109-NLR-NLR-V-21-THE-KING-v.-AMAN.pdf
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[Foil Bench.]
Present : Bertram 0.J. and Ennis and De Sampayo JJ.
THE KING v. AMAN.
219—D. G. (Grim.) Badvlla 4,768.
Joinder ofcharges—Runningamuck—Stabbingtwo ' persons—Criminal
Procedure Code, s. ISO-
The accused, who was drank, had an altercation with A, andstabbed him. Then he rushed along a crowded street, and about30 yards off, seeing B, with whom he had an altercation the previousday, reminded him of the occurrence, and stabbed him also.
Held, that in the circumstances of this case the two acts were soconnected together as to form the same transaction under section180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and he could be properlytried on one indictment.
BbbtbamC.J.—“ Theword‘ transaction ’is sufficientlygeneral
to cover the case of a man who is reduced to a state of temporaryfrenzy by drunkenness or drags, and in pursuance of the conditionso generated runs along a street and commits a series of offences,sometimesinspired by onemotive andsometimes byanother,
against persons with whom he comes face to face. *‘
HI facts appear from the judgment.
A. St. 7. Jayawardene, for the appellant.
Garvin, S.-G. (with him Jansz, G.G.), for the Crown.
February 2, 1920. Bertram C.J.—
In this case the accused was prosecuted on an indictment includingtwo counts, one for causing hurt to Sena Abdul Cader, and theother for voluntarily causing hurt to Cader Meera Saibo. The twooffences were committed owing to the fact that the accused hadgot into a condition of violent drunkenness. .He had words with theman who is the subject of the second count, pulled out a knife andstabbed him. He then rushed on along the street, in which wereseveral boutiques, and about thirty yards from the place wherehe committed the. first offence he saw Sena Abdul Cader. 'He hadhad an altercation with him the previous day about some' rice.The accused reminded him of the occurrence, and stabbed him also.The two offences were committed in the same street, and the manwho was struck on the occasion of the second offence could see fromwhere he was standing the disturbance going on in which the first
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offence was committed. The accused has been convicted, and Mr.Jayawardene, arguing on his behalf on the appeal, has raised twoobjections to the indictment.
The first is that charges of grievous hurt and simple hurt cannotbe combined on an indictment under section 179 of the CriminalProcedure Code as offences of the same kind, inasmuch as they arenot offences punishable by the same amount of punishment underthe same section. He maintained that, on the authority of thePrivy Council case which he cited, any misjoinder of this naturewas necessarily fatal to the indictment, as being an illegality andnot an irregularity.
The second objection was that these two offences could not beconsidered as a series of acts so connected together as to form thesame transaction under section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code.It is not necessary for us to consider the first objection. Theprinciple involved must remain for determination 'at some futureoocasion. It is sufficient to say that in this case we are of opinionthat the acts were so connected together as to form the same trans-action under section 180. That being so, the indictment is justifiedby the terms of that section.
Mr. Jayawardene relied on a series of Indian cases. But, inmy opinion,, these cases, if closely examined, do not support hisargument,
The first case was of Queen Empress v. Pakira’pa and others.1What that case, in my opinion, laid down was this, that in determiningwhether a. series of acts ought to be considered part of the same trans-action, it is proper for the Court to take into account the effect ofsuch a course upon the fairness of the trial, and that it wouldbe straining the construction of the section to apply it to eventsseparated by distinct, that is to say, substantial intervals of timeand place. That case has obviously no application here.
The second case was The Emperor v. Sherufalli AlUbhoy.2 In thatcase certain elements were mentioned as constituting a transactionwithin the meaning of the section. They were (1) purpose, (2) causeand effect, and (3) principal and subsidiary acts. These are veryuseful examples of what constitutes a transaction. They indicateconnections between circumstances which do, in many cases, bringabout a transaction,. But they are certainly not intended to beexhaustive. There are other circumstances besides those enumeTrated which are sufficient to establish a transaction within themeaning of the section.
The next case was The Emperor v. Datto Hanmant Shahapurkar.3There it was said (page- 54) “ the word ‘ transaction ’ means‘ carrying through,’ and suggests, we think, not necessarily proxi-mity in time, so much as continuity of action and purpose,’’ and
1 (1890) IS Bom. 491.1 (1902) 27 Bom. 135.
