANDARD-VACUUM OIL COMPANY, Appellant, amiJAYASURIYA, Respondent
S. C. 272—D. C. Colombo, 21,562 M
Kent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948—Sections 2 (5) and 27—Distinction between" business premises " and “ residential premises ”—“ Excepted premises ”.
Where certain premises situated in the Municipality of Colombo were occupiedwholly or mainly for the purposes of a Company's business, but at the sametime mainly for the purposes of residence for the Company’s Manager wholived there -with his wife—
Held, that the premises were “ residential premises ” within the meaning ofsection 27 of the Bent Bestriction Act. As the annual value of the premisesexceeded Bs. 2,000 they were “ excepted premises ” within the meaning ofsection 2 (5) read with paragraph 2 of the Schedule of the Act.
^^PPEALi from a judgment of the District Court, Colombo.
H. V. Perera, K.C., with J. R. V. Ferdinands and E. La Brooy, for thedefendant appellant.
E. B. Wickramanayake, K.C., with A. M. Charavanamuttu, for theplaintiff-respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
September 20, 1951. Gunasekara J.—
This is an appeal against a decree for damages and for ejectment of thedefendant appellant from certain premises as an overholding tenant.The only question for decision is whether the premises, consisting ofa house standing on 2£ roods of land in Horton Place, Colombo, were“ excepted premises ” within the meaning of section 2 (5) of the RentRestriction Act, No. 29 of 1948, as the plaintiff respondent claims theywere. Apparently what now turns on that question is whether the costsshould be paid by the plaintiff or the defendant ; for we were informedat the argument that the defendant had yielded up possession of the pre-mises to the plaintiff and paid her an amount equivalent to the amountdecreed as damages.
It is common ground that the annual value of the premises exceededRs. 2,000 and did not exceed Rs. 6,000. Therefore, in terms of section2 (5)-of the Act read with paragraph 2 of the Schedule, they were excepteduremises if they were “residential premises ” but not if they were“ business premises Section 27 defines residential premises as “ anypremises for the time being occupied wholly or mainly for the purposesof residence ”, and business' premises as “ any premises other thanresidential premises ”. The question thus resolves itself into a questionas to whether the premises were “ residential premises ”.
GUUASEKARA J.—Standard- Vacuum Oil Company v. Jayasuriya
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The defendant appellant is a limited Company. The premises wereused by it as a residence for its manager, who lived there with his wife.According to the case for the appellant Company the premises werefurnished as a residence and provided with a staff of domestic servants,all at its expense, and the Company also paid the electricity and telephonebills ; two motor cars belonging to the Company were garaged there,one of which was intended for the manager’s use and both of which wereused -by him on the Company's business ; the manager was required toentertain from time to time, as the Company’s guests, various personswith whom it had business, and he would entertain in this way, possiblytwice a month, about 15 to 60 persons at a time ; he was also required toaccommodate in these premises, as the Company’s guests, visitingexecutives from overseas, find he would put up such visitors on about 15occasions in the course of a year; the house was also used for business con-ferences held after office hours, for receiving telephone messages or tele-grams relating to the Company’s business that were received after officehours, and for the custody of the Company’s confidential papers, whichwere stored in the cupboard of a writing table.
The learned District Judge holds that the business that is transacted inthe premises “ is the sort of business any business man would conduct inhis house after business hours ” ; and that " it appears to be quite evidentthat although certain business transactions are effected in the premisesit is used mainly for the residence of the manager and his wife and onsome occasions for the residence of guests of the Company.” I do notthink there can be any doubt that this is the correct view of the use towhich the premises were put. It is contended for the appellant Company,however, that it was for the purposes of the Company’s business thatthey were used in this way, and that- the purpose that is material to thepresent question is the purpose for which the Company occupied thepremises through its manager who resided there. The manager was pro-vided with a residence, it is argued, for the purposes of the Company’sbusiness, and the premises being thus occupied by the Company wholly ormainly for .the purposes of its business were “ business premises ”.
1 shall assume that the occupation that is contemplated in the definitionof “residential premises” in section 27 is not limited to actual personaloccupation and also that the purpose .that is material is the tenant'spurpose. I agree with Mr. Perera’s contention that in this view of thematter the premises were occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes ofthe Company’s business. That circumstance, however, cannot concludethe question. Although by definition “ business premises ” and “ resi-dential premises ” exclude each other, “ purposes of business ” and“ purposes of residence ” do not ; and in a given case the one maywell include the other, as for example in the case of a tenant who takes inpaying guests. The premises were occupied wholly or mainly for thepurposes of the Company’s business by their being occupied mainly forthe purposes of residence; just as other premises may have been occupiedfor the purposes of the Company’s business by their being occupied for thestorage or the sale of petrol or for the purposes of office accommodation,as the case may be. The fact that in each of these cases the premises
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GUXASEKABA J.—Standard-Vacuum Oil Company o. Jayasuriya
■were occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes of the Company’sbusiness can make no difference to the fact that they were occupied moreparticularly for the purposes of residence or of storage or sale of petrolor for the purposes of an office. In the present case the premises inquestion were occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes of the Company’sbusiness, but at the same time mainly for the purposes of residence.Being occupied mainly for the purposes of residence they were “ residen-tial premises The Act does not provide that premises occupiedwholly or mainly for the purposes of business are ‘‘business premises
1 would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Gziatiaex J.—I agree.
A n nonl /J m c