MAARTENSZ J.—Storer v. Sinthamany Chettiar.
1938Present: Maartensz and Keuneman JJ.
STORER v. SINTHAMANY CHETTIAR.
277—D. C. Negombo, 10,023.
Promissory note—Payable at Negombo—No particular place specified—Pre-sentment for payment—Sills of Exchange Ordinance, No. 25 of 1927, s.88 (1).
Where a promissory note made at Chilaw, where the maker- wasresident, was made payable at Negombo,—
Held, that presentment for payment was not necessary to render themaker liable as the place of payment had not been sufficiently specifiedin the note.
^^PPEAL from a judgment of the District Judge of Negombo.
E. Chitty, for defendant, appellant.
N. Nadarajah (with him E. B. Wikramanayake), for plaintiff, respond-ent.„
March 17, 1938. Maabtensz J.—
THIS is an action to recover from the executrix de son tort of his estatethe amounts due on two promissory notes made at Negombo by the lateMr. E. C. S. Storer and which purport to be payable at Negombo.
The defendant appeals from the judgment which was entered against
* 46 M. L. J. 341 : 19 L. W. 367.
t 92 I. G. 520 : A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 540.
MAARTENSZ J.—Storer v. Sinthamany Chettiar.
The defendant is resident and the estate of the late Mr. Storer is situatedoutside the jurisdiction of the District Court of Negombo. The firstcontention in appeal was that the District Court of Negombo had nojurisdiction to entertain the action. It was argued that when an executrixde son tort is sued, the cause of action is the fact of intermeddling andnothing else. This argument was not supported by authority and is inmy opinion unsound. Intermeddling renders the intermeddler liabile topay the debts of the deceased. The cause of action of a creditor is thenon-payment of his debt and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertainthe action to recover it must be determined by the provisions of section 9of the Civil Procedure Code.
The second and final contention was that the defendant was not liableon the notes as they were not presented for payment at the place at whichthey were payable as required by section 88 (1) of the Bills of ExchangeOrdinance No. 25 of 1927.
Section 88 (1) enacts as follows:“ Where a promissory note is in the
body of it made payable at a particular -place, it must be presented forpayment at that place in order to render the maker liable. In any othercase, presentment for payment is amt necessary in order to render themaker liable ”,
The two notes sued on are printed forms with the blank spaces appro-priately filled up. The relevant portions read as follows : —
“Negombo, ( date ).
On demand …. the undersigned E. C. S. Storer, Proctor ofChilaw, promise to pay to (names of payees) or to any of them or on theorder of them or any of them at Negombo, the sum of . .' . . ”
The notes are signed :“ E. C. S. Storer ”.
The District Judge found that the maker was a Proctor residing inChilaw with no interests or business in Negombo, and that Negombobeing a fairly large town, “ the absence of a particular home or office atwhich payment is to be made makes it impossible for the plaintiff topresent the notes for payment at Negombo” unless Mr. Storer was metin Negombo either “ casually ” or “ by arrangement ”.
He went on to hold that no place of payment is mentioned in the notesso as to make presentation for payment imperative. The appellant’sCounsel contended that “ Negombo ” was a sufficiently specific descriptionof the place of payment to make the notes payable at a particular placeand presentment for payment imperative. In support of his argumenthe cited the case of Hardy v. Woodroofe
The note sued on in that case was “ Payable at Guildford ” where themaker had no residence. The note was presented at two banks and thentreated as dishonoured. This was held to be a sufficient presentment.I do not think this case is of assistance to the appellant as the questionwhether “ Guildford ” was sufficiently specific to make the note payableat a particular place was not raised or decided.
The question as to what degree of particularity is necessary to make anote payable at a particular place does not appear to have been raised ordecided in any case, and we have to decide whether “ Negombo ” is a
»■ (1818) 2 Stark 319.
KOCH J.—Carolis v. Commissioner of Stamps.
sufficiently specific description of the place of payment by first impression,1 do not t.hirilc a general rule can be laid down, for in my opinion theanswer to the question whether such a description is sufficiently specificmust depend on the circumstances of each case. Where the place atwhich a note is payable is not specific, but there are circumstances toshow where in that place payment is to be made, then the note should bepresented for payment at the place indicated by the circumstances.
Thus, if a note payable at Negombo is made by a person who lives orhas a place of business in Negombo, or it can be gathered from the courseof business carried on between the maker and the payee where present-ment for payment should be made, Negombo would, in my opinion, be asufficiently specific description of the place where the note is payable torender presentment for payment imperative. But where, as in this case,there are no circumstances from which the place where payment is to bemade in Negombo can be gathered—and it does not even appear whetherby “ Negombo ” is meant the town or district—the notes, in my judgment,are not made payable at a “ particular ” place, and presentment forpayment is not necessary to render the maker liable.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Keuneman J.—I agree.Appeal dismissed.
STORER v. SINTHAMANY CHETTIAR