089-NLR-NLR-V-28-THE-KING-v.-CAROLIS.pdf
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1987.
Present ; Drieberg A.J.
THE KING v. CAROLIS.4—D. C. (Grim.) Negombo, 3,789.
False charge—Complaint of a non-cognizable offence to the Police—Meaning of words—Penal Code, s. 208.
A person who makes a false complaint of a non-cognizable offenceto the Police may l>e said to charge another falsely within themeaning of section 208 of the Penal Code. „
The words “ falsely charge ” must he understood in the ordinarymeaning of a false accusation made lo any authority, bound by lawto investigate or to take any steps in regard to it, each as givinginformation of it to superior authorities with a view to investigation.
A
PPEAL from a conviction by the District Judge of Negombo.
The appellant, a Police Headman, was convicted under
section 208 of the Penal Code with having falsely, and with intentto injure, charged a woman called Karonona, with having caused amiscarriage. It was contended that the evidence, even if accepted,did not justify a conviction under section 208, as the appellant insending up a written report to the Police was acting under section 22of the Criminal Procedure Code, and, further as the offence allegedagainst the woman was one under section 303 of the Penal Code andnon-cognizable, the Police had no power of investigation without an.order from the Police Magistrate undoc section 129 of the CriminalProcedure Code.
H. V. Pcrcra (with Sri Nissanka), for accused, appellant.
J..E. M. Obeysekcre, G.C., .for the Crown.
April 27, 1927. Drikberg A.J—
The appellant has been convicted of an offence punishable undersection 208 of the Penal, Code, viz., of having falsely and withintention to injure charged Karonona with having caused a mis-carriage.
The appellant, who is the Police Headman of Godigomuwa, wassentenced to pay a fine of Us. 700, in default four months' rigorousimprisonment. If the fine was paid, Rs. 250 was to be given’ toKaronona.
I see no reason to differ from the learned District Judge on hisfinding of fact in^this case. It has been clearly proved that theaction of the appellant was prompted by malevolence, and that he
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had no belief in the charge he made and cannot claim to have actedbona fide. It is more than likely that Juan and Puran had more todo with this than they admit. The appellant in his report to thePolice does not mention them as his informants, and it is significantthat the appellant did not get their signatures to the complaint theyare said to have made to him. It seems to me that this was a care-fully designed scheme by which the Headman desired to injure thefamily of Karonona while keeping himself and his alleged informatssafe, so he thought, from any responsibility for the institution ofsuch proceedings as should follow. The Headman could exculpatehimself by saying he acted on information, while Juan and Puran(the informants) could deny that they gave the information.
If Juan and Puran play the part in it which I think they did,it in no way affects the finding of the learned District Judge, but ifanything makes the appellant’s conduct worse.
Mr. Perera, for the appellant, contended that the evidence ifaccepted did not justify a conviction under section 208. He sub-mitted that the essence of the offence was that it should be a chargein the sense of an accusation; that the term “charge” could not beapplied to a case like this, where the Appellant in sending up a writtenreport to the Police did no more than he was bound to do undersection 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and, further, that theoffence which was alleged against Karonona was one under section303 of the Penal Code, and being non-cognizable the Police had nopower of investigation without an order from a Police Magistrateunder section 129 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The complaint itself of the offence being false to the knowledge ofthe writer, it becomes then merely a question whether the offence isone under section 208 or section 180 of the Penal Code.
Section 208 deals with two things: first the institution of the criminalproceedings, and second, a charge. .
As regards the first there can be no doubt; examples of this areafforded by a complaint direct to a Police- Magistrate who hasjurisdiction, or a complaint to the Police of the commission of acognizable offence.'
But the object of the section was to make it punishable if a personset the Criminal law in motion against another in certain circum-stances, and the Criminal law may be set in motion otherwise .thanby -this direct action. The distinction between the two expressions“institute proceedings” and “charge” is well explained in the caseof Karim Buksh v. Queen Empress,1 where it has been pointed-outthat a charge to the Police of a non-cognizable offence or a complaintto a Judge of a Civil Court or to Publip Officers of other kinds in orderto obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge within themeaning^of this section though it could not be described as theinstitution of criminal proceedings.
OSUXl* 17 Gal. 574.
1927.
Dubbed*
A.J.
The Kingv. Garotie
1987.
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The words ‘‘ false charge ” in the section must not be interpreted
Drxebkih* in any restricted or technical sense, but must be understood in itsA'J' ordinary meaning of a false accusation made to any authority boundThe Khtff by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, suchv. Varolia ns giving information of it to superior authorities with a view toinvestigation for other proceedings and so setting the Criminal law-in motion. (Sessions Judge of Tinnevelly Division v, §ivan Chetty.1)
I was referred to the case of Chcdi v. King Emperor 2, the report ofthis case is not available, but from the note of it in Sanjiva Row's AllIndia Digest 1836-1915, Vol. 11., 359S, it would appear that thecomplaint was one made to a Collector of certain persons enteringthe house of the writer and forcibly inoculating his wife and children. .It does not appear that the position of the Collector was in any waysimilar to that of the Police when they receive information of anon-cognizable offence.
It is difficult to see how a person who makes complaint of a non-cognizable offence to the Police cannot be said to set the Criminallaw in motion.. Cases may,’ no doubt, occur where a complaint maybe made to a person in authority, but where it cannot be said thatsuch action amounted to setting the Criminal law in motion. Inthe matter of the Petition of Jamoona (The Empress v. Jamoona*),a complaint was made to the adjutant of a regiment falsely charginga non-commissioned officer with rape. It was held that the offencewas not one punishable under section 211, which corresponds tosection 208 of the Ceylon Penal Code, for the reason that the StationStaff Officer had neither magisterial nor police power.
1 may now deal with the argument that the appellant was actingunder a statutory duty in reporting the matter to the Police, andthat any responsibility for further proceedings rested with the police.There are many cases in which this would be a good defence. But-the real test appears to be the intention of the person making thereport; did hef act with the (intention and object of setting theCriminal law in motion against the person against whom the falsecharge was preferred? (Rayenhutti v. The Emperor. 4)
If there is no intention to set the Criminal law in motion, a fakecharge may fall within section 180 of the Penal Code.
In tfre present case the appellant sent in a statement of an offencewhich was a pure invention of his. He was a Headman, he knew theconsequences which would follow on his action, and 1 must presumethat he knew that he M as .setting the Criminal law in motion againstIvaronona.
T dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
{1881) 6 Cal €20.
26 Mad. 640.
* 32 I. L. R. Mad. 25S.*7 A.L. J. 61S.