Subramaniam v. Liyanaye
1971Present: Wijayatilake, J.
T.SUBJRAMANTAM, Appellant, and R, U. L1YANAGE (S. X. Police),
•S'. C. GO 170—M. C. Point Pedro, 2770
.Motor Traffic Act (Cap. 203)—Bnil's oj the road— Breach of s. US (10)—Barden ojproof.
In n prosecution for broach of section 14S (10) of tho Motor Traffic Act (lieburden is on the complainant to establish that, at tho area of intersection,traffic was not regulated by a police officer or by means of (raffle signals or bynotices under section J50.
PPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Point Pedro,i?. V ivagananthan, for the accused.-appellant.
iTi tanka Wickrapmsinghe, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
VIJAYATI-LAKE, J.—Subramaniam v. Liyanagc
February 3, 1971. Wijayatilake, J.—
This appeal raises a very important question in regard to the burden ofproof on a charge of negligent driving read with Section 14S (10) of theMotor Traffic Act. Learned counsel for the appellant draws my attentionto the judgment of Sinnetamby, J. in Daniel v. Lewis 1 where he heldthat in a prosecution for breach of Section 150 (10), Motor Traffic Act14 of 1951 now 14S (10), of the present Motor Traffic Act—Chapter 203—the burden is on the complainant to establish that, at the area ofintersection, traffic was not regulated bj- a police officer or by means oftraffic signals or by notices under section 152 (present section 150).He took the view that these ingredients do not amount to a proviso orexception and they only constitute a conditional clause.
Mr. Vivagananthan submits that the prosecution has failed to callthis evidence and therefore the conviction cannot stand. It is clearfrom a perusal of the reasons of the learned Magistrate that he has foundthe accused guilty of negligent driving on the basis of Section 14S (10).In fact, he proceeds to state that neither of the roads is a main road andit is quite clear that the accused had no right of way and that the accusedshould have stopped his vehicle. Counsel further submits that the chargesare misleading as they appear to relate to offences under the PenalCode.
Learned Crown Counsel submits that although Section 14S is referredto in the charge there are several other items in the charge under whichthe accused could have been convicted. Be that as it may, it is quiteevident that the conviction is based on Section 14S (10). In view ofthe judgment of Sinnetamby, J. and the cases relied on by him Nair v.Saundias 2 and Sanitary Inspector, Miriganm v. Thangamani Nadar 3with which I agree, I set aside the conviction and send the case for atrial de novo before another Magistrate on fresh charges if so advised.
Conviction set aside.
J (1936) 37 A L. It. 439.
(1933) 33 iV. L. It. 302.
1 (1039) 61 A’. L. It. 137.
T. SUBRAMANIAM, Appellant, and R. U. LIYANAGE (S. I. Police), Respondent