2 (1905) 30 Bom. 49.
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the Court added, “ that the successive acts may be separated by aninterval ol time, and that the essential is a progressive action, allpointing to the same object. In section 239, therefore, a series ofacts separated by intervals of time are not, we think, excluded,provided that those jointly tried have throughout been directed toone and the same objective. ”
Here again, the Court is not making any exclusive definition.The particular category of circumstances it has in mind is that inwhich identity of purpose is relied upon as the connecting circum-stance constituting the transaction. What the Court said was thatif this is the class of case which is under consideration, it is not fatalto the circumstances being regarded as a transaction, that the actsreferred to are separated by intervals of time.
Finally, there is the important case of Gheragudi Vanakatadri v.Emperor.1 Here the previous cases are reviewed, and the law isvery clearly laid down. Benson J. says: “ I do not think that it isnecessary or advisable to attempt to define the expression ‘ the sametransaction, ’ which the Legislature has left undefined. Whether anyseries of acts is so connected or not must necessarily depend on theexact facts of each case, but these are so varied in character that itis impossible to provide a completely accurate definition. ” AbdurRahim J. in the same case said: “ Now what is the nature of theconnection contemplated between different acts which would bindthem into the ‘ same transaction ’ The idea conveyed by thewords “ same transaction ” seems to be obvious enough, and it maybe doubted whether it can be compendiously expressed “ in simplerand clearer language. ” The learned District Judge indicates thatproximity of time and unity of place might in a given case furnishgood evidence of the connection which unites several acts into onetransaction. These words are very applicable to the present case.It is true that he went on to add certain words on which Mr. Jaya-wardene relies, namely “community of purpose or design andcontinuity of action are essential elements- of the connectionnecessary to link together different acts into one and the sametransaction. ” That sentence has been embodied in the headnote.But the headnote is clearly misleading. The learned Judge isusing these words in a particular context. He is using them withreference to a particular class of cases, namely, that class of casesin which community of purpose is relied upon in order to establishthe connection. What he means is that where the prosecution reliesupon community of purpose or design, they must also showcontinuity of action as well.
There is a further case, Amrita Lai Hazre and others v. Emperor 2where Mookerji J. lays down the same principle in much the samewords as were used in the case last cited. “ -It is not possible toframe a comprehensive formula of universal application to determine
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1 {1900) 33 Mad. 502.
{1915) 42 Cat. 957.
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whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. ” Thoughhe indicates certain considerations as bearing on the subject, hedoes not suggest that these considerations are exhaustive.
The real truth is that in all cases that question is a question offact. The word “ transaction ” is defined in the Imperial Dictionary(which seems very closely to follow the definition in Webster) as“ that which is done or takes place, an affair.” Had the expressionin dur section been ‘ ‘ a series of acts so connected together as to formthe same affair ” there would have been no question as to the mean-ing. The word “ transaction ” does not necessarily mean somethingwhich takes place between parties. That is explained in the caseof Drinecqbier v. Wood,1 where Byrne J., in interpreting a similarphrase under the English rules of procedure, instances the case ofa traction engine proceeding along a highway and causing damageto a terrace of several houses. He says:" In the illustration
suggested by the illegal use of a traction engine passing in front ofthem, each owner would have to prove his title to his house, but theother questions of fact and law would be common to all the owners,and I have no doubt that they could all sue in one action.”
The word “ transaction ” in my opinion, is sufficiently generalto cover the case of a man who is reduced to a state of temporaryfrenzy by drunkenness or drugs, and in pursuance of the conditionso generated runs along a street and commits a series of offences,sometimes inspired by one motive and sometimes by another,against persons with whom he comes face to face. In my opinionthe objection to the indictment fails.
With regard to the sentence, the learned District Judge hasimposed a sentence of lashes. The offender is a person who has beenguilty of no previous lapse of this kind. He is a conductor, who -had been reduced to this condition by getting violently drunk on afestal occasion. His offence is a serious one, and might have hadtragic consequences. I do not think, however, that this case callsfor lashes. In my opinion the case is sufficiently met by the sentenceof two years’ rigorous imprisonment which the learned Judge has
Ennis J.—I agree.
De Sampayo J.—I agree.
Sentence varied. *
* (1899) 1 Oh. Div. 391.