015-NLR-NLR-V-64-THE-CEYLON-WORKERS-CONGRESS-on-behalf-of-K.-Ramasamy’s-wife-Appellant-and-T.pdf
TAMBIAH, J.—The Ceylon Workers' Congress v.
The Superintendent, Kallebokka Estate
95
1962Present: Tambiah, J.
THE CEYLON WORKERS’ CONGRESS (on behalf of K. Ramasaray’swife), Appellant, and THE SUPERINTENDENT, KALLEBOKKA
ESTATE, Respondent
S. C. 4/1961—Labour Tribunal, 2362
Estate Labour (Indian) Ordinance {Cap. 133 of Legislative Enactments, I960 Edn.)—Section 23 {1)—Meaning and effect of the term “ quit
Where a labourer’s services have been terminated against his wish, section23 (1) of tho Estato Eabour (Indian) Ordinance doos not ipso facto confor aright on the employer to terminate tho services of the labourer’s spouse.
Appeal from an order of a Labour Tribunal.
Colvin R. de Silva, with S. C. Crossette-Thambiah, for the appellant.
H. V. Perera, Q.Cwith L. Kadirgamar, for the employer-respondent.
Cur. adv. wit.
January 15, 1962. Tambiah, J.—
The appellant, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress, on behalf of one Rama-samy, made an application to the Labour Tribunal for his re-instatement.The President of the Labour Tribunal held that Ramasamy’s dismissalwas justifiable and dismissed his application. On an appeal by theappellant to this Court, I set aside the order of the President of tho LabourTribunal, who held that Ramasamy’s dismissal was justifiable, in S. C.No. 3/1961 /Labour Tribunal No. 23511., and I have directed anotherLabour Tribunal to hear the application of Ramasamy.
Having terminated the services of Ramasamy, the Superintendent ofKallebokke Estate, purporting to act under the provisions of the EstateLabour (Indian) Ordinance (Cap. 133 of the Revised Edition of theLegislative Enactments (1956 Ed.)) terminatedthe“services of Patchamma,the wife of Ramasamy. The appellant made an application to the LabourTribunal and prayed that Patchamma be re-instated. The Presidentof the Labour Tribunal made the following order :
For reasons set out above, I hold that the dismissal of Ramasamyis for justifiable reasons and the Union’s application is therefore dis-missed. So also is the application of the Union on behalf of Patchamma,whose services have been also terminated along with her husband's inaccordance with the provisions of the Estate Labour (Indian) Ordinance ”.
The appellant has appealed from the above order of the President of theLabour Tribunal. As I have set aside the order of the Labour Tribunal
1 {1962) 63 N. L. B. 536.
OGTAMBIAH, J.—The Ceylon Workers' Congress v.
The Superintendent, Kallebokka Estate
in S. C. No. 3/1961/Labour Tribunal No. 2351, this order has also to beset aside. It is unnecessary for me to send this matter before anotherLabour Tribunal for an inquiry as it could be decided on a question of law.
The counsel for the appellant contended that there is no evidence toshow that the Estate Labour (Indian) Ordinance (supra) applied to theappellant. Section 23 (1) of the said Ordinance runs as follows :—-
“ At the time when any labourer lawfully quits the service of anyemployer, it shall be the duty of that employer to issue to that labourera discharge certificate substantially in form II in Schedule B, and, .where at such time the spouse or a child of such labourer is also alabourer under a contract of service with that employer, it shall be theduty of the employer, subject as hereinafter provided, to determine 'such contract and to issue a like certificate to such spouse or child :Provided that where such spouse or child wishes to continue inservice under such contract and produces to the employer a jointstatement signed by both husband and wife to that effect, nothing intho preceding provisions of this subsection shall be deemed to requirethe employer to determine such contract or to issuo a discharge certi-ficate to such spouse or child. ”
The counsel for the appellant contended that the word “ quit ”, inthis context, moans voluntarily quitting tho services of an employer andthat this section cannot be applied to a case where a person’s serviceshave been terminated against his or her wish. The term “-quit”, in 1ordinary parlance, means to give up or hand over (vide the PocketOxford Dictionary (4th Edition) page 658) and the object of the aboveprovision is to force the hands of an employer to give a discharge certifi-cate to the spouse and children of a person who voluntarily and lawfullyquits the employer’s services. Without a discharge certificate, thatperson’s spouse and children could not be employed in other estates andit is of the utmost importance that they should obtain such certificatesin order to earn a livelihood. It was never the intention of the Legisla-ture to confer a right on an employer to terminate the services of a. personafter terminating the services of his or her spouse. The above provision,in my view, imposed a duty on the employer and does not confer a right.
The counsel for the respondent contended that the word “quit”,in this context, would cover the case of an employer terminating the ser-vices of a person’s spouse after terminating that person’s services.I cannot agree.
I hold that tho provisions of the Estate Labour (Indian)- Ordinance(supra) do not empower the Superintendent of Kallebokke Estate toterminate the services of Patchamma, in the circumstances of the case.I set aside the order of the President of the Labour Tribunal and ordertho re-instatement of Patchamma. The appellant would be entitled toposts fixed at Its. 105,
Order set aside,