057-NLR-NLR-V-36-THE-GOVERNMENT-AGENT-,PROVINCE-OF-SABARAGAMUWA-v.-PEIRIS.pdf
DRIEBERG J.—The Govt. Agent, Province of Saharagamwwa v. Peries. 291
1934Present: Drieberg J.
THE GOVERNMENT AGENT, PROVINCE OFSABARAGAMUWA v. PERIES
95&—P. C. Ratnapura, 3,742
Motor car—Possession of motor car without licence—Proof of user not neces-sary—Ordinance No. 20 of 1927, ss. 2 (2) and 30 (J).
In a charge under section 30 (1) of possessing a motor car without alicence no proof is necessary of its user during the period when there wasno licence in force.
PPEAL from an acquittal by the Police Magistrate of Ratnapura.
Wickremanaydke, C.C., for complainant, appellant.December 17, 1934. Drieberg J.—
Cur. adv. vult.
The accused was charged with having possessed or used a motor car forwhich a motor car licence was not in force. This is an offence undersection 30 (1) of the Motor Car Ordinance, No. 20 of 1927. On June 21he pleaded not guilty and the trial was fixed for July 4. On the day oftrial the accused admitted that the car was registered in his name. Therewas some discussion regarding the application of some authority. It wasstated for the accused that the car was non-existent; the learned PoliceMagistrate said that without expressing an opinion on the matter dis-cussed he would call on the accused to lead evidence, and fixed thefurther hearing for July 23. On that day the accused said he would pleadguilty and that in the meantime he wanted to correspond with theRegistrar of Motor Cars. It was ordered that the case should be calledon August 29. On this day the Magistrate noted that in view of section2 (2) of the Ordinance he asked the Kachcheri Clerk, who was conductingthe prosecution for the complainant, the Government Agent of theProvince, whether he could prove that the car was being used on a high-way. The Kachcheri Clerk said that all he could do was to produce thecertificate of registration and prove that the registration had not beencancelled nor had notice of non-user been given. He relied apparentlyon the ruling in the case of The Government Agent, Central Province v.Beeman referred to at the argument on July 4. The learned Magistratethen made the order from which this appeal is taken. He held that thoughhe agreed with the prosecution that “ possess ” in section 30 (1) had tobe construed as equivalent to “ own ” and that, under section 25 theaccused was to be deemed the owner, and that so long as the registrationremained the accused could not be heard to say that the car was non-existent, he was of opinion that by reason of section 2 (2) of the Ordinancethe words “ motor car ” only applied to a car when on a highway and asthe prosecution could not prove that the car was on a highway at anytime during the current year, for which its licence was not renewed, hehad to acquit the accused.
* (1932) 88 N. L. B. 84$.
292 DRIEBERG J.—The Govt. Agent, Province of Sabaragamutoa v. Peries.
Section 2 (2), which influenced him to this conclusion, is as follows:—“Unless otherwise provided this Ordinance applies to a motor car onlywhen on a highway This section is not well worded. The Ordinancecontains provisions regulating the use of motor cars and also provisionsregarding cars in matters independent of and unconnected with use.Illustrations of the former are to be found in Chapter 7, which deals withrules regulating driving, and Chapter 8, which deals among other matterswith speed limits, and these may be made applicable by regulations tospecified areas other than highways, section 58 (1).
Matters unconnected with the use of cars are to be found, apart fromthe section under consideration, in section 18 (1) which makes it an offencefor a person to possess a car without being registered as the owner of it.Section 20 provides that once a car is registered the registered ownershould give information to the Registrar of any alteration in its weight,dimensions, character or seating accommodation which would affect theaccuracy of the description of it in the Register of Motor Cars. In thecase of change of possession provided for in section 22, the transferor mustwithin seven days surrender the car licence to the Registrar and informhim of the name and address of the new owner and the date of the changeof possession. Failure to comply with these requirements is an offence.
Section 30 (1) makes it an offence for a person to possess a motor carfor which a licence is not in force. It is also an offence for a person to usea car for which there is not a licence. In the case of use the person maynot have possession of the car—one person may be entitled to possessionand actually have possession of the car, but another may be using it.There may be possession without user, and user without possession.
In my opinion one must regard section 2 (2) in its reference to highwaysas dealing with so much of the Ordinance as regulates the use of cars:the words “ only when on a highway ” clearly suggest this.
The cases “ otherwise provided ” are those which though not expresslyexcluded • from the application of section 2 (2) are by their very natureoutside it—a. clear illustration of such a case is section 22 which placescertain obligations on a person who, for example, sells a car to another.There can be no relevancy to the offence or non-observance of this pro-vision where the car happens to be, whether on the road or in a garage.It is only when a provision connected with the use is concerned that the placeof user is a relevant matter, and section 2 (2) deals only with such cases.In section 30 (1) we have an instance of both subjects in the samesection. It is an offence for a person to possess a car for which no licenceis in force and this is not affected by the question of place of user orwhether it is used at all. If a person were to use an unlicensed car, in thepossession of another, his use would not be an offence unless it was on ahighway. This is reasonable for otherwise a man who drives an unlicensedcar of another from his garage to the porch of his house would be guilty ofan offence; the driver in such case cannot be said to be in possession ofthe car,, but he would come within the section if he took it on to a highway.
Similarly a person who drives a car recklessly or negligently on aprivate drive within his own premises cannot be brought within section 57
DALTON S.P.J.—Hooper v. John.
293
and (3) of the Ordinance, for it is not user on a highway, though hemay be liable under the Penal Code.
I have not lost sight of the requirement that this being a taxing Ordi-nance a strict construction is required, but it must be remembered thatthe registration and licensing of cars is one of the main objects, if not theprimary one, of the Ordinance, and where the effectiveness of it can besecured by a reasonable construction of section 2 (2), I would not, unlesscompelled to do so, adopt a view of that provision which reduces to nullitya great part of the Ordinance.
I hold, therefore, that the charge against the accused of possession ofthe car—section 30 (1)—does not require proof' of its user.^during theperiod when there was no licence in force.
I cannot regard the statement of the accused on July 23 as an unquali-fied plea of guilt. I therefore set aside the judgment of acquittal anddirect that there should be a new trial.
Set aside.