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Jon. 17,1910 Present: The Hon. Mr. J. P. Middleton, Acting Chief Justice,
and Mr. Justice Wood Benton.
Thoroughfares Ordinance, No. 10 of 1861, s. 86—Building—Pandal.
A pandal or ordinary temporary decorative andjubilant erection
of poles and palm leaves is not’ a building within the meaning ofsection 86 of Ordinance No. 10 of 1861.
The “ ‘building” contemplated in the section is a building of apermanent character.
PPEAL against a judgment of the Police Magistrate of Ealutara(J. E. de Silva, Esq.).
The accused was charged with having erected a building (apandal) along a road without notice to the Chairman, District RoadCommittee. He was acquitted.
The Attorney-General appealed.
The case was first argued before Grenier J., who referred it .toa bench of two Judges.,
Van Langenberg, Acting S.-O., for the appellant.—This building is“ along ” the road; it is “ by the side of the road.” “ Along ” doesnot mean “ on ” (Chairman, D.R.C., v. Gurunnanse *). A ‘‘ pandal ”is a “ building.” Counsel also cited Corporation of Leicester v.Browne.*
F. de Silva (with him Cooray), for the respondent, not calledupon.,
January 17, 1910. Middleton A.C.J.—
This was an appeal by the Attorney-General as representing theChairman, of the District Road Committee of Ealutara against anacquittal of the defendant, on a charge ot having erected a buildingalong a thoroughfare without giving notice in writing to the Ghair-inan of the District Road Committee, contrary to the terms of .section 86 of Ordinance No. 10 of 1861. The case was referred toa Court of two Judges by my brother-Grenier. The building inquestion was not described in the evidence, but was admitted to bewhat is known as a pandal or ordinary temporary decorative andjubilant erection of poles and palm leaves.
The only point raised by the learned Solicitor-General was whetherthe Magistrate was right in holding that such an erection was not abuilding within the meaning of the section. There is no definition1 (1809) Cur. L R. 164.‘ 62 L. J. M. C. 22
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of the word “ building ” in the Ordinance, and that word has been Jon. 17,1910widely and ^differently construed by decisions under the Public MidduetonHealth Act in England (see Stroud’s Legal Dictionary, “ Building ”). A.C.J.
In the Corporation of Leicester v. Browne 1 justices were upheldin finding as a fact what in their opinion was a ” building ” undersection 3 of the Public Health Act, 188S.
In the present case our section 86 shows from its context, I think,that the building contemplated in the second line must be of apermanent character, as the learned Magistrate holds in his judgment.
The object of the section is to be found in the caption to section84, i.e., to enable the District Committee to prevent encroachments,latent or otherwise, or a permanent character upon thoroughfares,and to prohibit temporary erections on thoroughfares for thepurpose of building alongside them without giving due notice, andthe Ordinance not only applies to rural, but urban thorougfares.’
It is conceivable that a building might be erected in such a way onthe owner’s land alongside the public thoroughfare as to involvesome encroachment on the public toroughfare, especially in a town;and the first part of the section is, in my opinion, directed againstthis possibility.
I think the Magistrate was right in holding that the panda! inquestion was not a building within the meaning of .the section, andI would dismiss the appeal.
Wood Benton J.—
I am of the same opinion. The caption of the group of sectionsto which 86 belongs, the terms “ wall ” and fence, ” which areassociated with it, and the reference to encroachment in the latterpart of the section, all seem to me to point to the conclusion thatthe enactment in question is directed against encroachments andencroachments of a permanent character.
Appeal dismissed.
1 02 L. J. M.C.22